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ABSTRACT 
 
During the past decade, a significant change in use of force norms took place within the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  The United Nations (UN) is founded on a 
collective security agreement, which gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of 
force to protect UN member-states.  The UN Charter explicitly provides the UNSC with a 
mandate to keep peace between states, not within them.  In 2006, however, the UNSC 
unanimously adopted the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine, which expanded 
what I call the UNSC’s circle of protection to include “human protection.”  Further, in 
exceptional circumstances, R2P gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force 
in a country without the consent of its government.  Many UNSC members initially 
resisted institutionalizing R2P, especially those with contested territory and a history of 
foreign intervention, such as China.  This dissertation attempts to explain how and why 
this change in use of force norms developed.  I argue this macro-level change was 
principally due to two often overlooked factors: an epistemic community pushing the 
Council to become more empathetic and altruistic, and Council members wanting to gain 
social status.  In order to adequately explain the development of R2P you must explain 
   
    vii 
the significant role the epistemic community played.  And to adequately explain the 
significance of the epistemic community you must explain the significant role empathy 
played.  Further, to sufficiently explain the UNSC’s decision to adopt R2P you must 
explain the significance of China’s acceptance.  And to sufficiently explain China’s 
acceptance you must explain the significant role status-seeking played.  Explanations for 
the adoption of R2P that do not acknowledge the significant role of empathy and social 
influence are incomplete and insufficient.  Although others have argued emotion and 
social influence are important causal variables in international relations, few offer 
specific mechanisms or micro-processes demonstrating how these factors work.  This 
dissertation attempts to fill this gap.  The implications are that empathy and status-
seeking matter far more to international relations than many suggest. 
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Expanding the Circle of Protection: 
 
The Evolution of Use of Force Norms Within the UN Security Council 
 
 
“External military intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial 
both when it has happened – as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo – and when it has failed 
to happen, as in Rwanda.  For some the new activism has been a long overdue 
internationalization of the human conscience; for others it has been an alarming breach of 
an international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of 
their territory.”1  
   
- Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
      
 
In 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked, “if humanitarian intervention 
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, 
to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every 
precept of our common humanity?”2  The purpose of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), created the following year at the UN 
Millennium Assembly, was to answer this question.  “In order to stimulate debate and 
ensure that ICISS heard the broadest possible range of views,” eleven regional 
roundtables and national consultations took place around the world.3  During a ICISS 
meeting in Beijing, Chinese delegates argued that, “the assertion of ‘human rights 
transcending sovereignty’ has serious fallacies,” and the “conceptualization of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, pg. vii. 
2 ICISS, 2001, pg. vii. 
3 Weiss and Hubert (2001, pg. 343).  Thomas Weiss and Don Hubert co-authored the 
Supplementary Volume to the ICISS Report: The Responsibility to Protect. 
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humanitarian intervention is a total fallacy.”4  Their position reflected traditional 
international use of force norms.5  “Nowhere in the UN Charter can one find a clause that 
permits using force, except for national defense under Article 51 and for restoring 
international peace, as specified in Chapter VII.  Using force for moral or conceptual 
reasons is questionable and dangerous,” the delegates argued.6  Thus, the Chinese 
opposed adopting the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine, which would redefine 
the limits of sovereignty, expand the UN Security Council’s security mandate to include 
“human protection,” and signify a historic change in international use of force norms.  
Yet in 2006, China joined the rest of the Security Council to vote unanimously in favor of 
Resolution 1674, which officially adopted the R2P doctrine.   
China and the Council’s adoption of R2P marked a significant change in 
international use of force norms.  It expanded the UNSC’s security mandate to include 
“human protection,” defined a state’s sovereignty to include a responsibility to protect its 
citizens, and legitimized military intervention in a country if its “national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.”7  Although protecting civilians from mass killing is a 
traditional territorial responsibility for states, adding the extraterritorial responsibility to 
protect, and in exceptional circumstances without the consent of the domestic 
government, is quite novel.  The collective security arrangement upon which the UN was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Weiss and Hubert, 2001, pg. 409. 
5 I am using Merriam-Webster’s definition for a norm: “an authoritative standard; or a principle 
of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate 
proper and acceptable behavior.” 
6 Weiss and Hubert, 2001, pg. 392. 
7 S/Res/1674, 28 April 2006. 
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founded assigned the UNSC the responsibility of protecting states from other states.  
Thus, by accepting “human protection” as their responsibility, the UNSC expanded what 
I call the Council’s circle of protection to the individual level.  The exact means of 
protection may be ambiguous, however, the responsibility to protect is not.  Moreover, 
although the Council sometimes fails in its responsibility, the fact that there is an 
expectation for it stop mass killing, even at risk to its own members and potentially 
without consent, is historic.  
I argue this historic change was principally due to two overlooked factors: an 
epistemic community pushing the UNSC to adopt more empathetic and altruistic norms, 
and Council members wanting to gain social status.  In order to adequately explain the 
development of R2P you must explain the significant role the epistemic community 
played.  And to adequately explain the significance of the epistemic community you must 
explain the significant role empathy played.  The epistemic community drew strength and 
resources from a growing international network of people seeking to alleviate the 
suffering of others.  Further, to sufficiently explain the Council’s decision to adopt R2P 
you must explain the significance of China’s acceptance.  And to sufficiently explain 
China’s acceptance you must explain the significant role that status seeking or wanting 
recognition as a “responsible stakeholder” played.  Put another way, the epistemic 
community presented UNSC members with a choice to expand the Council’s circle of 
protection, and to gain social status by doing so.  Explanations for the adoption of R2P 
that do not acknowledge the significant role of empathy and social influence are 
incomplete and insufficient. 
   
    
4 
Before presenting my argument in more detail, a brief explanation an epistemic 
community is in order.  According to Peter Haas: “An epistemic community is a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.  
Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of 
disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of principled beliefs… and a 
common policy enterprise.”8  In the case of R2P, the epistemic community consists of 
people in government, UN agencies, think tanks, universities, the media and beyond.  The 
institutionalization of R2P, therefore, is the result of the work of people, such as Francis 
Deng, Roberta Cohen, Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, Gisèle Côté-Harper, Thomas 
Weiss, Kofi Annan, and many others who formed an epistemic community.  The ICISS 
shows how the R2P epistemic community worked to institutionalize norms meant to 
alleviate the suffering of others, as will be discussed in detail below.  In 2001, the ICISS 
literally wrote the book on R2P (their report is aptly titled “The Responsibility to 
Protect”).9  The report became the foundation for UNSC resolution 1674, which 
redefined the normative foundation of sovereignty, expanded the UNSC’s circle of 
protection, and transformed international use of force norms. 
Empathy was critical to this process.  The common interest of those in the R2P 
epistemic community was sympathetic concern for the victims of genocide, and a desire 
to try and prevent the type of suffering witnessed in Rwanda.  The epistemic community 
also used the Rwanda narrative to provoke sympathetic concern in others, in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Haas, 1992, pg. 3.  Also see: Adler and Haas, 1992. 
9 ICISS, 2001. 
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build a transnational movement to reform international use of force norms.10  Hence, the 
movement gained support it became more influential, and therefore, more able to 
pressure the UNSC to help prevent another genocide.  Significantly, the epistemic 
community also sought to make the UNSC more empathetic in order to provoke 
sympathetic concern and targeted helping.  Sympathetic concern, targeted helping, and 
the process of turning empathy into action is critical to my argument, and therefore, is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.11 
Clearly, the process of institutionalizing R2P also required Council members’ 
acceptance, particularly the “Permanent Five” members (P5).  Some members, especially 
China and Russia, initially resisted expanding the Council’s authority, especially to 
militarily intervene in domestic conflicts.12  Although Russia has been in the news more 
of late due to its position on Syria, China has supported far less UNSC use of force 
authorizations than Russia.  For example, from 1990 to 2013, China abstained from 12 
authorizations, while Russia only abstained twice (see Appendix, Table 1).  
Consequently, China more often offers the key counterpoint to the NATO allies’ position.   
Further, China represents the “hard case” in explaining the change in use of force 
norms.  Chinese leaders often point out to their Western counterparts that China endured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Transnational movements have helped reform other international norms throughout history.  
See: Jackie Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, (eds.), 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 1998; 
Evangelista, 1999; N. Crawford, 2002; Speth and Haas, 2006. 
11 Chapter 3 also provides a fuller account of the empathy-altruism hypothesis.  See also: De 
Waal, 2008; and Batson, 2011.   
12 When referring to states, such as China, I am using shorthand for an assemblage of components 
that are not completely cohesive.  States are not people; however, regarding votes in the UN, 
states are treated as individuals in the sense that they cast one vote.  Thus, I acknowledge there 
may be issues with “reification,” but I think these issues do not invalidate my research and/or 
analysis.   
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a “century of humiliation” mainly due to foreign intervention – humanitarian or 
otherwise.13  Further, China has contested territory, such as Tibet, and limiting the right to 
“non-interference” creates potential risks.  Hence, Beijing had important reasons not to 
legitimize R2P, as a traditional realist would predict, but they did nonetheless.  As E. H. 
Carr said, “Respect for international law and for the sanctity of treaties will not be 
increased by the sermons of those who, having most to gain from the maintenance of the 
existing order, insist most firmly on the morally binding character of the law.”14  
Moreover, according to realists like John Mearsheimer, states are short-term power 
maximizers.15  It is difficult to see what short-term power gains would offset the risk of 
potentially legitimizing a US led military intervention in Tibet or other contested territory 
in and around China.  Either Chinese policy makers were mistaken for supporting the 
adoption of R2P, or realists cannot adequately explain why it was in their interest to 
support expanding the international community’s authority to use force. 
My research supports the argument that social influence best explains the overall 
change in China’s official position on the use of force.16  According to Gill and Huang, 
“The expansion in Chinese peacekeeping contributions reflects the country’s overall 
efforts, especially since the late 1990s, to raise its profile in the international community 
as a constructive and responsible power.”17  Allen Carlson also shows that “the growing 
interest in Beijing in portraying China as a responsible member of the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Gries, 2001. 
14 E. H. Carr, 1939, pg. 84. 
15 Mearsheimer, 1994. 
16 See: Carlson, 2004, 2005; Liu et al., 2004; A. Johnston, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2009; Wuthnow, 
2009; Teitt, 2008, 2013; Lanteigne and Hirono, 2013.  
17 Gill and Huang, 2009, pg. 12. 
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community pushed the Chinese to make more compromises on the sovereignty-
intervention nexus.  Participating in humanitarian operations provided the Chinese with a 
vehicle to demonstrate Beijing’s willingness to play an increasingly benign and 
cooperative role in international politics.”18  Further, “Chinese official discourse,” 
according to Alastair Iain Johnston has adopted “a new identity discourse that describes 
China as a ‘responsible major power,’ a key characteristic of which is to participate in 
and uphold commitments to status quo international economic and security institutions.”19  
In 2005, the Chinese government published a white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful 
Development Road,” which presented China’s official foreign policy objectives.20  
According to the white paper, “China shoulders broad international obligations, and plays 
a responsible and constructive role.”  Thus, China “actively supports the UN [playing] a 
greater role in international affairs,” and “backs up UN reform.”21  To this end, in another 
white paper Beijing explicitly supported the adoption of R2P, stating: “When a massive 
humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate concern of the international community to 
ease and defuse the crisis.”22  Beijing has also made tangible changes in its commitment 
to UN peacekeeping, and now deploys more than 20 times as many peacekeepers as it did 
in 1999.23  Johnston and others argue that social influence best explains this change.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Carlson, 2004, pg. 11. 
19 A. Johnston, 2008, pg. 205. 
20 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2005. 
21 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2005. 
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2005. 
23 See the UNPKO website: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.  
24 See: Carlson, 2004, 2005; Liu et al., 2004; A. Johnston, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2009; Wuthnow, 
2009; Teitt, 2008, 2013; Lanteigne and Hirono, 2013. 
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Specifically, much of the aforementioned literature and the evidence suggest that the 
Chinese sought recognition as a “responsible power.”   
I attempt to add to this research by offering a specific social mechanism, or 
micro-process, for China’s change in position: status seeking.  Larson, Paul, and 
Wohlworth define status as "collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on valued 
attributes."25  Further, "Status is also highly subjective.  Status cannot be read off a state's 
material attributes; it depends on others' perceptions.  A state's estimate of its status is 
based in part on interpretation of the behavior and speech of others, a judgment that may 
leave it either satisfied of dissatisfied with its status.  Although some attributes that serve 
as the basis for status are measureable - such as the size of the national economy or 
military forces - more intangible assets such as cultural achievements, soft power, an 
moral authority are not."26  Regardless of whether status is based upon material 
capabilities or moral authority, however, a states' status is a social construction.  As 
Pouliot argues "notions of rank, prestige and hierarchy make sense only as part of larger 
structures of meaning," such as what constitutes a "responsible power."27  International 
norms and institutions, therefore, affect the constitution of international status, which are 
"historically contingent and socially defined."28  In other words, status depends upon 
others' perceptions, and is not an observable material attribute.  
Further, although status seeking is inherently self-interested, the rewards are 
social not material.  Regrettably, most realist and liberal explanations for state decision 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Larson, Paul, and Wohlworth, 2014, pg. 14. 
26 Larson, Paul, and Wohlworth, 2014, pg. 14. 
27 Pouliot, 2014, pg. 189. 
28 Pouliot, 2014, pg. 189. 
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making focus almost exclusively on the significance of material benefits.  Yet, as will be 
explained in Chapters 2 and 3, constructivists and psychologists tend to show how social 
influence and psychology motivates behavior.  Hence, if most of the China experts are 
correct in concluding that Beijing’s primary reasons for supporting more UNPKOs and 
R2P, then most realists and liberals should have a difficult time explaining this change.  
A focus on the role of international society, social influence, and status-seeking, however, 
supports what the aforementioned China experts suggest: that over the last several 
decades Beijing became increasingly interested in integration into international society 
and being perceived as a “responsible state.” 
Yet all of the Council members, not only China, acted as if status seeking 
influenced their acceptance of R2P, and the overall increase in “humanitarian 
interventions” since the early 1990s. Even if economic and strategic interests are 
important in particular cases, it is highly implausible the broader historic change in use of 
force norms is principally due to material interests.  As Martha Finnemore argues, “In 
most of these cases, the intervention targets are insignificant by any usual measure of 
geostrategic or economic interest.”29  Moreover, the history of the institutionalization of 
R2P shows that an epistemic community pushed the Council to be more empathetic and 
altruistic, not increasingly self-interested.  That the UNSC accepted this responsibility 
and expanded its circle of protection runs counter to most traditional explanations for 
state behavior, as will be discussed in detail below. 
Thus, my hypothesis is that an epistemic community pushing the Council to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Finnemore, 1996, pg. 154. 
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more empathetic was the most significant exogenous influence on the change in UNSC 
norms, and the most significant endogenous factor was status seeking.  Put another way, 
the epistemic community was the external trigger and status seeking was the key factor 
within the Council.  This distinction is important because the R2P doctrine originated 
outside the UNSC with an epistemic community seeking to prevent “another Rwanda,” 
not from states seeking to justify intervention.  Consequently, claims that R2P is “the 
return of the civilizing mission,” or was created as a “Trojan horse” for imperialism, miss 
this vital point.30  Further, the US invasion of Iraq and the Russian annexation of Crimea 
show Council members’ willingness to authorize the use of force without UNSC 
approval.  Moreover, many argue the UNSC’s “chief failing” is not too much 
intervention, but as UN Secretary General (SG) Ban Ki-Moon suggests, “the reluctance 
to act in the face of serious threats.”31 
The process of non-state actors pushing states and international organizations to 
become more empathetic and altruistic is not new, yet what makes this story interesting is 
that it took place within the UNSC.  The Council’s main task is to maintain international 
security, or regulate war, a job typically treated as being unaffected by empathy.  Further, 
as the strategic use of the veto and the perpetual failure to reform veto power within the 
Council demonstrates, UNSC members, particularly the P5, too often put self-interest 
ahead of the collective-interest.  Therefore, the fact that the UNSC expanded its circle of 
protection is worth studying.   
One of my first goals, therefore, is to provide an accurate description of how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mazower, 2012, pg. 395. 
31 Ki-Moon, 2012a.  
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UNSC use of force authorizations changed over the years. Importantly, most of the 
Security Council’s authority to use force is established not by the Charter, but the 
Council itself.  Although the Charter is relatively specific about the membership 
requirements and voting structure of the General Assembly (GA) and UNSC, it is 
purposely more ambiguous regarding why the Council can decide to authorize the use of 
force.  What constitutes a threat to “international peace and security” is not always clear.  
In practice, therefore, the Council establishes its authority to use force through Security 
Council resolutions.  There is no higher body in the UN than the Council, and its 
resolutions are typically treated as part of international law.   
Thus, to understand the evolution of the Council’s authority to use force, and 
international use of force norms more broadly, we need to study UNSC resolutions 
authorizing the use of force.  A norm is a prescription for behavior, not a measure of 
behavior.  I pay particular attention, therefore, to the evolution of UNSC resolutions 
authorizing the use of force, and Council-members’ normative justifications for and 
against such authorizations.  “Principles, rules, and laws are prescriptive normative 
statements that rest on normative beliefs,” according to Neta Crawford.32  Tracking the 
evolution in the UNSC’s authority to use force, therefore, can reveal how normative 
beliefs about the use of force changed over time.  
Tracing the changes in these normative beliefs required multiple research 
methods.  First, I used archival research to show that prescriptive normative statements 
changed over time.  I then show how normative beliefs changed by using process tracing.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 N. Crawford, 2002, pg. 41. 
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And third, I supplemented my archival research and process tracing with interviews of 
key actors. I will briefly discuss each in turn. 
Through archival research, relying principally on UNSC resolutions, meeting 
transcripts, and other primary source documents, I built a data set that includes every 
UNSC use of force authorization/resolution, each corresponding vote, and each of P5’s 
official justification for such vote.  After cataloguing resolutions, votes, and normative 
justifications, I tracked the changes in members’ votes and normative justifications over 
time.  Where appropriate I use descriptive statistics to highlight the differences between 
states and to show patterns, trends, and points of convergence.  Although my research 
design uses descriptive statistics to analyze voting behavior, I principally employ 
qualitative methods.  Council meetings, UNSC resolutions, UN reports, and public 
statements, and the like provide a rich discourse to analyze.  
My principle research method, therefore, is process tracing.  According to 
Alexander George, process tracing is: “a procedure for identifying steps in a causal 
process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of particular case in a 
particular historical context.”33 In this case, I trace the evolution of use of force norms 
within the UNSC by specifically focusing on how UNSC resolutions dealing with the use 
of force changed over time.  Through process tracing I also was able to see correlations 
between particular documents referenced in these resolutions, such as the ICISS report, 
and significant changes in UNSC use of force norms.  I used process tracing to try and 
discover the causal mechanisms in the change in use of force norms, and to show the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 George and Bennett, 2005, pg. 176. 
   
    
13 
underlying mechanisms connecting causal and dependent variables.  Process tracing also 
helps “to demonstrate the conjunction and the temporal sequence of variables,” according 
to Vennesson.34  Consequently, through process tracing I was able to show the 
importance of the epistemic community presenting the UN with the R2P doctrine.  As 
mentioned above, the temporal sequence demonstrates that R2P originated with an 
epistemic community seeking to reform UNSC use of force norms, and not Council 
members seeking to justify military interventions in their strategic interests, as a 
traditional realist might predict.  Pascal Vennesson also suggests that, “The goal of 
process tracing is ultimately to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads 
to a specific outcome.”35  Hence, much of Section II provides a narrative explanation of a 
causal path that leads to the institutionalization of R2P. 
Although my primary research method was process tracing, I also relied on 
interviews and other sources to try and ascertain the causal weight of the causal factors 
revealed through process tracing.  As mentioned in the acknowledgements, I was 
fortunate to be able to interview Thomas Weiss, one of the principle authors of the R2P 
doctrine.  Prof. Weiss provided a first-hand account of his work on R2P, and his thoughts 
on the theoretical and practical significance of its adoption.  I was also fortunate to 
discuss Chinese foreign policy with Peter Hays Gries, one of the world’s leading China 
scholars.  He also provided me with his personal translations and notes on several key 
Chinese texts.  De Yuan Kao and Chien-Kai Chen also helped with translation.  The book 
chapter I wrote with De Yuan Kao, “The Evolution of China’s Normative Position on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Vennesson, 2008, pg. 231. 
35 Vennesson, 2008, pg. 235.    
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Use of Force,” initially helped me frame the questions and understand Chinese attitudes.36  
Prior to its publication, I presented it as a paper at an international conference, “The EU, 
the US and China – Towards a New International Order?”, at the College of Europe in 
Belgium.  This conference also gave me the opportunity to meet and learn from some of 
China and the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy.  It became relatively 
clear to me at this conference that the Chinese government was actively seeking 
recognition as a “responsible power” from the international community.  This idea was 
bolstered by subsequent research, which will be discussed below.  Employing all of the 
aforementioned research and analysis methods allowed me to tell the story of the 
evolution in use of force norms within the UNSC. 
Section II, therefore, provides a general history of the evolution of use of force 
norms within the UNSC.  I specifically focus on the institutionalization of R2P, and the 
role the epistemic community and China played because my analysis leads me to believe 
they were critical causal factors.  I also show that 1999 was the key “tipping point.”  In 
addition to the question Kofi Annan asked above in 1999 leading to creation of ICISS, 
the UN Secretariat published highly influential reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica, and an 
epistemic community began to coalesce around the idea of R2P.  Also during a 
Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in 1999, a NATO plane bombed China’s embassy in 
Kosovo, which began a dramatic shift in China’s support for UNSC use of force 
authorizations.  For example, from the end of 1999 until the Libyan vote in 2011, Beijing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Marlier and Kao, 2014. 
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voted in favor of 20 use of force authorizations in a row (see Figure 1 in Appendix).37  
Further, the mandate to protect civilians has been consistently integrated into every 
UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force since late 1999 (S/Res/1289, see Table 1 in 
Appendix), virtually all of which China supported. 
Although the P5 seem to have come to a relative normative convergence 
regarding why to use force, there is still a degree of divergence regarding how and when 
to use force.  Essentially, the NATO allies tend to set more limits on sovereignty than 
China and Russia.  Russia and especially China are less likely to authorize the use force 
without consent than the NATO allies.  We might think of this as a convergence on the 
principle of using force for “human protection,” if necessary, but a divergence on the 
degree of consent necessary for such an intervention.  
Before presenting this history in more detail, however, Section I presents some 
theories for this evolution.  Although others have argued that empathy and social 
influence are important causal variables in international relations, as will be discussed 
below, few offer specific mechanisms or micro-processes demonstrating how these 
factors work.  This dissertation attempts to fill this gap by demonstrating how an 
epistemic community pushed the Council to become more empathetic, and how status 
seeking was critical to overcoming certain Council-members’ resistance to change.  I end 
Section I by discussing my hypothesis more thoroughly.  
Section II then provides historical evidence to support my argument for why the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Although they occasionally block other types of UNSC resolutions, such as the recent veto of a 
draft resolution demanding that the Syrian government “cease all violence and protect its 
population” (S/2012/77).  See also: Marlier and Kao, 2014.   
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Council expanded its circle of protection.  I present the key cases that demonstrate the 
long-term transformation of use of force norms within the UNSC.  This history shows the 
ups and downs in this evolution, and demonstrates it was not a straight line to R2P.  I pay 
special attention to the epistemic community and China’s role in the institutionalization 
of R2P throughout Section II, because of their causal significance. 
I conclude by discussing the potential implications of my research.38  As stated 
above, my overall conclusion is that emotion and social influence were crucial to the 
evolution in the UNSC’s authority to use force.  Specifically, empathy and status seeking 
were critical to the Council expanding its circle of protection.  The implication is that 
empathy and social influence matter far more to issues of war and peace than many 
would allow.  The practical significance is that epistemic communities pushing 
international organizations to be more empathetic and altruistic can be effective without 
providing material rewards, because states have social interests, such as status.  I also 
suggest that this process could work not only with other international organizations, but 
at the state level as well.  This is principally due to the fact that emotion and social 
influence affect human decision-making at every level.  Just as you cannot have a state 
without people, you cannot have a state without people influenced by norms and emotion.  
Moreover, the growing interconnectivity of the world will likely make the sharing and 
spreading of emotions and norms easier.  Based upon my research, and others discussed 
below, this may be a net positive for not just international relations but all social life. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This dissertation does not attempt to explain the causes for specific Peacekeeping Operations 
(PKOs).  I am also not claiming that empathy is the sole motivation for UNSC use of force 
authorizations, only that it typically works as a catalyst.  I am also aware that R2P has the 
potential to be abused, or used as a fig leaf, for illegitimate military interventions.   
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Section I: Theories for Why Use of Force Norms Changed 
 
“Choice and responsibility lie at the heart of human action.  We begin with the premise 
that there are genuine choices about whether, when, and how to act in the face of 
particular circumstances.  The notion of responsibility itself entails fundamental moral 
reasoning and challenges determinist theories of human behavior and international 
relations theory.  The behavior of states is not predetermined by systemic or structural 
factors, and moral considerations are not merely after-the-fact justifications or simply 
irrelevant.  Taking such a position about the role of responsibility also challenges 
postmodern views that deny the possibility of engaging in intelligible moral reasoning 
across cultures and across time.”39 
 
- Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
 
 
Why did use of force norms within the UN Security Council (UNSC) change?  
Why did the Council expand circle of protection and its authority to use force within 
states?  More specifically, why did Council members agree to institutionalize the 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine?  Although protecting civilians from mass 
killing is a traditional territorial responsibility for states, adding the extraterritorial 
responsibility to protect is a novel and risky proposition.  “This suggested duty,” as Luke 
Glanville points out, “would seem to have extraordinary implications for interstate 
relations.  It could be taken to imply, for example, that bystander states have not an 
option but an obligation to act in response to all situations, like Libya, in which civilians 
are understood to be at risk of mass atrocities.”40 
Further, why would member-states authorize the Council to potentially militarily 
intervene – without their consent – in their own states?  For states that have contested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Weiss and Hubert, 2001, pg. 129. 
40 Glanville, 2012, pg. 4 (emphasis in original). 
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territory, such as China with Tibet and Russia with Chechnya, this was a significant 
precedent to set.  Part of the reason the Permanent Five (P5) members can afford to make 
this concession is that they still maintain veto power over any such proposed mission.  
Further, there is some ambiguity as to the legally binding status of Resolution 1674, 
which formally institutionalized R2P.  According to Glanville, “there is little ground for 
thinking that the leading international statements and UN resolutions on this principle 
have, by themselves, established new legal obligations with respect to the extraterritorial 
protection of populations.”41  By agreeing to institutionalize R2P, however, Council 
members legitimized a norm that explicitly establishes a duty for the international 
community to prevent mass killing, and if necessary to use force without consent.  
Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in Section II, the Council and some states have 
begun to formally institutionalize bureaucracies whose explicit purpose is to look for 
cases that merit invoking R2P.   
As mentioned above, my research suggests there are two often overlooked causal 
factors in this development.  First, an epistemic community that developed and coalesced 
in the 1990s (consisting of academics and UN staff members, and supported by 
journalists), which pushed the Council to become more empathetic and altruistic.  The 
second factor was Council members wanting to enhance their social status.  Importantly, 
I argue that the epistemic community was the key catalyst to the change in use of force 
norms – not the Council members themselves.  In particular, the creation and work of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) demonstrates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Glanville, 2012, pg. 2. 
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the role the epistemic community played, and will be discussed more below.  Also, 
China’s acceptance of R2P was most likely due to social influence and wanting 
recognition as a “responsible power.”42  China’s change in normative position was both 
critical and illustrative, therefore, I will discuss it in detail in Section II.  My overall 
conclusion, therefore, is that empathy and social influence were necessary to the change 
in use of force norms.  Put another way, they are the constants in the equation.  Before 
presenting my hypothesis more precisely in chapter four, however, I will lay out the 
overall structure of Section I. 
In this section, the first chapter places my argument in context through a brief 
literature review of the basic theories and concepts in play.  The second chapter digs 
deeper into the concept of social influence, and the third chapter focuses more on 
empathy.  Section I concludes with a short chapter presenting my own hypothesis more 
precisely.  Section II then presents evidence to support my hypothesis through a history 
of the evolution of use of force norms within the Security Council. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See: Carlson, 2004; Liu et al., 2004; A. Johnston, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2009; Wuthnow, 
2009; Teitt, 2008, 2013; Lanteigne and Hirono, 2013. 
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1. Basic Theories and Concepts: 
 
“Why is there no international theory?  …The reason is that the theorizing has to be done in the 
language of political theory and law.  But this is the language appropriate to man’s control of his 
social life.  Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm 
of normal relationships and calculable results.  They are the theory of the good life.  International 
theory is the theory of survival.  What for political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, or 
civil war) is for international theory the regular case.  The traditional effort of international 
lawyers to define the right of devastation and pillage in war; the long diplomatic debate in the 19th 
century about the right of intervention in aid of oppressed nationalities; the Anglo-French 
argument in the 1920’s about which proceeds the other, security or disarmament; the controversy 
over appeasement; the present debate about the nuclear deterrent – all this is the stuff of 
international theory, and it is constantly bursting the bounds of the language in which we try to 
handle it.  For it all involves the ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and 
national extinction.”43 
           – Martin Wight 
 
In this chapter, I briefly review the international relations literature on state 
behavior, and the more specific literature on use of force norms within the UNSC.  In 
general, “realists” tend to focus on how strategic interests, material capabilities, and the 
structure of the international system explains state behavior.  “Liberals,” “idealists,” and 
“constructivists,” however, typically pay more attention to the role economic interests, 
identity, social influence, and emotion play.  Thus, realists tend to explain the historic 
increase in “humanitarian interventions” and the adoption of R2P as the product of the 
international “balance of power” shifting so dramatically in the US and its allies’ favor  
following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  This allowed them to change the rules of the 
game to suit their strategic interests.  Any rhetoric regarding “defending human rights” is 
merely a smokescreen for realpolitik.  Liberals, however, tend to view the change in use 
of force norms as the result of increasing international economic interdependence, which 	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leads to a mutual interest in a stable and peaceful international system.  Idealists and 
constructivists, however, tend to explain the Council expanding its circle of protection as 
being the product of a broader normative shift in international society.  More human 
rights norms are being adopted and institutionalized, because more people are seeking to 
alleviate the suffering of others.  This is principally due to socialization and emotions, 
such as empathy.  All these factors and more influenced the change in use of force norms 
within the UNSC, however, my research suggests social influence and emotion were the 
most important.  I focus on these two factors and my own hypothesis in more detail in the 
following chapters, however, in order to place my hypothesis in context I will first 
discuss the relevant literature. 
Many of the earliest recorded texts tell stories of wars between tribes, kingdoms, 
and nations.  Most of these works blur the line between promulgating a particular belief 
system and analyzing historical fact.  Ancient works often used stories about war as a 
way to discuss not only the morality of killing, but also as a way of explaining humans’ 
place in the universe.  The Mahabharata is one of the founding Hindu texts.  Originating 
in the 8th or 9th centuries BC, it is also one of first examples of “Just War” theory.44  Yet it 
also attempts to explain the rules governing the cosmic system, and similar to the Torah, 
Bible, Koran, etc., how people can best live within it.  More historical accounts, such as 
Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War written around 400 BC, eliminate many of 
the cosmic and supernatural elements, and focus more on understanding and explaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Subramaniam, (trans.), 2007. 
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the rules ordering international systems.45   
The common goal in nearly all the literature is to bring order out of chaos.   
Put another way, the literature represents a collective effort to find the best means to a 
lasting peace.  One of the central debates in the early literature, however, stems from 
what type of means are necessary to achieve peace, and what kind of peace is necessary.  
The debate over means tends to focus on whether “the ends justify the means,” as 
suggested by Machiavelli.46  In other words, it matters little how peace is achieved, it is 
more important that peace exists and violent anarchy ends.  The discussion about what 
kind of peace is achieved, however, centers on a debate regarding the justice of the 
governing order.  Many scholars, such as Thomas Hobbes, suggest that a somewhat 
unjust government capable of enforcing a sustainable peace is better than a just 
government incapable of imposing order.  Further, each kingdom is threatened by 
invasion from other kingdoms, and therefore, obedience to a Leviathan, or state, is the 
price of survival because no individual can effectively defend against such an invasion.47  
Although Hobbes suggests survival is not the only motivation for peasants and kings, 
without first securing one’s survival all other interests are secondary.48  
This view that peasants and kings are motivated first and foremost by an interest 
in survival dominates the classic “realist” literature.  Assuming that humans and states 
want to survive, scholars thought of ways to use this inherent interest to establish a stable 
order.  One of the classic ideas on how to achieve order was through a “balance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Thucydides, (Crawley, trans.), 1934. 
46 Machiavelli, 1950. 
47 Hobbes, 1962. 
48 Hobbes, 1962. 
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power.”  According to this logic, a king is unlikely to decide to invade a kingdom without 
superior forces, so peace is best sustained by developing an army capable of deterring 
other kingdoms from attacking.  When all of the kingdoms within a system are relatively 
balanced in terms of capabilities, then war is less likely and a regional or international 
order can exist.  If the balance is upset, however, and a kingdom gains a disproportionate 
military capability, then war becomes more likely and order more likely to give way to 
chaos or anarchy.  Thus according to the classic “realist” view of international relations, 
by balancing power between kingdoms, nations, or states survival can be ensured and a 
peaceful international order can be achieved.   
Another important aspect of the traditional realist literature is a common view that 
people, especially political leaders, are principally motivated by an interest in power.  
Realists, according to Hans Morgenthau, share a common assumption: 
“We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the 
evidence of history bears that assumption out.  That assumption allows us to retrace and 
anticipate, as it were, the steps of a statesman – past, present, or future – has taken or will 
take on the political scene…  Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the 
political and cultural environment.  Power may comprise anything that establishes and 
maintains the control of man over man.  Thus power covers all social relationships which 
serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one 
mind controls another.”49   
 
Hence, people are motivated generally by an expanding appetite for power, according to 
classic realism.  Further, people will break social norms when the material benefits 
outweigh the potential costs, including physical punishment.  Moreover, any observable 
altruism is either self-interest in disguise, or too exceptional to count on as a way order 
society.  Thus, what typically keeps people in line is a Leviathan with enough 	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enforcement power to deter breaking the rules, not norms or an interest in the collective 
good.  And what keeps states in line is a balance of power based upon an interest in 
survival, not international law. 
Although most modern realists, or neo-realists, place more emphasis on economic 
interests than classic realists, most still argue that the international system is 
fundamentally ordered by self-interested states and by a balance of power.  For example, 
Kenneth Waltz argues the distribution of capabilities within the international system, 
based upon states’ relative military and economic power, best explains the international 
order.50   
Waltz also suggests trusting in mutual economic interests, international law, the 
UNSC, or norms to provide security is overly idealistic and potentially dangerous.  He is 
also, therefore, skeptical of social influence.  He admits identity and norms matter, but 
only marginally, because the “international environment” is the most dominant influence 
on state behavior.   
“If every war is preceded by acts that we can identify (or at least try to identify) as cause, 
then why can we not eliminate wars by modifying individual or state behavior?  This is 
the line of thinking followed by those who say: To end war, improve men; or: To end 
war, improve states.  But in such prescriptions the role of the international environment is 
easily distorted.  How can some of the acting units improve while others continue to 
follow their old and often predatory ways?  The simplistic assumption of many liberals, 
that history moves relentlessly toward the millennium, is refuted if the international 
environment makes it difficult almost to the point of impossibility for states to behave in 
ways that are progressively more moral.”51  
 
Although there are Realists who allow a greater role for identity and norms, most tend to 
follow Waltz and give them little causal weight in explaining world politics, especially on 	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issues such as the use of force.  There is typically a strategic or economic motivation that 
explains state behavior more than identity, culture, or norms.  Moreover, for most modern 
realists the balance of power, or the distribution of material capabilities, still best explains 
the dynamics of the international system. 
Robert Gilpin shares Waltz’s core assumptions, but focuses more on the dynamics 
of system change.  In War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin builds upon Waltz’s 
work.52   Gilpin shares the core assumptions of Realism, but tries to overcome much of 
the criticism of Waltz’s model by focusing on the dynamics of system change.  Thus, he 
tries to avoid the criticism of Waltz’s model being ahistorical (describing the Cold War 
and not much else).   
Drawing on economics and sociology, Gilpin’s model is based on 5 core 
propositions: 
1. The international system is in a state of equilibrium if no state believes that it is 
profitable to try and change the status quo. 
2. A state will attempt to change the status quo of the system if the expected benefits 
outweigh the costs.   
3. A state will seek change through territorial, political, and economic expansion 
until the marginal costs of further change equal or exceed the marginal benefits.   
4. When equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion 
is reached, the economic costs of maintaining the status quo tend to rise faster 
than the resources needed to do so (think imperial overstretch).  An equilibrium 
exists when no powerful state believes that a change in the system would yield 
additional net benefits. 
5. Finally, if the resulting disequilibrium between the existing governance of the 
international system and the redistribution of power is not resolved, the system 
will be changed and a new equilibrium reflecting the distribution of relative 
capabilities will be established. 
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According to Gilpin a state will seek change through territorial, political, and 
economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change equal or exceed the 
marginal benefits.53  Based upon this logic, one might argue that principle cause of the 
big shift in use of force norms following the collapse of the USSR was due to the US 
pushing for global hegemony.  Without the Soviet check, the US was able to project its 
military power into regions previously outside its control, set the agenda at the UNSC, 
and more easily alter the international order in American interests.  Thus, any changes 
that serve the collective interest were the result of self-interest not altruism.  The US 
championed human rights in order to receive material rewards, and any social rewards 
were merely icing on the cake.  This sort of argument runs through much of the literature 
regarding the motivations behind the increase in humanitarian interventions since 1990. 
Most realists, therefore, tend to emphasize how UNSC decisions to use force 
primarily serve the national interests of the P5, typically defined in economic or strategic 
terms.  For example, Laura Neack studied the extent to which participation in PKOs, the 
geographical distribution of operations, and accounts of success or failure were the result 
of a normative commitment to the global community or a consequence of states' national 
interests.54  After analyzing eighteen UNPKOs that took place between 1948 and 1990, 
she concludes that, "states whose interests were better served by the continuation of the 
status quo – that is, states of the advanced industrialized West and non-Western states 
that have enjoyed some prestige in the international status quo – have dominated UN 
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peacekeeping."55  Similarly, Chantal De Jonge Oudraat argues that UNSC decisions to 
use force are determined by "the extent to which the interests of one or more of the 
members of the P5 are engaged in the case in question; and the extent to which the 
conflict is believed by the P5 to constitute a threat to international peace and security."56  
She defines whether a case is a threat to international peace on the basis of whether the 
war spills over its borders to pose a larger regional threat.   
In sum, much of the realist literature tends to argue that the main motivations for 
UNSC use of force authorizations are the economic and strategic interests of the P5.  
According to John Mearsheimer, states are all short-term power maximizers.57  The 
increase in humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War reflects a shift in the 
international balance of power to the US and its allies not a normative convergence on 
human rights.   With no one to stop them, the US and its allies pursued their interests 
relatively unimpeded.  Although they may cloak their interests in the language of 
“universal human rights,” it is the pursuit of material interests that really matter.   Thus, 
any cooperation and/or collective action for the common good is inherently fleeting and 
most likely a fig leaf for material self-interest, not a sign of normative convergence.  As 
E. H. Carr argued, “supposedly absolute and universal principles… [are] not principles at 
all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based upon a particular 
interpretation of national interest at a particular time.”58  Thus, for realists like Carr, and 
many of the aforementioned, “liberals” and “idealists” overstate the significance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Neack, 1995, pg. 181. 
56 De Jongeo Udraat, 1996, pgs. 518-519. 
57 Mearsheimer, 1994. 
58 E. H. Carr, 1939, pg. 111. 
   
    
28 
“humanitarian” military interventions and the importance of international cooperation in 
general.  International relations are structured on self-interested states seeking their own 
security above others.  And because there is no world Leviathan to enforce laws and 
norms the international system is anarchic and peace is best achieved through a “balance 
of power.” 
Liberals, however, typically argue peace can be established through reason, or 
rationality, rather than a tenuous balance of power.  Interestingly, classic “liberals” and or 
“idealists” generally agree with Hobbes regarding the natural state of the world.  
Immanuel Kant posits that, “The state of peace among men living side by side is not the 
natural state (status naturalis); the natural state is one of war.  This does not always mean 
open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war.”59 However, according to, Kant, 
“Just as nature wisely separates nations, which the will of every state, sanctioned by the 
principles of international law, would gladly unite by artifice or force, nations which 
could not have secured themselves against violence and war by means of the law world 
citizenship unite because of mutual interest.  The spirit of commerce, which is 
incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state.  As the power 
of money is perhaps the most dependable of all the powers (means) included under the 
state power, states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to promote honorable 
peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it threatens to break out.  They do so 
exactly as if they stood in perpetual alliances, for great offensive alliances are in the 
nature of the case rare and even less often successful.  
In this manner nature guarantees perpetual peace by the mechanism of human 
passions.”60 
 
Thus, Kant argues that through a rational calculus of the costs of war, states will 
eventually reason their way to a lasting peace.  International laws and treaties come to be 
respected not out of fear of punishment, but because war typically hinders international 
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commerce leaving everyone worse off.   
Further, many liberals and idealists argue that states can be motivated by a 
rational interest in cooperation, which can lead not just to mutual economic gains but 
normative convergence around humanitarian principles.  By this logic, states are not just 
interested relative security gains, but also interested in absolute gains in other areas such 
as trade.  Therefore, cooperation between states in trade leads to mutual benefits and an 
interdependence, which typically causes more cooperation.  Further, “Neo-liberal 
institutionalists” stress how states find mutual benefits in legitimizing and maintaining 
global governance institutions, such as the UNSC.  According to Robert Keohane: 
“Global governance institutions are valuable because they create norms and information 
that enable member states and other actors to coordinate their behavior in mutually 
beneficial ways… Once an institution is in place, ongoing support for it and compliance 
with its rules are sometimes simply a matter of self-interest from the perspective of states, 
assuming that the institution actually achieves coordination or other benefits that all or at 
least the more powerful actors regard as valuable.  Similarly, once the rule of the road has 
been established and penalties for violating it are in place, most people will find 
compliance with it to be rational from a purely self-interested point of view.”61 
 
Thus, following the rules and norms promulgated by the UN becomes rational, and 
therefore, enforcing and protecting human rights can become an end in and of itself.  In 
other words, according to Keohane and others, institutions can alter state preferences and 
therefore change state behavior.  So states may be motivated to support UNPKOs even if 
it costs them in the short-term, in terms of the distribution of power, if they believe it is in 
their long-term interest to legitimize the authority of the UNSC to intervene on behalf of 
humanitarian norms.  
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Yet some also argue liberal states have an inherent interest in humanitarian 
interventions.  According to Gary Bass:  
“Humanitarian intervention emerged as a fundamentally liberal enterprise, wrapped up 
with the progress of liberal ideals and institutions.  Ideologically, it grew out of the 
radical ideas of freedom and the rights of man, a driving force in world politics since the 
French Revolution in 1789; institutionally it grew up along with the rise of the mass 
media, public opinion, and responsive government.”62 
 
Bass also argues that in liberal states “the ambit of solidarity is potentially unlimited.  
Everyone’s lives count…  Their state ideology has no natural end point.  It encompasses 
the entire human race.”63  According to this logic, if all people deserve to have their 
individual rights respected, then all people ought to have their rights protected. Further, 
citizens of liberal democracies with a free press are more aware of the suffering of others, 
and subsequently more likely to intervene on behalf of defending human rights.  As Bass 
notes: 
“The radical premise of human rights is that human lives are human lives, near or far.  As 
Immanuel Kant argued, ‘Because a… community widely prevails among the Earth’s 
peoples, a transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere.’  Edmund 
Burke, denouncing British corruption in India, declared, ‘The laws of morality are the 
same everywhere.’  To a pure liberal, if people are dying in a quarrel in a faraway 
country between people of whom we know nothing, all that matters is that people are 
dying.”64 
 
Thus, liberal states should be more likely to support R2P based upon their founding 
principles.   
Similarly, Andreas Andersson argues “the democratic peace” explains why the 
UNSC supported more PKOs in the 1990s.65  The “democratic peace hypothesis” is one 
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of the most widely supported theories in international relations.  According to this theory, 
as posited by Michael Doyle, effectively liberal democracies do not go to war with one 
another. 66  Showing the broad geographical distribution of interventions and the many 
missions that do not appear to be in any P5’s direct interest, Andersson argues that the 
UNSC was guided primarily by a desire to promote democracy.  He asserts this motive 
stems from a belief in the democratic peace hypothesis, and the liberal project more 
generally.  If democracies never go to war with other democracies, then the UNSC, 
especially the more liberal members, desire to increase the number of democracies.  In 
other words, according to Andersson, liberal states have an interest in promoting 
democracy, and when necessary by force. 
Another of the most cited papers on the motivations for UNSC use of force 
authorizations is by Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman.67  The authors did a 
robust statistical analysis of PKOs.  According to Gilligan and Stedman:  
“The results that we report here suggest an image of a UN that attempts to balance 
between dictates of power and concerns of principle.  With regard to the latter, the UN 
seems to respond, other things being equal, to civil wars that involve the greatest human 
catastrophes.  The number of deaths that a conflict produced was the most robust 
predictor of UN intervention across all our specifications.”68 
 
They also find no evidence that the UN intervenes more in countries with high primary 
commodity exports, and reject the hypothesis that the UN intervenes “in some 	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neocolonialist fashion because of permanent member interests in securing steady flows of 
raw materials.”69  Moreover, there is no evidence that the UNSC intervenes in former 
colonies of the P5 at a higher rate than it does in other places.  Further, “There is no 
strong evidence that the United Nations intervenes in democracies at a lower rate than it 
does in nondemocracies.”70  Thus, the evidence presented by Gilligan and Stedman does 
not seem to support the claim presented by Andersson that the UNSC has an overriding 
interest in spreading democracy through PKOs.  Yet, there is evidence to support claims 
that the UNSC has an interest in promoting and enforcing humanitarian norms.   
The “most robust” result of Gilligan and Stedman’s analysis is that the likelihood 
of a UN intervention increases as the death toll in the conflict increases.71  In other words, 
as the scale of the crisis grows it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore UN principles 
regarding maintaining international peace and security.  This finding also seems counter 
to most realist theories regarding motivations, because it suggests that the scale of the 
violence, or the depth of the suffering, trumps material interests.  One might argue that as 
the scale of the violence passes a tipping point it become impossible for anyone aware of 
the suffering not to empathize with the victims.  Once this critical level of empathy is 
reached it is easier to push the Council to act altruistically.  
Yet material interests can trump empathy and humanitarian concerns in particular 
cases, because the UNSC does account for the costs of intervening in a militarily 
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powerful state.  According to Gilligan and Stedman, “This was the strongest result in our 
analysis, in the sense that the size of government army variable produced the largest 
changes in the probability of a UN intervention.”72  This is not surprising, but it is 
important to note the long term expansion of human rights does not mean that a concern 
for others will always trumps self-interest.  As Bass points out: 
“Even if a president or a prime minister has credible information about atrocities, and 
there is strong public sympathy for those victims, there must still be a cold realpolitik 
calculation about the costs of intervening.  If foreign murderers are relatively weak, it 
may be tempting to confront them.  But if a humanitarian intervention would lead to a 
broader international crisis, or plunge the country – or the world – into a massive war, 
then most cabinets will decide that it is just not worth it.  After all, governments are 
opportunistic in their humanitarianism, as they are with any military venture; believing in 
human rights does not make one suicidal.”73 
 
Similarly, there is some evidence to support some realist claims that the UNSC 
functions in the interests of the most powerful members, because it is more likely to 
intervene in Europe than elsewhere.  Which makes sense if one considers that for most of 
the last three decades the most powerful members of the UNSC were also the core 
members of NATO.  Therefore, it is not surprising they might have had a greater interest 
in intervening in conflicts so close to home.   
However, why the discrepancy between Asia and Africa?  Although the European 
bias is easier to explain, the bias towards Africa is less so.  One explanation might be 
“regional norms,” according to Gilligan and Stedman,   
“Whereas the Organization of African Unity gradually changed its stance in the 1990s 
toward conditional acceptance of interference in state sovereignty to encourage conflict 
resolution and war termination, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 	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and states in the larger Asian region have consistently resisted the suggestion that 
humanitarian principles take precedence over state sovereignty and noninterference.”74 
 
This suggestion that a change in sovereignty norms might be the key explanatory variable 
is interesting, because most modern realists and neo-liberals tend not to treat norms as 
causal variables.  Yet this kind of explanation poses less of a problem for 
“constructivists.”   
The role of emotions and norms in causal explanations are quite limited in most 
stereotypical “rational choice” models, but norms, culture, and increasingly emotions are 
at the theoretical core of most constructivist theories.  For example, Hedley Bull 
emphasized the role of values, norms, and institutions in world politics.75  Bull argued 
that there is such a thing as “international society,” because state diplomacy operates 
according to mutually understood rules.  Contrary to the realist view that states are 
engaged in a perpetual struggle for power in an anarchic system, Bull argues that 
international society is composed of states tied together by a common set of values, rules, 
and institutions – or common culture.  Although Bull may not have considered himself a 
constructivist, his work on “international society” is a touchstone for most constructivists. 
Building on Bull’s idea of international society, Evan Luard argues that, “it is the 
ideology of international society – the set of assumptions and expectations which are 
established there – which determine the thinking of individual decision-makers, and so 
the way they will respond when faced with a particular threat, dignity, or affront.”76  
Luard also argues it is impossible to understand state behavior “without regard to the 	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social context, the international environment, within which they exist.”77  Thus, like 
Waltz he posits that the international environment helps explain state behavior, but Luard 
like Bull treats this environment as a society structured by social norms and beliefs.   
This emphasis on the role “international society” has in constructing states’ 
preferences and behavior can be found in the work of John Meyer.  According to Meyer, 
states adhere to global norms and enact related social policies in order to be regarded as 
legitimate members of “world society.”78  Further, the macrostructure of “world society” 
is conceptualized as a global cultural frame with historic roots in Western society, which 
constitute individual and collective actors.79  This “more or less worldwide rationalistic 
culture” demonstrates “less a set of values and norms, and more a set of models defining 
the nature, purpose, resources, technologies, controls, and sovereignty of the proper 
nation state.”80  Likewise, Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein assert, “These models are 
politically constructed and contested within international organizations, transnational 
professions, the sciences and other ‘epistemic communities,’ social movement networks, 
and so forth.”81  Thus, according to this logic, the international model for using force can 
be constructed and contested within international organizations, such as the UNSC, by 
people in an epistemic community, such as the one that developed the R2P doctrine. 
Similarly, Alexander Wendt emphasizes how ideas and culture construct identities 
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and consequently the international system.82   Wendt, Katzenstein, and others argue that 
identity and interests are socially constructed, and thus norms and culture play a much 
larger role in the motivations for state behavior than most Realists would admit.83  Wendt 
also argues that collective identities can be formed around a shared understanding of 
“common fate,” and that cooperation, collective action, and normative convergence are 
more possible under conditions of anarchy than most Realists might allow for.84  
Constructivists also tend to offer a different theory for how the international 
system changes.  According to Kratochwil: 
“Domestic and international actors reproduce or alter systems through their actions.  Any 
given international system does not exist because of immutable structures, but rather the 
very structures are dependent for their reproduction on the practices of the actors.  
Fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their 
practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction…  
Fundamental changes in international politics occur when beliefs and identities of 
domestic actors are altered thereby also altering the rules and norms that are constitutive 
of their political practices.”85 
 
This is a more holistic theory for change, one that emphasizes how states shape and are 
shaped by international norms.  Another way of thinking about this is: states are 
socialized into international society, and the culture of international society is constructed 
through states’ collective behavior.   
 Thus, shared ideas help structure society.  The rules, norms, and beliefs we learn 
help constitute our individual identity and in turn the structure of society.  Social learning 
is crucial to human development, because the complexity of our environment implies that 	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we cannot learn everything by trial and error.86  Learning by observation, or imitation, 
facilitates a much quicker spreading of successful behaviors throughout a community.87  
The language we speak, the familial traditions we are taught, the habits we emulate, and 
the meanings we share help construct our communities and culture.   
 Culture is not deterministic, however, and individual agency is crucial to any 
explanation of behavior.  Yet, the degree of agency is constrained an actor’s belief system 
and knowledge of the world.  In other words, the choices available to us are constrained 
by what we consider legitimate options.  Beyond ignorance, certain choices are 
considered taboo, and therefore, unlikely to be chosen.  For example, as Nina Tannewald 
demonstrated, since 1945, the use of nuclear weapons has been considered taboo by 
every US president.88  Further, our beliefs not only constrain our decisions, but also shape 
our desires and preferences.  As Wendt says, “we want what we want because of how we 
think about it.”89  Therefore, preferences can never be truly exogenously given.  They are 
constituted through an actor’s interaction with the world, and the culture or social 
environment he or she is embedded.   
Another of the key roles culture or social context seems to play is in constraining 
certain emotions.  We can be socialized to restrain emotions such as fear, anger, or lust.  
Norbert Elias wrote of “the civilizing process,” which he argued was a process of 
restraining emotions or “drives.”  According to Elias,  
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“The affect-structure of human beings is a whole.  We may call particular drives by 
different names according to their different directions and functions.  We may speak of 
hunger and the need to spit, the sexual drive and of aggressive impulses, but in life these 
different drives are no more separable that the heart from the stomach or the blood in the 
brain from the blood in the genitalia.  They complement and in part supersede each other; 
a disturbance here manifests itself there.  In short, they form a kind of circuit in the human 
being, a partial unit within the total unity of the organism.  Their structure is still opaque in 
many respects, but their socially imprinted form is of decisive importance for the 
functioning of a society as to the individuals within it.”90 
 
Elias suggested that emotions were imprinted or embedded in social structures.  For 
example, fear is inherent in shame – the fear of being designated inferior – and thus 
shame helps taboos, such as blasphemy or incest, remain socially marginalized.  
Moreover, Elias argued that the spread of particular norms of self-restraint over time in 
Europe constructed a more “civil” society where aggressive instincts were increasingly 
suppressed.   
How and why actors are socialized, and what fosters pro-social norms are at the 
center of much of the constructivist literature.  This is also at the core of most theories 
regarding how humanitarian norms evolve within international institutions.  According to 
Alastair Iain Johnston: 
“Constructivists suggest that international institutions in particular are often agents of 
counter-realpolitik socialization.  They posit a link between the presence of particular 
normative structures embodied in institutions and the incorporation of these norms in 
behavior by the actor/agent at the unit-level.  It is in institutions where the interaction of 
activists, so-called norm entrepreneurs, is most likely, and where social conformity 
pressures are most concentrated.  Institutions often have corporate identities, traits, 
missions, normative cores, and official discourses at odds with realpolitik axioms, indeed 
at odds with the socialization pressures that many realists argue come with being 
sovereign, insecure actors operating in anarchy.”91 
 
The UNSC’s principle mission is to maintain international “peace and security,” which is 	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inherently a cooperative goal guided by normative concerns.  Thus, if we follow the logic 
presented by Johnston the UNSC should be a ready environment to observe social 
influence.92  As mentioned above, social influence is at the core of my argument, 
therefore, I will dedicate the next chapter to a fuller discussion of it.  
Martha Finnemore has also written extensively on the evolution of international 
use of force norms.  Finnemore shows how the purposes for intervention, and the rules 
guiding how they are carried out have changed over the years.93  For example, it is no 
longer seen as appropriate to militarily intervene in a country to collect debts, due in 
much part to the successes of lawyers at the 1907 Hague Conference in “legalizing” 
diplomacy.  The Second Hague Conference “was the first forum that aimed at universal 
state representation,” and was a key part of the process of internalizing the norm of 
sovereign equality, which rests on an assumption of states having legal equality 
regardless of their material inequality. 
Further, how and why states militarily intervene has changed, according to 
Finnemore, due to three factors.  First, “who is human has changed.”  It used to be only 
Christians but now non-Christians are considered part of humanity due to the successes 
of the human rights, decolonization, and self-determination movements. Therefore they 
are generally considered worthy of protection.  Finnemore agues that empathy was 
critical to this change.  Second, “how we intervene has changed.”  It is no longer seen as 
appropriate to intervene unilaterally, multilateral intervention is the norm.  International 
institutions and/or organizations, such as the UNSC, are typically the forum for deciding 	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when an intervention is legitimate and the rules for how interventions should be carried 
out.  This is due to the increasing internalization of the sovereign equality norm.  Third, 
“our military goals and definitions of ‘success’ have also changed.”  Intervening states 
used to simply install a government, now they “install a process, namely, elections.”  This 
is also tied up with the increasing internalization of self-determination norms.  
Essentially, Finnemore argues that over time people have come to expect that the use of 
force will only be used as a last resort to protect people from violence, that the 
intervention will be a multilateral action endorsed by legitimate international 
organizations, and that the end goal should be building a lasting peace and a sovereign 
democratic state.   
Whether these expectations will always be met is a separate argument, because 
what Finnemore is arguing is that these expectations order international society.  
Moreover, the shift in these expectations or norms, according to Finnemore, have less to 
do with changes in material power and more to do with an evolution in thinking.  In other 
words, ideas, beliefs, and feelings are the key causal factors in international relations not 
wealth, military capacity, or the material structure of the international system.  Material 
incentives matter, but they cannot explain the shift in use of force norms, or expressed 
purposes of intervention. 
Finnemore shows that the changing beliefs about the use of force have more to do 
with the evolution of the “international order” – or “the regularized patterns of behavior 
among states, what some might call the structure of the system and others the rules of the 
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system.”94  In other words, the big shifts in behavior do not seem to stem from a change 
in military power but from how states define their interests in relationship to what sort of 
behavior they expect from other states.   
For example, during the “balance-of-power” system of the 18th century, according 
to Finnemore, it was accepted to go to war in pursuit of glory, wealth, and territorial 
dominance.  Yet, during the subsequent “Concert of Europe” system, following the 
Napoleonic Wars, war was less likely to be seen as glorious, war was seen as needing 
Great Power approval, and the Vienna guarantee made territorial expansion a collective 
concern requiring Great Power consent.95  In the “spheres of influence” system of the 
Cold War, intervention was typically only undertaken under the auspices of either the US 
or USSR, and only within their corresponding “spheres.”  The US and its allies typically 
agreed not to intervene in the Soviet sphere, and vice versa.  The current system, which 
Finnemore, does not define but describes as being defined by “strong multilateralism 
norms,” an abhorrence of interstate war, and an emerging commitment to intervention in 
the name of human rights.  In sum, Finnemore supports the argument that empathy and 
social influence best explain the shift in use of force norms within the UNSC.  Yet, she 
does not explain the specific mechanism for this change.  I will dedicate the next chapter 
to this task. 
Finally, most realists would likely argue that at the end of the day the change in 
use of force norms were caused by material self-interests.  According to this logic, the 
states supporting R2P actually wanted more authority to use force in their self-interest.  	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Hence, R2P is just a fig leaf for a power grab.  Further, less powerful Council members 
likely went along with the adoption of R2P in order to receive side-payments from 
Council members pushing for change.  Although the side payments argument is 
interesting, especially because these could be made secretly, given that the entire General 
Assembly adopted R2P, however, and the UNSC subsequently did unanimously, side 
payments unlikely explain such unanimity.  Perhaps in particular cases a side payment 
was the key factor, but this does not appear to be the case according to my research.  
Also, as will be shown below, the traditional realist explanation makes little sense in light 
of the fact that an epistemic community and the UN Secretariat pushed the Council to 
accept R2P.  Moreover, based upon the history of imperialism and colonialism, many UN 
members, such as China, had strong material incentives to reject R2P.  So many that it is 
highly implausible they were all bought off by the US and its allies.  Thus, most 
traditional realist explanations for the adoption of R2P make little sense, especially in 
light of the evidence presented in Section II.  I argue, therefore, that a more plausible 
explanation can be found elsewhere, specifically, in the work of scholars focusing on 
social influence and empathy.  The next two chapters will discuss this work in more 
detail.  
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2. Social Influence: 
 
“Conformity emerges as an outgrowth of the power of social rules and roles.  When you 
adopt social rules, you are to some extent conforming with social expectations about how 
to think or behave.  People often tend to assume behaviors and opinions of the group.  In 
return for such subservience, members of the group hope to obtain the help, approval, 
support, and even affection of other group members.”96 
 
       - Rose McDermott  
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the role of social influence in explaining state 
behavior.  Several of the specific mechanisms or micro-processes of social influence such 
as persuasion and especially status-seeking are clearly part of the reason for the change in 
use of force norms, as will be demonstrated in Section II.  There is evidence that a desire 
to be recognized as a “responsible state” is a large part of the reason for China’s growing 
cooperation in international organizations.97  This also helps explain much of China’s 
support for PKOs since 1999.98  Moreover, seeking honor might help explain why China 
and other Council members authorize the use of force when there is no clear material 
interest at stake.   
To begin with, “Social influence refers to a class of micro-processes that elicit 
pro-normative behavior through the distribution of social rewards and punishments,” 
according to Johnston.99  “The rewards and punishments are social because only groups 
can provide them, and only groups whose approval an actor values will have this 
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influence. ”100  Hence, “social influence rests on the influenced actor having some prior 
identification with a relevant reference group,” such as the UN Security Council.101  
While material rewards such as cash payments are easier to measure, social rewards are 
more difficult to quantify.  A psychological sense of well being stemming from an 
elevation in social status is difficult to observe and measure.   
Yet Phillip Zimbardo shows that people often conform to the position of a group 
in order to gain approval from the group, even absent direct material reward.102  Social 
influence, therefore, can be driven by a desire to maximize social status, prestige, 
reputation, image, or honor.   It can also be driven by a desire to avoid a loss in status 
through shaming and other social sanctions.  The benefits of status may lead to material 
rewards, however, and social rewards are often pursued egotistically.  Consequently, 
although social influence may have the effect of promoting pro-social norms, such as 
cooperation or altruism, it still may be driven by self-interest.  “Social influence occurs 
when an actor attempts to maximize the accumulation of status markers in the context of 
a relatively fixed and unquestioned self-categorization,” according to Johnston.103   So if 
an actor is a member of a group founded on altruistic principles, the actor may seek 
opportunities to behave altruistically, which can make it difficult to distinguish self-
interest from pure altruism.   
Yet this type of self-interest differs from traditional notions of self-interest in that 
there is no direct material reward.  Social influence, therefore, differs from typical realist 	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explanations for behavior because it depends upon social rewards and punishments from 
a group rather than material costs and benefits.  Further, the identity and purpose of the 
group affect the behavior of the actor trying to maximize status within the group.  In 
other words, interests can be defined by the culture of the group, rather than being fixed 
by nature or a material structure.   
Persuasion is another tool of social influence.  Persuasion, according to Perloff, 
“is an activity or process in which a communicator attempts to induce a change in belief, 
attitude, or behavior of another person or group of persons through the transmission of a 
message in a context in which the persuadee has some degree of free choice.”104   
Crawford argues that many of the most significant changes in the international 
system, such as the abolition of slavery and decolonization, are the result of persuasive 
ethical argument.105  Crawford discusses the conditions under which ethical arguments 
can be persuasive and describes the process.  She suggests ethical arguments generally 
are used to do one of three things: “uphold existing beliefs and practices, extend 
normative beliefs to new areas of practice, and change dominant practices.”106  The latter 
two may be crucial in explaining how dominant use of force norms and practices 
changed.  
Crawford provides evidence for how ethical arguments were more important than 
coercion and economic interests in the abolition of the international slave trade, 
decolonization, and the advent of humanitarian intervention.  She asserts:  
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“This argument about arguments offers an alternative theory of choice in international 
relations that is not based on rational actor theory, but on the role of practical reason and 
the importance of beliefs rooted in culture.  The major evolutionary or revolutionary 
changes of world politics are thus a consequence of reasoned choice – as much as change 
is due to accident or material forces and structures.”107 
 
Importantly, Crawford’s theory shows how identities, interests, and behavior can change, 
and consequently alter dominant cultures.   
Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and others offer similar theories regarding the 
role of argument in international relations.108  According to Risse, “Social constructivism 
often emphasizes learning and socialization processes in order to link social structure to 
agents…  arguing provides a mechanism for both learning and norms socialization in 
social settings.”109  By showing how socialized actors can be placed in environments 
where they might be re-socialized through argument, Risse offers a plausible explanation 
for how states might come to support norms that not only alter the status-quo, but may 
even work against their material interests.   
Yet, this logic relies on an important caveat, “Arguing and truth-seeking behavior 
presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative 
interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward 
reaching a consensus.”110  This is an important point, because it is not clear why states 
would inherently be so flexible in their interests.  According to Risse, however, states 
might be willing to alter their initial preferences on a particular issue because they have a 
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larger interest in international prestige.  He argues: “Sustained changes in human rights 
practices occur when governments become convinced through arguing processes that 
human rights constitute part of their collective identity as a modern member of the 
international community.”111  In sum, according to Johnston, Crawford, Risse, Sikkink, 
and others actors can be persuaded by ethical arguments in international institutions to 
adopt more humanitarian norms.  Thus, the power of social influence to change state 
behavior can be just as important, if not more so, than economic or strategic interests.   
Ian Hurd has also written extensively on the UNSC, and provides something of a 
caveat to the aforementioned theories.112  Hurd also argues that social status is an 
important interest for states, and the UNSC’s symbolic power can be used to advance 
social and strategic interests.113  According to Hurd: 
“I use the contestation over norms and law at the Council to argue three broader themes 
about international politics: first, that states' perceptions about the legitimacy of 
international institutions is important in influencing state behavior; second, that this 
legitimacy creates powerful symbols in international relations that are strategically useful 
to states in the pursuit of their interests; and third, that the distribution of material power 
among states does not necessarily parallel the distribution of symbolic power, and so it is 
not uncommon for apparently strong states to be defeated by apparently weak ones when 
they fight over symbolic stakes. The norms of liberal internationalism are intersubjective 
resources useful in the strategic competition among states.”114  
 
Hurd explores “states' use of international norms and institutions in the pursuit of 
strategic interests.”  This behavior “straddles the realms of strategic choice and of norms, 
two worlds that are traditionally kept separate in IR theory.  By positing from the start 
that states are strategic actors embedded in a socially constructed environment,” Hurd 	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suggests “constructivism and rational choice are essential complements to each other in 
IR rather than antagonists.”115   Thus, Hurd finds common ground with rational-choice 
theorists, in that states typically employ a rational decision-making model.  Significantly, 
however, he suggests states use symbolic power in the pursuit of strategic interests, and 
importantly, that symbolic power trump material power in certain circumstances.   
Hurd’s arguments regarding the role of symbolic power, therefore, contribute to 
the social influence literature by showing that how symbols and norms can be used to 
change states’ strategic calculus.  Furthermore, Hurd’s focus on how legitimacy is 
constructed and contested within the Council supports Johnston’s arguments regarding 
treating international institutions as social environments.  Yet Hurd’s larger contribution 
is to remind us that it is often difficult to disentangle social and material incentives, 
because both satisfy an actor’s self-interest.  In other words, even in the absence of 
significant and direct material rewards a state may seek to maximize their social status in 
order to advance its long-term strategic interests.   
Ian Manners builds on this idea by presenting the concept of “normative power.”  
According to Manners: 
“The concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than 
material or physical. This means that its use involves normative justification rather than 
the use of material incentives or physical force. Clearly the use of normative justification 
implies a very different timescale and form of engagement in world politics.  In this 
respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be ‘normatively 
sustainable’ – i.e. ‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others; ‘sustainable’ into the 
next generation.”116  
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Manners presents two examples of normative power.  “Two examples of the power of 
ideas and ideation in post-Cold War EU relations with the world include the idea of 
‘sustainable development’ and of ‘humanitarian intervention.’ In both cases the ideas 
came from within the UN system, were adopted into the EU treaty base, and then 
eventually promoted and practiced in EU external relations.”117 He goes on to say, 
“Normative power should secondly be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to 
promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then 
the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige 
or shame.”118  Here we see the influence of the aforementioned theories, especially the 
emphasis on persuasion through ethical argument, and the interest in social status.  
Status seeking, or a drive for self-esteem is one of the recurring themes 
throughout much of the literature regarding motivations.  Richard Ned Lebow also asserts 
that an interest in status is a leading cause of war.119  Lebow presents extensive evidence 
that shows far more wars were waged in search of status rather than security.120   
He also suggests that often states seek a specific type of social status: honor.  
According to Lebow, “Honor refers to the seemingly universal desire to stand out among 
one’s peers, which is often achieved by selfless, sometimes even sacrificial, adherence to 
social norms.”121  This may also help explain why so many states support and engage in 
humanitarian interventions, especially when there is no clear material incentive to offset 
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the risks involved.  Acting altruistically provides an opportunity for states to gain honor.  
Risking soldiers’ lives in a military intervention for little to no immediate material reward 
gives states an opportunity to become a “hero.”  Although we may never know if or how 
often this is why states support humanitarian interventions, it is important to note this 
incentive exists in most cases. 
Yet even though an incentive to gain honor through defending human rights 
exists, all states also have an incentive to enforce their right to self-determination.  The 
UN Charter exemplifies a principled commitment to collective security and altruism, but 
it also commits UN members to resect the sovereignty and right to self-determination of 
other member-states.   Hence as Crawford points out: 
“[T]he possibility and practice of humanitarian interventions raises the question of how to 
reconcile clashing normative beliefs.  Specifically, the development of Western theories 
of sovereignty, as well as the long history of colonialism and the struggle for 
decolonization, generated a deserved respect for the legal and political concepts of self-
determination and non-intervention.  On the other hand, the development of human rights 
norms – which helped to create the conditions for decolonization – elevates the status of 
the individual in world politics and challenges the inviolability of sovereignty as a legal 
protection for states which violate human rights.  Some even argue that states vitiate their 
sovereignty when they violate the social contract by allowing or engaging in human 
rights abuses.  Humanitarian intervention thus pits powerful normative beliefs and 
international legal conventions against each other: state sovereignty and the rule of law 
may be violated to protect or promote individual rights.”122 
 
This tension helps explain the initial resistance to R2P from many UN member-states, 
especially those with a history of colonialism and/or Western interference.  This is 
another reason why China’s acceptance of R2P is so interesting, as will be discussed in 
Section II.    
In conclusion, the importance of social influence to international relations is well 	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established, as this chapter shows.  Some of the specific mechanisms of social influence 
such as persuasion and especially status-seeking are clearly part of the reason for the 
change in use of force norms, as will be shown in Section II.  There is evidence that a 
desire to be recognized as a “responsible state” is a large part of the reason for China’s 
growing cooperation in international organizations.123  This also helps explain much of 
China’s support for PKOs since 1999.124  Moreover, seeking honor might help explain 
why other Council members support or authorize the use of force when there is no clear 
material interest at stake.  Yet, the role of empathy is also part of the story, and will be 
discussed in detail below. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See: Carlson, 2004; Liu et al., 2004; A. Johnston, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2009; Wuthnow, 
2009; Teitt, 2008, 2013; Lanteigne and Hirono, 2013.  
124 Stahle, 2008; Teitt, 2008, 2013; Gill and Huang, 2009; Wuthnow, 2009; Lanteigne and Hirono, 
2013; Marlier and Kao, 2014.   
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3. Empathy: 
 
 “Yet war recurs.  The beast in man may glory in the carnage; the reason in man 
rebels.”125 -­‐ Kenneth Waltz 
 
I argue that not only reason, but also empathy causes us to recoil at the horrors of 
war.  As Aristotle said, “To perceive is to suffer.”  Hence, to abhor violence is not just a 
rational response but also an emotional reaction.  The latter can be tied to the former, but 
most parents know that when toddlers see realistic violence they tend to hide their eyes, 
or even cry, regardless of the social context.  Perspective taking can allow us to feel the 
suffering of others, arouse sympathy, and in some circumstances provoke altruistic 
behavior.  This relates directly to my thesis.   
First, R2P institutionalizes empathy, by tasking Council-members with taking the 
perspective of individuals’ “needing support.”  This concern for individuals rather than 
states expanded the Council’s “circle of empathy,” which in turn expanded the Council’s 
“circle of protection.”  Second, I argue R2P also institutionalizes altruism by assigning 
the UNSC the responsibility and risk of using force, as a last resort, in order to protect 
vulnerable populations.  Peter Singer argues that altruism began as a genetically based 
drive to protect one's kin and community members but has developed into a consciously 
chosen ethic with an “expanding circle” of concern.126  Thus, R2P institutionalizes 
empathy, and according to the doctrine, demands not just sympathy but altruism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Waltz, 1959, pg. 224. 
126 P. Singer, 2011. 
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Although empathy and sympathy seem to increase based upon our proximity, 
familiarity, and association with those suffering, I suggest that globalization, mass media, 
and digital communications have greatly expanded most people’s “circle of empathy.”  
Epistemic communities can be successful in changing “collective minds” by using the 
mass media to show the suffering of others.  Moreover, they can help channel empathy 
into action by providing realistic policy recommendations, as will be discussed below.  
The use of mass media to provoke sympathy is not new (as pointed out by Bass above), 
however, the rapid growth of global communications has dramatically increased the 
potential power of the “CNN effect” described by Jacobsen above.   All of which helps 
explain the role of empathy in the expansion of the Security Council’s “circle of 
protection.”   
Although these may seem modest or superficial contributions to world politics, 
institutions that provoke empathy and altruism have over time helped make slavery, wars 
of conquest, and many other forms of violence considered illegitimate.127   “The reduction 
in war over several decades,” Joshua Goldstein shows, “that the international community 
is doing something right in trying to tame war.  We are winning the ‘war on war.’”128  
According to Goldstein, “the ‘international community’ consists primarily of national 
governments and the organizations they belong to, such as the UN…  It also includes 
nongovernmental actors and individuals, and it draws strength from people’s nascent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See: N. Crawford, 2002; Mueller, 2004; Finnemore 2003, Pinker 2011; for specific arguments 
explaining the role of empathy and altruism in the decline in violent practices and war over 
centuries.   
128 J. Goldstein, 2011, pg. 7.  Goldstein also provides the empirical data to back up the claim that 
war is on the decline, yet no less horrific to those affected by it. 
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identities as human beings, caring about others from different lands or tribes.”129  Steven 
Pinker also provides extensive evidence that an “expanding circle of empathy” is one of 
the key forces behind the worldwide decline in violence.130  “The science of empathy has 
shown that sympathy can promote genuine altruism, and that it can be extended to new 
classes of people when a beholder takes the perspective of a member of that class,” 
according to Pinker.131  
Unfortunately, because emotions like empathy are difficult to measure they are all 
too often left out of political science and international relations literature.  The study of 
preferences, attitudes, and norms has been at the core of much scholarship for the last few 
decades.  Waltz, Wendt, Jervis, Keohane, and many others have taught us quite a bit 
about why people think the way they do, but relatively little about why people feel the 
way they do.  There is large body of work on emotions, such as empathy, in political 
psychology.132  Yet there is relatively little work on how emotion influences decision-
making at the international level, and there is even less work on the role emotion plays in 
institutionalization.133  As mentioned above, I hope to help fill in some of the gaps in the 
literature by showing how empathy was integral to the institutionalization of R2P.  
Before turning to empathy specifically, however, I will first briefly discuss emotions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 J. Goldstein, 2011, pgs. 7-8. 
130 Pinker actually expands on the concept introduced by Peter Singer (1981).  Pinker also 
suggests the decline “also owes much to harder-boiled faculties like prudence, reason, fairness, 
self-control, norms and taboos, and conceptions of human rights,” Pinker, 2011, pgs. 572-573.  
131 Pinker, 2011, pg. 590.   
132 For comprehensive reviews of the literature see: Zajonc, 1998; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; 
Bradley 2000; G. Marcus 2000, 2003; Sears, Huddy, and Jervis (eds.) 2003; R. McDermott, 2004.  
133 For some examples of the work on emotion in IR see: Thomas U. Berger, 1996, 2012; J. 
Mercer, 1997, 2000, 2003; N. Crawford, 2000, 2002, 2013.  
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more broadly.  
Defining Emotions: 
According to the literature, at the core of emotion is feeling. 134   Carroll Izard 
defines emotional feeling as, “a phase of neurobiological activity that is sensed by the 
organism.  It is sensed and expressed even in children without a cerebral cortex.  This 
component of emotion is always experienced or felt, though not necessarily labeled or 
articulated or present in access consciousness.”135  The key aspect of this definition is that 
emotional feelings are felt not reasoned.  This is an important distinction, because 
feelings are not the result of rational deliberation.  Emotions at their core are “evolved 
and unlearned neurobiological activity.”136  They are instinctive rather than learned.   
Emotions, however, are complex and subject to cognitive processes or 
socialization.  The literature divides emotions into two categories that seem to reflect 
their level of cognitive processing and socialization: “basic emotions” and “emotion-
schemas.”  I will briefly discuss the first before turning to the latter. 
Basic emotions, such as joy, sadness, anger, and fear, “are emotions that organize 
and motivate rapid virtually automatic yet malleable responses that are critical in meeting 
immediate challenges to survival or well-being.”137   Basic emotions tend to affect action 
but not higher-order cognition.  In other words, they are more feeling than thought.   
Because they are particular sensations, it is difficult – perhaps impossible – to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Emotion is also referred to as “affect” in much of the psychology literature; however, I will use 
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135 Izard, 2009, pg. 5 (emphasis added). 
136 Izard, 2009, pg. 6. 
137 Izard, 2009, pg. 6. 
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embody oppositional basic emotions simultaneously.  For example, if a student fails an 
exam, she is unlikely to feel joy and sadness at the exact same time.  Although we may 
not be able to predict exactly why or what emotion someone may feel, we can predict that 
he or she is unlikely to feel positive and negative emotions simultaneously.  
Neuroscientists have observed that positive emotions, such as interest and joy, cause 
different reactions in the brain than negative emotions, such as anger, sadness, disgust, 
and fear.138  Anger may be followed shortly by happiness, but not simultaneously.  Thus, 
it is possible to ascribe a dominant basic emotion to an actor, at least temporarily. 
Basic emotions such as fear or anger at their core are pre-social.  An infant may 
become angry because she is hungry.  This does not require her to understand the 
“meaning” of hunger or anger; she simply has to feel them.  Likewise, if a person is 
falling from a tall building the fear she feels is not culturally embedded.  Fear may have 
different contextual causes, but the emotion is universal to all humans.   
Emotion-schemas, however, are more influenced by cognitions and culture.  
Emotion-schemas are the second type of emotions, and more complex than basic 
emotions because they are constituted by the interaction or overlap of the emotional and 
social components.   According to Izard:  
“Emotion schemas are causal or mediating processes that consist of emotion and 
cognition continually interacting dynamically to influence mind and behavior. It is the 
dynamic interaction of these distinct features (emotion and cognition) that enables an 
emotion schema, acting in the form of a situation-specific factor or a trait of 
temperament/personality, to have its special and powerful effects on self-regulation and 
on perception, thought, and action.”139 
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The key aspect of emotion-schemas is their capacity to form a personality trait.  In other 
words, an emotional feeling can become a defining characteristic of identity.  According 
to Izard, “Positive and negative emotion schemas may have a relatively brief duration or 
continue over an indefinitely long time course… Frequently recurring emotion schemas 
may stabilize as emotion traits or as motivational components of 
temperament/personality traits.”140  We might think of this trait formation as the 
emergence of a new equilibrium, which is the result of a feedback loop destabilizing the 
ex ante equilibrium of an actor’s identity.  In other words, recurring emotions can become 
motivational traits that define interests. 
From Emotion to Action: 
 In addition to the research on how emotion affects individuals, there is a growing 
body of work on how emotions affect groups of people.141  For example, Elaine Hatfield, 
Richard Rapson, and Yen-Chi Le present a theory for “emotional contagion,” which 
attempts to explain how emotions can be “caught.”  They posit that: 
“[T]he process of emotional contagion consists of three stages: mimicry, feedback, and 
contagion.  People tend to (a) to automatically mimic the facial expressions, vocal 
expressions, postures, and instrumental behaviors of those around them, and thereby (b) 
to feel a pale reflection of others’ emotions as a consequence of such feedback.  The 
result is that people tend (c) to catch one another’s emotions…  By attending to this 
stream of tiny moment-to-moment reactions, people are able to ‘feel themselves into’ the 
emotional lives of others.”142 
 
According to Franz De Waal, “The next evolutionary step occurs when emotional 
contagion is combined with appraisal of the other’s situation and attempts to understand 
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the cause of the other’s emotions.”143  This often leads to “sympathetic concern,” or 
“concern about another’s state and attempts to ameliorate this state.”144  In turn, this can 
provoke “empathic perspective-taking: the capacity to take another’s perspective – e.g., 
understanding another’s specific situation and needs separate from one’s own – 
combined with vicarious emotional arousal.”145  Hence, “sympathetic concern” and 
“empathic perspective-taking” involve not just feeling the suffering of others, but seeking 
to understand the source of the suffering in order to end it.  “A major manifestation of 
empathic perspective-taking is so-called targeted helping, which is help fine-tuned to 
another’s specific situation and goals.”146  This chain of responses began with feelings, 
which affected decisions, which led to action.  
Thus, empathy can move from emotion to decision-making to action.  Although 
the research is still unsettled, and we are still at the early stages of understanding how 
empathy impacts behavior, it seems clear from the aforementioned that empathy effects 
decision-making.  As Arne Johan Vetlesen suggests,  
“Emotions anchor us to the particular moral circumstance, to the aspect of a situation 
that addresses us immediately, to the here and now.  To ‘see’ the circumstance and to see 
oneself as addressed by it, and thus to be susceptible to the way a situation affects the 
weal and woe of others, in short to identify a situation as carrying moral significance in 
the first place – all of this is required in order to enter the domain of the moral, and none 
of it would come about without the basic emotional faculty of empathy.”147 
 
Further, as Frans de Waal argues, “Without the emotional engagement brought 
about by empathy, it is unclear what could motivate the extremely costly helping 	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behavior occasionally observed in social animals.”148  Sending troops into a foreign 
conflict to protect another state’s people is typically a risky proposition, and often there 
are little to no significant material gains to offset such risk.   
C. Daniel Batson suggests “empathic concern” may help explain this behavior.  
According to Batson, 
“[E]mpathic concern is not a single, discrete emotion but includes a whole constellation.  
It includes feelings of sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow, 
sadness, upset, distress, concern, and grief… empathic concern is other-oriented in the 
sense that it involves feeling for the other – feeling sympathy for, compassion for, sorry 
for, distressed for, concerned for, and so on.  Although feelings of sympathy and 
compassion are inherently other-oriented, we can feel sorrow, distress, or concern that is 
not oriented toward someone else, as when something bad happens directly to us.  Both 
the other-oriented and self-oriented versions of these emotions may be described as 
feeling sorry or sad, upset or distressed, concerned or grieved.”149 
 
More importantly, Batson posits that, “Empathic concern produces altruistic motivation.” 
150  This is the “empathy-altruism hypothesis.”  He also asserts, “by altruism I mean a 
motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare… Altruism can 
be juxtaposed to egoism, which is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of 
increasing one’s own welfare.”151  Thus, “altruistic motivation need not involve self-
sacrifice.  Pursuing the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare may involve cost to 
self, but it also may not.  Indeed, it may even involve self-benefit and the motivation still 
be altruistic as long as obtaining this self-benefit is an unintended consequence of 
benefiting the other, not the ultimate goal.”152  
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The “empathy-altruism hypothesis” may help explain why the UNSC has 
dramatically increased in humanitarian interventions since 1990, despite the risks 
involved.  According to what Peter Jacobsen calls the “CNN effect,” the rise of the 24 
hour global news coverage and the growth of international communications due to 
globalization makes human suffering much more visible. 153  This increases the chance 
and scale of provoking empathic concern, and consequently altruism.  Thus, humanitarian 
interventions are more frequent because more people demand them as Gilligan and 
Steadman also suggested above, and they do so out of empathic concern as suggested by 
Batson. 
Although Jacobsen’s research seems to support Batson’s empathy-altruism 
hypothesis, he presents an important caveat.  Jacobsen examines the impact of five 
explanatory factors in a focused comparison of five peace enforcement missions.154  
Jacobsen finds evidence for two distinct motivations, one driven by self-interest 
regarding the material consequences of clear interstate aggression, and one animated by 
empathy precipitated by massive human suffering.  The two motivations operate 
differently.  States are willing to take higher levels of casualties when national interests 
are at stake than they are when only humanitarian motivations are present.  The “CNN 
effect” is real, according to Jacobsen, but it only operates when there is both a high 
probability of success and low probability of casualties.  In other words, empathy plays a 
greater role than in the past, but altruism is still constrained by material interests.  Hence, 
in cases where the UNSC may not want to risk intervening against a state with a powerful 	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military, those seeking protection cannot rely on sympathy, as the United Nations’ 
collective failure to protect people in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, etc. showed.   
The ICISS, therefore, tried to design a doctrine that not only provokes perspective 
taking, but also more effectively channels empathy into responsible altruism.155  In certain 
respects, the authors were successful.  The responsibility to protect doctrine was 
unanimously adopted by the UNSC (Resolution 1674, April 28, 2006).156  Further, as 
Edward Luck suggests, “the fact that the humanitarian imperative shows signs of taking 
hold in national decision-making processes, however slowly and unevenly, and that 
public acceptance of a shared responsibility to protect is becoming commonplace, is 
remarkable in historical and political terms.”157  Moreover, when situations like the crisis 
in Syria occur, many chastise the UNSC for failing in their responsibility to protect.  This 
expectation reflects a change in the Council’s moral frame of reference.158 
The UNSC is an extraordinarily complex organization.  Considering that states 
representing millions and even a billion people are treated as individuals within the 
Council makes it difficult to study.  Yet it shares many of the same qualities of other 
collective or corporate actors.  According to Wendt, corporate identities are “the intrinsic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See: G. Evans and Sahnoun 2001; Thakur, 2006; and J. Traub, 2007.  All offer first-hand 
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authors of the original ICISS report.  
156 Also, the mandate to protect civilians in UNPKO has been consistently integrated into every 
UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force since January of 2000 (S/Res/1289).  The UNSC 
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self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality.”159   The components of social 
identity are the “sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the 
perspective of others, that is, as a social object.”160   These “sets of meaning” or roles can 
be found in culture, which helps socialize multiple actors into a unified collective identity.  
Cederman and Daase argue that collective identity requires “some notion of group 
consciousness… to constitute the group’s ‘collective mind.’”161   This “collective mind” 
allows a corporate actor to work towards collective goals, such as defense, or in the case 
of the UNSC, the maintenance of international peace. 
As Crawford states: 
“Organizations are not simply an aggregation or magnification of individual power and 
material resources.  They are also more than social groups. Organizations are the 
coordinated action of many individuals, bound together by their knowledge of particular 
beliefs and structured routines.  Organizations are collective or corporate moral agents in 
the sense that they have the capacity to act, albeit under constraints, and in the sense they 
have the capacity to deliberate about both the ends and the means of action.”162 
 
Thus, although there are enormous risks of reification, it is plausible to argue that the 
UNSC can act as a moral agent capable of not only empathy but also altruism.  
For example, by adopting R2P the Council expanded on its capacity for empathy 
and altruism.  An organization already founded on such principles, sought to become 
even more empathetic and altruistic.  Moreover, as will be shown below, it put in place 
rules, procedures, and allocated resources to help put these principles in practice.  
Institutionalization occurs when particular norms become rules, roles, procedures 	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63 
and policies.  For example, the UNSC decided that it will not just attempt to prevent 
interstate war, but when necessary try and prevent ethnic cleansing or genocide.  The 
adoption of the R2P doctrine was an attempt by the Council to institutionalize their role, 
and ideal procedures for dealing with “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”  
Institutionalization occurs at several levels and in stages.163  At the first level, 
meta-institutionalization, the organization identifies, defines and adopts an area of 
concern. For example, when the United Nations formed, its principle purpose was to 
promote and help provide peace and security among states.   At the next level of 
institutionalization decision-making procedures and roles for the organization are put in 
place.  At the third level of institutionalization, the organization alters knowledge-
building procedures in order to integrate new areas of concern. As will be discussed in 
greater detail in Section II, R2P changed the knowledge building procedures and role of 
the UNSC for dealing with genocide, ethnic cleansing and other forms of mass violence. 
Institutionalization entails specifying ideas, beliefs, and norms are so that they 
become the guidance for rules, roles, procedures and policies.  An idea or norm has been 
institutionalized within an organization when the standard operating procedures are 
changed to accord with the new beliefs.164  Over time, institutionalization helps make 
norms seem taken for granted. 
Once beliefs are institutionalized, it is difficult to change organizations, especially 
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those dedicated to security such as the UNSC.165  Change is often the result of long-term 
efforts to reorient an organization by a leader or dedicated pressure group.166  In the case 
of R2P, an epistemic community grew around an idea of protecting people from 
genocide, and pushed the Council and member-states to expand their circle of protection.  
Another catalyst for changing an organization’s institutions is a significant external 
shock, which clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of status quo ante institutions.167  As 
will be discussed in Section II, the impact of the mass killings in Rwanda and Srebrenica 
had such an effect on the Council.  
The Role of Empathy in the Institutionalization of R2P: 
As stated above, R2P “implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of view 
of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considering 
intervention.”168   This implies perspective taking which takes into account the suffering 
of individuals.  According to the Oxford Dictionary empathy means “the ability to 
understand and share the feelings of another,” which is what the authors of R2P intended 
to institutionalize in the UNSC.  As Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, two of ICISS’s 
principle authors, recently stated: 
“ICISS was successful in repositioning the international consensus because we made the 
core sustaining idea not the ‘right to intervene’ but the ‘responsibility to protect.’  We 
quickly discovered the visceral hostility across the developing world to any so-called 
right of intervention, for any purpose, rooted in these countries’ experience of Western 
missions civilsatrice in the era of colonialism.  The developing countries remain deeply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 See: Posen, 1984; S. Rosen, 1991; Zisk, 1993; Avant, 1994; Murray and Millett, 1996; Kier, 
1997.  For a broader discussion of the institutionalization of normative beliefs see also N. 
Crawford, 2002.  
166 See: Jackie Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, (eds.), 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 
1998; Evangelista, 1999; N. Crawford, 2002; Speth and Haas, 2006. 
167 Marlier and Crawford, 2013. 
168 ICISS, 2001, pg. 17, para. 2.29, (emphasis added). 
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suspicious of the self-serving hidden agenda of geopolitical and commercial interests 
behind such claims.  To dismiss their claims is to deny their history and disrespect their 
collective memory.  Unlike humanitarian intervention, R2P puts the needs and interests 
of the victims of atrocities ahead of those of the intervening powers.  It is victim and 
people centered, whereas ‘humanitarian intervention’ privileges the perspectives, 
preferences, and priorities of the intervening states.  Unlike humanitarian intervention, 
which is only about military coercion, R2P embraces a whole spectrum of preventive and 
reactive responses, with coercive military action reserved only for the most extreme and 
exceptional cases.”169 
 
 
By effectively assigning the UNSC the responsibility of all peoples’ security everywhere, 
R2P greatly expanded the “circle of empathy” of the Council.  For example, by 
institutionalizing R2P, the UNSC is now formally expected to care not just about the 
deaths brought on by interstate war, but about civilians being killed in domestic conflicts.  
Thus, although R2P at this point is not deeply institutionalized, especially on the national 
level, the empathy it may provoke could eventually be critical to its deeper 
institutionalization. 
As mentioned earlier, studies on empathy show that it can provoke pro-social 
behavior.  According to Pinker, 
“[H]umanitarian reforms are driven in part by an enhanced sensitivity to the experiences 
of living things and a genuine desire to relieve their suffering.  And as such, the cognitive 
process of perspective-taking and the emotion of sympathy must figure in the explanation 
for many reductions in violence.  They include institutionalized violence such as cruel 
punishments, slavery, and frivolous executions; the everyday abuse of vulnerable 
populations such as women, children, homosexuals, racial minorities, and animals; and 
the waging of wars, conquests, and ethnic cleansings with a callousness to their human 
costs.”170 
 
This “enhanced sensitivity” to the suffering of others is fostered by the growing role of 
mass media.  As Bass, Jacobsen and others suggest the more we learn about other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 G. Evans and Thakur, 2013, pg. 202. 
170 Pinker, 2011, pg. 590. 
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humans suffering the more likely we are to act to alleviate it.171  For example, Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin was the best selling novel of the 19th century.  It 
helped people empathize with the plight of slaves, and led many to join the abolitionist 
cause.172  The abolitionist movement also contains an early version of an epistemic 
community exemplified by Harriet Beecher Stowe, Frederick Douglass, and others.  One 
of the key roles of the humanitarian epistemic community, therefore, is to use the mass 
media to alert people to the suffering of others.  Groups such as Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, and the Red Cross work to ensure that leaders and citizens know 
about human rights abuses occurring within and beyond their own country.  Much of the 
work of the UN Secretariat consists of commissioning and disseminating independent 
reports on humanitarian crises (I will discuss several of the most influential such reports 
in Section II).  Many of these commissions consist of members of the R2P epistemic 
community.  
Certain members of the R2P epistemic community have been very successful 
using the mass media.  For example, Samantha Power’s bestselling book “A Problem 
From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide won the Pulitzer Prize, and eventually 
helped her become the first person to head up the US Secretary of State’s R2P office, and 
the current US Ambassador to the United Nations (I will discuss her role in the R2P 
epistemic community further in Section II).173  Her success in many ways demonstrates 
the influence of the epistemic community, and how empathy can be used to promote pro-
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172 Goldner, 2001. 
173 Power, 2002. 
   
    
67 
social norms, such as altruism. 
Empathy by itself, however, is not enough to consistently alter behavior.  
“Empathy,” according to Pinker, “in the morally relevant sense of sympathetic concern, 
is not an automatic reflex of our mirror neurons.  It can be turned on and off and even 
inverted into counterempathy, namely feeling good when someone else feels bad and vise 
versa.”174  Further, when people are in competition they often seem to take pleasure in the 
pain of their opponent.175  In other words, empathy may lead to pro-social behavior such 
as altruism, or it may not.  As Pinker reminds us: 
 “Empathy has surely been historically important in setting off epiphanies of concern for 
members of overlooked groups.  But the epiphanies are not enough.  For empathy to 
matter, it must goad changes in policies and norms that determine how the people in 
those groups are treated.  At these critical moments, a newfound sensitivity to the human 
costs of a practice may tip the decisions of elites and the conventional wisdom of the 
masses.  But… abstract moral argumentation is also necessary to overcome the built-in 
strictures on empathy.  The ultimate goal should be policies and norms that become 
second nature and render empathy unnecessary.  Empathy like love, is in fact not all you 
need.”176 
 
Thus, empathy is a necessary but insufficient cause of humanitarian reforms.  
Hence, many members of the R2P epistemic community not only seek to provoke 
empathy through the mass media, but also suggest ways to channel it into action.  “The 
essential element of R2P is the international responsibility to act,’’ as Thomas Weiss 
points out. 177  Hence, the importance of R2P is that the UN has formally institutionalized 
it, and that it formally prescribes altruistic action by the UNSC. 
The Oxford Dictionary defines altruism as: “the belief in or practice of 	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175 Lanzetta and Englis, 1989. 
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177 Weiss, 2007, pg. 56 (emphasis added). He adds, “with or without the approval of the host 
country.”  
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disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of others.”  Altruism, therefore, can 
be a belief and/or a behavior.  Altruism is commonly treated in the psychology literature 
as a motive to benefit another actor as an end in itself rather than as a means to some 
other end.178  In other words, most psychologists define altruism in terms of motives 
rather than behavior.   
This distinction is relevant to the institutionalization of R2P, because 
institutionalization of beliefs occur when people within an organization use beliefs to 
acquire and organize knowledge to formulate a response to conditions.179  By adopting 
R2P the UNSC incorporated empathy into its behavioral routines (as will be discussed in 
Section II), and bolstered altruism’s role in the Council’s founding principles.  Because 
altruism’s place in the Charter is taken for granted it often helps motivate behavior out of 
habit rather than calculation, and even when not actually put into practice it serves as a 
model for future action. 
As mentioned, altruism is already institutionalized throughout the UN Charter.  
The collective security arrangement upon which the UN is founded demands coming to 
the aid of a member-state when attacked, even if this poses a risk to the other members 
and is not in their strategic interest.   What R2P changed is that it demands the 
international community come to the aid of individuals who may be under threat from 
their own government.  Moreover, it often entails taking the risk of involvement civil 
wars and insurgencies that are difficult to manage, and can quickly become “quagmires.”  
Yet this risk is expected to be taken up by the UNSC as a last resort.   	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This responsibility, however, required a change in the UNSC’s organizational 
responsibility.  The UNSC always had a collective responsibility to stop interstate war, 
however, the responsibility for stopping intrastate conflict shifts the organization’s moral 
frame of reference from state to individual security.  By effectively expanding the 
UNSC’s “circle of empathy” to include every person everywhere, and demanding taking 
risks to protect them, the organization’s responsibility is immense.  
In sum, R2P institutionalizes empathy, by tasking Council-members with taking 
the perspective of individuals’ “needing support.”  This concern for individuals rather 
than states expanded the Council’s “circle of empathy,” which in turn expanded the 
Council’s “circle of protection.”  R2P also institutionalized altruism by assigning the 
UNSC the responsibility and risk of using force, as a last resort, in order to protect 
vulnerable populations.  Empathy has been a causal factor in many normative shifts 
throughout history.  Empathy can allow us to feel the suffering of others, often arouses 
sympathetic concern, and in some circumstances provokes altruistic action.  Epistemic 
communities can be successful in catalyzing this process by changing “collective minds,” 
through the mass media.  Moreover, they can help channel empathy into action by 
providing realistic policy recommendations, as exemplified by the role of the ICISS 
discussed below.  Although the use of the mass media to provoke sympathy is not new 
(as pointed out by Bass), the rapid growth of global communications over the past several 
decades has greatly expanded the humanity’s collective “circle of empathy.”  The “CNN 
effect” described by Jacobsen appears to be growing, and as will be shown in Section II 
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helped expand the Council’s “circle of protection.” Before moving on to Section II, 
however, I will conclude Section I below by a stating my argument more precisely.   
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4. My Argument and Hypothesis: 
 
  
Why did the Council expand its circle of protection?  My hypothesis is that this 
historic change was principally due to two overlooked factors: an epistemic community 
pushing the UNSC to become more empathetic, and Council members wanting to gain 
social status.  As I argued above, in order to adequately explain the development of R2P 
you must explain the significant role the epistemic community played.  And to adequately 
explain the significance of the epistemic community you must explain the significant role 
empathy played.  Further, to sufficiently explain the Council’s decision to adopt R2P you 
must explain the significance of China’s acceptance.  You simply cannot tell the story of 
R2P without empathy and social influence.  Put another way, they are the constants in the 
equation.   
Although I argue that empathy and status seeking are critical, my research also 
shows economic and strategic interests played a significant role.  For one thing, the P5 
countries are all among the world’s largest economies.  Each has global economic 
interests, which they treat as matters of national interest.  All members of the P5 do not 
always share the same interests in each case, however, at least one member nearly always 
has some material interest in every case.   
This helps explain why there is a degree of self-interest in expanding the circle of 
protection.  There is an incentive to expanding the authority to use force in domestic 
conflicts, because a Council member may want the right to intervene in a situation where 
mass violence/instability threatened its country’s economic interests.   
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Similarly, strategic interests also provide an incentive to expand the Council’s 
authority to intervene in domestic conflicts, especially for the P5.  All of the P5 have a 
global military presence.  Much is made of the scale and scope of US military bases 
around the world.   Although not as large as the American presence, each of the P5 has 
military assets across the globe.  Each also has military alliances with many states around 
the world.  This global reach has its own benefits, and therefore, is sometimes worth 
protecting and expanding.  In other words, all have inherent strategic interests in 
expanding the Council’s authority.   
Because an individual state has its own material interests, however, there is also 
an incentive to check the power of the group acting against these interests.  China and 
Russia’s initial resistance to adopting R2P arguably stems from this concern.   
As I will discuss in greater detail below, however, China’s growing acceptance of 
R2P most likely is due to being socialized to international norms, as suggested by 
Johnstone; and wanting status, or recognition as a “responsible power,” as suggested by 
Risse, Lebow, and others.  Moreover, in order to be recognized as such, states are 
expected to adopt the dominant human rights norms laid out in the UN Charter and 
Declaration of Human Rights.  This exemplifies how the identity of the group matters to 
social influence.  As will be discussed in detail in Section II, the UN was founded on 
many altruistic principles, and consequently there are social rewards for members to 
behave as such.  This helps explain why most states adhere to most human rights norms, 
most of the time.  The fact that states do not always do so, does not change the fact that 
states can gain status by adopting, upholding, and expanding human rights norms.   
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My research also leads me to believe that my hypothesis should apply to other 
levels and other issue areas.  There is evidence of this process at work in the abolition of 
slavery, the regulation of greenhouse gases, and other successful social movements.180  
State leaders may even be more prone to seeking “honor” international organizations, 
especially when they are seeking to legitimize their authority or win an election.   
The role of the epistemic community is likely key.  Based upon my research their 
influence seems to depend upon two factors: first, having a clear and realistic policy 
change they wish to enact; and second, having a critical mass of public support for such 
change.  The former is easier to define than the latter, because we often do not know how 
much is “critical” until a tipping point is passed.  Although I cannot put an exact number 
on the degree of public support for R2P (especially in countries such as China, where 
polling is difficult), I suggest below that 1999 offers a clear tipping point in the evolution 
of R2P.  
In conclusion, although others have argued empathy and social influence are 
important causal variables in international relations, as discussed above, few offer 
specific mechanisms or micro-processes demonstrating how these factors work.  I try to 
help fill this gap by demonstrating in Section II how an epistemic community pushed the 
Council to become more empathetic and altruistic, and how status seeking was critical to 
overcoming China’s resistance to change.  
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Section II: The Evolution of Use of Force Norms within the UNSC 
 
 
“The current debate on intervention for human protection purposes is itself both a product 
and a reflection of how much has changed since the UN was established.  The current 
debate takes place in the context of a broadly expanded range of state, non-state, and 
institutional actors, and increasingly evident interaction and interdependence among 
them.  It is a debate that reflects new sets of issues and new types of concerns.  It is a 
debate that is being conducted within the framework of new standards of conduct for 
states and individuals, and in a context of greatly increased expectations for action.”181 
 
 - Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
 
 
 
According to its Charter, the United Nations principle purpose is “the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”  Towards this end, and to be a member 
of the UN, states give the UNSC the authority to mandate the use of force.  Over time, 
the limits of this authority have evolved.  The foundation of this authority, however, 
comes from the Charter’s collective security agreement.  According to the Charter, 
members are duty bound to come to the defense of another member under attack.  This 
mutual defense pact was designed, however, to help try and prevent violent conflict 
between states not within states.   Yet with the formal adoption of the “Responsibility to 
Protect” (R2P) doctrine, the UNSC is expected to not only deter inter-state war, but also 
help stop intra-state conflict.  In other words, they have a collective responsibility to 
ensure security between and within states.   
R2P is still controversial, however, and not as deeply institutionalized as its 
proponents may wish.  Yet, other international organizations, such as the African Union, 
have also begun to institutionalize R2P.  Institutionalization is also occurring at the state-	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level, as exemplified by the aforementioned Samantha Power creating an office focusing 
on R2P issues within the US State Department.  The fact that R2P is beginning to be 
institutionalized beyond the UN shows the historic nature of R2P, but its real significance 
lies in the authority it gives the UNSC to mandate the use of force.  This section presents 
a history of UNSC use of force authorizations, the emergence of R2P, and how the 
Council expanded its circle of protection. 
There are several central questions guiding this section.  How and why has the 
UNSC’s authority to use force evolved since 1945?  How and why have the normative 
justifications for the use of force by the UNSC and its members changed?  By focusing 
on the changes in Council use of force authorizations, found in resolutions, we can track 
how the Council’s authority to use force changed over time.  Similarly, we can trace the 
evolution in Council members support and justification for authorizing the use of force.  
During UNSC meetings, members present their official position on authorizations prior to 
voting on resolutions.  Luckily, over six decades of resolutions authorizing the use of 
force, the votes of the Permanent Five members (P5), and their corresponding normative 
justifications are all catalogued and made available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/.   Thus, we can trace changes in use of force 
authorizations, voting patterns, and normative justifications over many years.   
Tracking such patterns provides us with a history Council action that allows us to 
put present behavior in context.  For example, after China did not vote to authorize the 
use of force in Libya in 2011, many suggested it was typical of their behavior in the 
Council.  Since 1990, however, China had voted in favor of 30 of 42 use of force 
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resolutions.  Further, from 1999 until the Libyan vote, Beijing voted in favor of 20 in a 
row (see Figure 1 above, and Table 1 in the Appendix).182  Yet this overall degree of 
support obscures China’s voting behavior in the 1990’s.  Beijing did not support 11 of the 
21 UNSC resolutions authorizing the use of force from 1990 through September 1999.  
Since then, however, China has voted in favor of 21 out of 22 UNSC resolutions 
authorizing the use of force, including a mission in the Ivory Coast just weeks after the 
Libya vote.  Although much attention is paid to China’s stance regarding Syria of late 
(discussed below), this change in voting behavior is significant.  This voting pattern also 
provides an observable record, which we can use to generate and test hypotheses.  In this 
section, therefore, I track the key votes and normative justifications of members of the 
Council, and the overall evolution of UNSC use of force authorizations, in order to 
support my hypothesis (discussed in detail in Section I).  
History suggests that the P5 have come to a relative normative convergence, in 
principle, regarding why the use of force may be necessary to protect civilians, even from 
their own government.   Yet there is still a degree of divergence over how and when it is 
appropriate to use force.  Much of the disagreement stems from their differing 
conceptions of sovereignty.  Essentially, China and Russia set less limits on sovereignty 
than the US, UK, and France.  They are less likely to authorize the use of force without 
consent than the NATO allies.  Further, when the P5 agree, Beijing and Moscow are 
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often less willing to send troops, planes, etc., especially if it is a US-led mission.183  It 
must be noted, however, that China and Russia have agreed to far more Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKOs) than they have opposed, and that China is a relatively large 
contributor to PKOs not led by the NATO allies.  Moreover, neither China nor Russia 
uses the veto often and typically abstain rather than actually block a use of force 
authorization.  When the veto is threatened or used, however, the stakes are typically high 
and the media coverage intense (as the recent Syrian case shows, and will be discussed 
below).    
Yet this is often the case for Council use of force authorizations, which also gives 
Council members an opportunity to enhance or detract from their international social 
status.  Virtually all governments act as if they are interested in social status, and most 
make moral arguments for their positions.  Moreover, most argue that their policy is the 
most responsible action to take.  Although in some cases it may clearly not be, the fact 
that governments choose to claim they are upholding norms shows at least a marginal 
interest in their status.   
Further, even when there is agreement amongst the P5 regarding violations of 
international law, there is often disagreement on the means of enforcement.  In particular, 
Russia and China typically share similar concerns regarding UNSC resolutions that 
would authorize a US-led mission.  Also China has been more consistent about not 
supporting the use of force without consent, even when they agree with the other 
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members on the initial violations.  Thus, the normative convergence regarding R2P, at 
least in principle, is a significant historical evolution.   Moreover, the institutionalization 
of R2P could not have occurred without the support of Russia and China.  This fact is 
often ignored. 
Another key development in the evolution of use of force norms is the rise of 
Chinese influence within the UNSC.  After over forty years of the Council being 
dominated by Cold War politics, the last several decades have increasingly centered on 
the rise of China.  Although the US is still the most powerful actor, and Russia still plays 
a critical role, China’s rising influence in the Council correlates with its overall growth in 
power.  This is not to say that the other members of the P5 are unimportant, but the UK 
and France typically vote with the US (with a few notable exceptions);184 and similarly 
Russia and China often jointly criticize resolutions put forward by the NATO allies.  
However, although they often share concerns regarding the limits of sovereignty, China 
abstained from far more use of force authorizations than Russia from 1990 till the Libya 
vote (12 to 2).  Further, China is more consistent in its opposition to limiting sovereignty, 
as its recent failure to cast its veto alongside Russia on a UNSC draft resolution regarding 
Crimea.185  Consequently, China often offers a key counterpoint to members more willing 
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S/Res/1497).  According to their public justifications they supported the intervention in Liberia, 
but opposed US demands that the resolution exempt soldiers from prosecution at the International 
Criminal Court. 
185 S/2014/189, 15 March 2014. 
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to intervene without consent, such as the US.  In order to present a more focused account, 
therefore, I will often concentrate on the differences between the US and China’s 
normative justifications.   
I will also highlight the most significant contributions of the epistemic community 
to the evolution of UNSC use of force norms.  These include reports from the UN 
Secretariat and other relevant UN offices, independent international commissions, and in 
particular the work produced by the ICISS.  The common link between these sources is 
that they are produced by an epistemic community working to influence how and why the 
UNSC authorizes the use of force.  I attempt to use all of the aforementioned sources to 
illustrate how the Council’s authority to use force evolved.    
Finally, as stated above tracking the normative divergence/convergence between 
China and the US over the last few decades provides a good perspective on the overall 
evolution in use of force norms.  In many respects, China represents the “hard case,” 
because they are typically the most resistant to changing the Council’s traditional use of 
force norms.  Consequently, much of this section will center on their gradual acceptance 
of R2P.  The first two chapters, however, will focus on the Cold War era.  During this 
period, the Council seldom authorized the use of force, relative to the following era, 
mainly due to US/Soviet politics.  The last three chapters will focus on the history of the 
Council after the Cold War, which is a period marked by far more UNSC use of force 
authorizations, the rise of Chinese influence on the Council, and the emergence of R2P.   
Although this section will touch on causal factors, by highlighting some of the 
work of the epistemic community and the rise of Chinese influence, the bulk of the work 
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on causal factors is presented in Section I.  Also there are cases not presented that some 
may consider important, but in the interest of parsimony I tried to highlight the most 
relevant.  Also, although this section may resemble something of a diplomatic history due 
to the focus on the words of UN bureaucrats and official state representatives, writing a 
history of every state and non-state actor that influenced the process would be 
unmanageable.  In other words, any omissions were either unintentional or in the interest 
of efficiency.  I apologize in advance for both. 
  
   
    
81 
5. Founding Authority 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the founding authority of the UNSC to 
mandate the use of force, as written in the UN Charter.  As mentioned, the Charter makes 
no explicit reference to authorizing the use of force for any sort of “human protection.”  
Yet as will be shown, some of the articles are ambiguous enough to argue for such action.  
Another important aspect of this chapter is to highlight the role military power played in 
writing the Charter.  The US, UK, France, and the USSR effectively wrote most of the 
rules regarding UNSC membership, UNSC voting, and the UNSC’s use of force 
authority.  As will be shown, however, this reflected practical enforcement capabilities as 
much as the spoils of war.  This chapter also emphasizes the issues raised by the principle 
of “non-interference” in the Charter, which suggests that sovereignty is inviolable.  
Another reason this chapter is important, is what it does not discuss.  Following the war, 
there is no significant epistemic community pushing for the use of force on behalf of 
“human protection.”  Although a recognizable epistemic community wrote the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, there is no mention of “humanitarian intervention,” a 
“responsibility to protect,” or any other explicit reference to enforcing human rights 
contained within the document.186  Moreover, even the “Convention of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” adopted by the UN in 1948, does not advocate 
the use of force to prevent genocide.187  In sum, this chapter provides a baseline to put the 
emergence of R2P in context. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
187 Resolution 260 (III) A, 9 December 1948. 
   
    
82 
At its inception, the principle mission of the United Nations was to prevent 
another mutually destructive World War.  The second war claimed at least fifty million 
lives, according to most estimates, and approximately half were civilians.  The war also 
destroyed villages, towns, and cities across the globe, and even the victors endured 
massive losses.  Virtually no one wanted to repeat such a tragedy.  Roosevelt proposed 
the idea for the UN, however, to Stalin and Churchill well before World War II ended.  
Roosevelt’s initial concept was for an international organization built around a collective 
security arrangement between all members, with “Four Policeman” (the US, Britain, the 
USSR, and China) to enforce the peace.  He envisioned an organization similar to the 
League of Nations, but with far more powerful enforcement capabilities, so as not to 
repeat the failures of the League.188  When the first conference was announced, Roosevelt 
explained that if an aggressor “started to run amok and seeks to grab territory or invade 
its neighbors,” the proposed organization would “stop them before they got started.”189    
The UN was formally created in two conferences.  The first took place at 
Dumbarton Oaks from August to October 1944, and the second at San Francisco from 
April to June 1945.  The war was still ongoing, therefore, while diplomats were working 
on the UN Charter (Japan did not surrender until August 15, 1945).  One of the most 
significant effects of this was that the victorious Allies effectively co-authored the 
Charter.   Further, Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States gave themselves 
the only permanent seats on the Security Council and veto power.190   Thus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Meisler, 2011. 
189 Meisler, 2011, pg. 3. 
190 Although China/Taiwan was given a permanent seat they had little influence on the writing of 
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“Permanent Five” (P5), have a disproportionate influence on deciding when, where, how, 
and why force should be authorized because each has the power to veto any proposed 
resolution.  Although rotating members of the UNSC can vote against any resolution, 
they cannot veto one.  Thus, the P5 are the most powerful members of the Council, and 
therefore receive the most attention.191   
The Council and the United Nation’s principle duty, according to the UN Charter, 
is “the maintenance of international peace and security.”   According to the Charter, “The 
Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1… shall fulfill 
in good faith the obligations assumed by them.”  In other words, regardless of their actual 
fulfillment of said obligations, members are legally bound to the Charter.  And as 
Geoffrey Robertson reminds us, “The test of international law is not, however, whether it 
is regularly flouted but whether it is occasionally enforced – a prospect which is apt to 
diminish the number of future floutings.”192  
Hence, UN members have a collective responsibility to keep the peace.  Article 1 
states that to achieve this end, the UN has the authority “to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace…”193 The Charter, 
therefore, legitimized and institutionalized collective security on an unprecedented scale.  
There had been collective security arrangements made in the past, but none this global.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Charter, and essentially voted according to US interests.  This changed when the People’s 
Republic of China took over their permanent seat in 1971 (discussed below). 
191 This approach invariably has its flaws, but when doing a longer historical study, such as this 
one, tracking the changes in the permanent members positions may make sense because they have 
continuously cast votes since 1945 (although the People’s Republic of China took over the 
Republic of China/Taiwan’s seat on October 25, 1971). 
192 G. Robertson, 2006, pg. 216. 
193 UN Charter, Article 1, (emphasis added). 
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In principle, if not practice, the Charter voluntarily binds each UN member-state to come 
to the defense of another member-state, when called upon.   
As the collective representative of the entire UN, the Security Council has the 
authority to intervene militarily, as a last resort, in order to achieve this end.194  One of the 
other consequences of the Allies winning the war, beyond writing the Charter, was that 
they had the largest armies left standing.  Therefore most of the other participants at San 
Francisco grudgingly accepted their special status and authority to use force, because 
without their military power enforcing the peace would likely be a practical 
impossibility.195   
Virtually all of the UNSC’s authority to use force comes from Chapter VII, which 
states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace… 
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken… to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”196  In other words, according to the Charter, 
the Council decides when to use force not the General Assembly (GA).  The Charter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 See UN Charter, Chpt. VII in particular. 
195 See: Luck, 2006; Traub, 2007; Weiss, 2007; Hurd, 2008; Lowe et al., 2008; Meisler, 2011. 
196 Chapter VII: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”  Article 41 states: “The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”  Article 42 states: “Should 
the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations.”  
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granted the GA many powers, but it left all use of force decisions to the Council.197   
Note that Chapter VII also gives the UNSC the authority to maintain international 
security, not national security.  This is an important distinction.  The UN Charter was 
written with the hope, perhaps small, that a commitment to collective security could be 
balanced with a principle of “non-interference.”  According to Article 2, therefore, “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  Article 2 also states:  
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”  There is a 
caveat however, contained in paragraph 7, which states: “this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”  This is an important point, 
even if it is stated somewhat ambiguously.  It effectively gave the members of the UNSC 
a loophole to “non-interference,” by invoking their authority under Chapter VII, Article 
42, to use force “as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”198  So sovereignty was not absolute, and the Council could use force anywhere, 
if it was deemed necessary to restore international peace. 
Importantly, however, most of the Security Council’s authority to use force is 
established not by the Charter, but the Council itself.  As mentioned above, although the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 In 1950, however, the GA passed the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, 377 A (V), which gave 
them the power to recommend the use of force, but only if the UNSC “because of lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” The resolution was implemented during the 
Korean War. 
198 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42. 
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Charter is relatively specific about the membership requirements and voting structure of 
the General Assembly and Security Council, it is purposely more ambiguous regarding 
why the Council can decide to authorize the use of force.  What constitutes a threat to 
“international peace and security” is not always clear.  In practice, therefore, the Council 
establishes its authority to use force through Security Council resolutions.  Thus, to 
understand the evolution of the Council’s authority to use force we need to study not only 
the Charter, but also the resolutions authorizing the use of force.  Hence, particular 
attention is paid to UNSC resolutions authorizing the use of force, and the language 
contained in them throughout this section. 
In sum, the Charter simultaneously based sovereignty upon a principle of “non-
interference” in other member’s domestic affairs, and as contingent based upon a state’s 
commitment to international “peace and security.”  The tension between these principles 
has been at the center of most UNSC debates from the outset.  As will be shown below, 
although the former value typically trumped the latter for the first four decades, since the 
end of the Cold War the balance has shifted.  Throughout the Cold War, however, many 
states worked together to try and ensure that their right to “non-interference” was 
absolute.  Thus, just as the idea for an “immediately available” air-force contingent 
(Chapter VII, Article 43) and a standing “Military Staff Committee” (Chapter VII, Article 
47) withered on the vine, so too did the caveat to “non-interference” laid out in Article 2, 
paragraph 7.  Further, as will be discussed below, as the decolonization movement grew 
the UN became an organization more dedicated to trying to ensure newly independent 
states’ rights to self-determination, than maintaining international peace and security.  In 
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fact, as the Cold War intensified many of the grand hopes for the UN faded, and the 
UNSC seemed to be in perpetual gridlock.  Yet there were some notable developments in 
the Council’s authority to use force, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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6. The Cold War Era 
 
This chapter focuses on the Cold War era within the UNSC.  Significantly, during 
this period the UNSC did not authorize the use of force very often.  This was principally 
due to the US and especially the Soviet Union using their veto power far more than the 
authors of the Charter anticipated and much more frequently than after the Cold War.  
Yet in the relatively few times military intervention was authorized the Council helped 
establish “traditional” use of force norms.  Beyond the Korean War, which was a 
relatively clear case of enforcing a collective security agreement, the use of force was 
relatively constrained relative to the post-Cold War era.  Yet, the Suez crisis helped 
establish “traditional peacekeeping” norms, which required consent, impartiality, and the 
use of force only in self-defense of peacekeepers.  Although the UNPKO in the Congo 
deviated from “traditional peacekeeping,” it was the notable exception to the era.  
Further, the controversial nature of the mission led to a stricter adherence to “traditional 
peacekeeping,” and a Council unwilling or unable to militarily intervene in domestic 
conflicts. 
Similar to the last chapter, there is no significant epistemic community pushing 
the Council to expand its circle of protection.  In fact, the most significant epistemic 
community of the era centered on the decolonization movement and a strong normative 
commitment to “non-interference.”  Interestingly, this movement also pushed the Council 
to be more empathetic and altruistic, but by ending the suffering stemming from 
colonialism and “great power” interference in developing countries.  This movement also 
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influenced how and why the Council authorized the use of force.  In the Suez case, it 
helped justify intervening on behalf of Egypt to uphold its right to self-determination.  
Similarly, in the case of the UN PKO in the Congo, the US and UNSC were accused of 
interfering in Congo’s domestic politics, which helped justify a lack of support for future 
interventions in domestic conflicts.  Another significant aspect of the Cold War era was 
the lack of participation by China (PRC).  At first this was due to their lack of a seat on 
the UNSC, but even after they gained a seat in 1971 the Chinese tended not to deeply 
engage in Council affairs unless an issue directly affected their national interest.  This 
chapter, therefore, places the rise of China and an R2P epistemic community in historic 
context.  Before discussing this context, and the Korean, Suez, and Congo cases in more 
detail, however, I will first discuss how the dynamics of the Cold War effected the 
UNSC. 
The Cold War and the UNSC: 
Although Roosevelt envisioned the UNSC as a far more powerful enforcer than 
the discredited League of Nations, the veto powers of the P5 embedded in the Charter 
combined with the dynamics of the Cold War and decolonization to limit the actual 
ability of the Council to authorize the use of force.  In other words, the Cold War era was 
marked by a relatively paralyzed UNSC, a dramatic growth in UN member-states 
increasingly committed to “non-interference,” and the US and Soviets’ veto power.  Yet, 
there were some significant historic developments in the Council’s authority to use force.  
Before presenting these cases, however, I will briefly discuss the broader historical 
dynamics of this era.   
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For the first four decades of the United Nations a more absolutist interpretation of 
sovereignty centering on “non-interference” prevailed.  This is perhaps best exemplified 
by the General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations, which stated: 
“No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.  Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the state, or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in 
violation of international law.”199 
 
This resolute defense of “non-interference” typified an era defined by decolonization and 
the Cold War.   
Decolonization provided the period with a normative structure centering on the 
right of “self-determination,” which the above resolution was primarily concerned with 
protecting.  After years of interference by foreign powers, virtually all of the newly 
independent states pushed for an interpretation of sovereignty that severely circumscribed 
the UNSC’s ability to justify the use of force.  As “the Third World” increased its 
numbers in the UN, many of their leaders realized that if they and their colleagues held 
ranks, they could control debate and resolutions in the General Assembly.200  However, as 
Stanley Meisler points out, “The Third World had no real authority within the Security 
Council.”   
Yet the US and Soviet Union did, and consequently the Cold War supplied the 
material structure to the Council, or the UNSC’s actual ability to authorize the use of 
force.  Due to the mutual veto power of the US and Soviet Union it was extraordinarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Reprinted in Bellamy and P. Williams, 2010, pg. 32. 
200 Meisler, 2011. 
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difficult to pass any resolution in the Council.  So although the UN General Assembly 
passed many resolutions reinforcing members’ rights to self-determination and non-
interference, many of these resolutions only bolstered the inaction of a Council paralyzed 
by the US and Soviet confrontation. 
Although the Council seldom authorized military interventions during the Cold 
War, the US and Soviet Union did use force in a number of countries, typically without 
UNSC approval.  Martha Finnemore suggests we categorize this period as the “spheres of 
influence system,” in which there was a shared understanding that the use of force was 
legitimate by the dominant power only within its sphere.201  Thus, what international 
intervention did occur typically involved either the US or USSR intervening in its own 
sphere of influence and staying out of the other’s.   
Consequently, throughout the Cold War, the Council seldom authorized the use of 
force for any reason.  Moreover, according to David Malone, the UNSC was “operating 
on the margins of the major conflicts of its time, often intervening to encourage 
negotiation, to strengthen cease-fires and to deploy monitors and impartial peacekeeping 
forces.”202   The UNSC was mostly a non-factor throughout the Cold War, and there were 
relatively few Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), and these tended to be missions not 
authorized to use force.  In fact, there were only fourteen UNPKOs between 1945 and 
1987, and arguably only three involved a significant use of force.  Further, each of these 
missions was something of an exceptional case.  However, each had important long-term 
consequences.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Finnemore, 2003. 
202 D. Malone, 2007. 
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The UN Force in Korea:  
The first significant UNSC use of force authorization was the UN Force in Korea 
(1950-’53).  Although in many respects it was a relatively simple case of the UN acting 
in the collective defense of a member state being illegally invaded, the politics of the 
Cold War made the situation far more complicated.  Unfortunately, the Korean War 
helped turn the Security Council into another forum for the US and Soviets to work 
against each other’s interests.   Consequently, this limited the UNSC’s ability to live up 
to its potential as a neutral enforcer of the collective interest.  Before discussing the 
significant consequences of the Korean mission on the UNSC’s authority to use force in 
more detail, however, I will briefly present its historical context. 
Following the Soviets’ intervention in the war against Japan on August 8, 1945, 
two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the USSR invaded the Korean 
peninsula in pursuit of the Japanese.  This caused concern in Washington that the Soviet 
forces would occupy the entire country before American troops could arrive to receive 
the surrender of the defeated Japanese military units there.203  Truman, therefore, obtained 
Stalin’s consent on August 14 to the provisional partition of Korea along the 38th parallel 
of latitude into a Soviet occupation zone in the north and an American occupation zone in 
the South.204   
The US and Soviets could not agree on a way of uniting Korea.  The US refused 
to accept the Russian demand that the less populous North share power equally with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Keylor, 2009, pg. 242. 
204 Keylor, 2009, pg. 242. 
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South in a united government, and in 1947 went to the UN to try and solve the issue.205  
The General Assembly passed a resolution providing for UN supervised elections in the 
two zones for a single united national assembly, which would inevitably have given more 
seats to the more populous South.206  The North refused to take part in the elections, 
therefore, and set up their own government backed by the Soviet Union.207  The South 
had an election without the North’s participation, and formed a government backed by 
the Americans.  The US and USSR withdrew their troops, and left behind two 
governments both claiming to represent one Korea.  The UN stayed, and stationed 
observers in a series of posts along the 38th parallel.   
Thus, the UN was already on the ground when the North invaded the South on 
June 24, 1950, and consequently the Security Council had to respond.  At an emergency 
Council meeting Secretary General Trygve Lie opened the session by saying, “I consider 
it a clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to reestablish peace.”208  
The resolution drafted by the Americans was adopted by a vote of nine to zero, with 
Yugoslavia abstaining and the Soviet Union absent.   
UN Security Council Resolution 82 (S/Res/82, 25 June 1950) declared North 
Korea guilty of a breach of the peace, demanded an “immediate cessation of hostilities,” 
ordered North Korea to withdraw, and called upon “all Member States to render every 
assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.”209  Still without 
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Soviet participation, the Council subsequently voted to set up a UN command to 
coordinate military operations.  Since American forces would be doing the bulk of the 
fighting the US was authorized to command the UN force.  Within a few months 
American pressured twenty other states to join the force, but the 83,000 US troops bore 
the brunt of the fighting, accounting for half of the ground forces (compared to only 40% 
contributed by South Korea).210 
 The Soviets were boycotting the Council because they wanted the Peoples 
Republic of China’s (PRC) to have Taiwan’s UNSC seat.  The Soviets’ apparently 
assumed that in their absence the Council would not be able to pass the resolution 
because Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive UNSC 
resolutions require an affirmative vote of nine members “including the concurring votes 
of the permanent members.”211  The majority of the members of the Council disagreed.  
Eventually, therefore, the USSR returned to the Council in order to veto resolutions 
aimed at North Korea.  To overcome the Soviet veto, the Americans, particularly Dean 
Acheson, succeeded in persuading the majority of the General Assembly that they should 
claim a subsidiary responsibility for international peace and security, as enunciated by 
Article 14 of the Charter.212   
The result of these efforts was the “Uniting for Peace” resolution (377 A (V)), 
which states: 
“[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails 
to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 	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security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a 
view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."213 
 
Subsequent to its passage, the resolution was used by the GA to condemn China’s 
intervention in the conflict (see resolution 498 (V), 1 February 1951, “Intervention of the 
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea”), and to 
endorse the US led defense of South Korea.   
The “Uniting for Peace” resolution created a way for the GA to work around the 
Council, but only up to a point.  The resolution allowed for the GA to call for 
“emergency special sessions” and make “recommendations” to use force, however, only 
the UNSC has the legally binding power to authorize the use of force, according to the 
Charter.  Moreover, because of the tension between the “Uniting for Peace” resolution 
and the Charter, it has only been invoked eleven times, since the Korean War (seven 
times by the UNSC in resolutions transferring an issue to the GA, and four times by the 
GA to request an emergency special session).214  Further, it has only been used by the GA 
once to justify a use of force mandate: the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai (UNEF, 
1956-’67, discussed below).  Arguably its only actual remaining significance is the GA’s 
power to convene “emergency special sessions,” which it still continues to do, but with 
decreasing frequency.  Yet during the Korean War, “Uniting for Peace” and the GA 
helped the US-led mission to claim UN legitimacy despite Soviet protests and vetoes, and 
to condemn the PRC’s intervention in the conflict. 	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During the Korean War, therefore, the PRC fought directly against the UN forces.  
In many respects, this created a paradox for Chairman Mao and the governing elite.  
From their perspective this provided further evidence that the UN functioned in the 
strategic interests of the West, but it also further demonstrated that their absence on the 
UNSC was a liability.215  Although they disagreed with much of the agenda set by the 
UN, they were unable to play a meaningful role in changing it.  Arguably, fear of a lack 
of influence in international decision-making has been an undercurrent throughout the 
history of China’s relationship with the UNSC.   
In sum, the UN Force in Korea was principally a US-led mission, and was 
authorized without the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) vote.216  
The USSR boycotted the vote and the PRC was not yet a member of the Council.  This 
lack of participation in the Council’s authorization of the use of force had lasting 
implications, well beyond “Uniting for Peace.”  Russian leaders never again missed an 
important vote, and began to use its veto more than any other member for the next thirty 
years.217  In other words, the UNSC became yet another battleground in the Cold War, 
and much of the ensuing Council paralysis began with the Korean crisis.  Finally, because 
the intervention was a relatively clear case of collective defense, based upon the UN 
Charter’s collective security agreement, the Korean case also shows the baseline for the 	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Council’s authority to mandate the use of force.  
The Suez Crisis: 
The UN Emergency Force (UNEF, 1956-‘67) in the Sinai is another significant 
case.  UNEF is the only mission, to date, for which the UN General Assembly (GA) 
invoked the “Uniting for Peace” resolution to override the vetoes of UNSC members 
(Britain and France), in order to pass a use of force mandate.  It was also the first official 
UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO).  In contrast to the Korean mission, which was 
organized and commanded by the US, UNEF was organized and commanded through the 
UN Secretary General’s (SG) office.  Thus, although the UNSC did not authorize the use 
of force, UNEF set a lasting precedent that the Council used as a template for future 
UNPKOs.  Further, the Suez crisis was a key example of how the Cold War and 
decolonization, or historical context, impacted the development of the Council’s authority 
to use force. 
During World War I, the British declared Egypt a protectorate, and would directly 
interfere in the country’s government for decades to come.  In July 1952, however, a 
military coup overthrew “the corrupt, British-subsidized monarchy” of King Farouk.218  
Eventually in 1954, Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, the “brains behind the military revolt,” 
became Prime Minister and embraced Egypt’s right to “self-determination” in earnest.219  
Nasser also became a founding member of the “Nonaligned Movement,” and “soon 
perfected a remarkable capacity for playing the two superpowers against one another in 
order to obtain from both the economic and military assistance that his campaign of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Keylor, 2009, pg. 359. 
219 Keylor, 2009, pg. 359. 
   
    
98 
national regeneration required.”220  For example, Nasser was able to secure an attractive 
loan from the Soviets for the massive Aswan Dam, but upon hearing of the Soviet’s 
largess he got an even better offer from the Americans and British.   
Yet Nasser eventually alienated the US with his diplomacy.  After an arms deal 
with Communist Czechoslovakia, the courting of Communist China, Nasser also angered 
many Americans by supporting Palestinian raids against Israel, denying it access to the 
Suez Canal and Red Sea, and openly calling for its destruction.  These actions, and 
others, finally led to the US and Britain to withdraw their offers to help finance the 
Aswan Dam.   
A few days after the US and UK abruptly revoked their support, Nasser 
announced on July 26, 1956 that his government had seized control of the Suez Canal 
Company, and would use the toll revenues to finance the Aswan Dam project.  The 
nationalization of the Suez drew sharp protests from the British and France because they 
were the primary stakeholders in the Suez Canal Company.  In a telegram to US 
President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden declared “we must be ready 
to use force, in the last resort, to bring Nasser to his senses.”221  Eisenhower, however, 
argued that using force “would automatically weaken, perhaps even destroy, the United 
Nations.”222  Eisenhower helped pressure the British and French to take the issue to the 
UN.   
“A charade followed at UN headquarters in New York,” according to Stanley 	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Meisler.223  Although the British and French called for a meeting of the UNSC to 
supposedly try and resolve the crisis peacefully, they were also secretly planning with 
Israel to take the Suez by force.224   “The collusion of Britain, France, and Israel was 
officially sealed in a series of secret meetings at a villa in the Parisian suburb of Sevres,” 
and the secret “Protocol of Sevres” was signed on October 24, 1956.225   According to the 
“Protocol of Sevres” in five days the Israelis would launch “a large scale attack on the 
Egyptian forces with the aim of reaching the Canal zone the following day,” despite the 
UNSC agreeing on resolution to resolve the matter peacefully on October 13th.226   
Consultations on the implementation of those principles were under way when 
Israel invaded Egypt on October 29th.  After issuing an ultimatum that within twelve 
hours both parties withdraw ten miles from each side of the canal (leaving Israel on 
Egyptian territory), which Nasser predictably rejected, British and French troops landed 
in the Suez Canal Zone.  All of which went more or less according to the plan of the 
“Protocol of Sevres,” at least initially. 
The US immediately called for a Security Council meeting on the day Britain and 
France intervened, October, 31st, and Eisenhower reportedly said “We plan to get to the 
United Nations the first thing in the morning – when the doors open.”227   The resolution 
put forward by the US and Soviets demanding the withdrawal of all forces from Egypt 
was not adopted, however, because of the vetoes of Britain and France.  So once again, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Meisler, 2011, pg. 105. 
224 Keylor, 2009; Meisler, 2011, pg. 105. 
225 Meisler, 2011, pg. 105. 
226 Meisler, 2011, pg. 105. 
227 Meisler, 2011, pg. 107. 
   
    
100
under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the matter was transferred to the General 
Assembly, which met in an emergency special session.    
The majority of the GA was sympathetic to Egypt, especially the newly 
independent states, and called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from occupied territories.  The GA also established the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, under the direction of UN 
Secretary General (SG) Dag Hammarskjöld.  UN Resolution 1001 authorized “the 
Secretary General to issue all regulations and instructions which may be essential to the 
effective functioning of the Force,” which was quite different than the US commanded 
Korean mission.228  Dag Hammarskjöld proved to be more than up to the task.229   
UNEF relatively successfully carried out its principle mandate “to secure and 
supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of 
France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, 
to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial 
supervision of the ceasefire.”230  Following the dispatch of the UNEF, US economic 
pressure, and nearly global public outcry, the French and British forces left the Suez 
Canal Zone on December 22, 1956.  The Israeli forces withdrew on March 8, 1957. 
The entire crisis highlighted many of the issues defining the era, especially 
decolonization.  According to Stanley Meisler:  
“The Suez crisis was a defining moment in the twentieth century… and it defined the end 
of traditional imperialism.  The crisis exposed the British and French, masters of the two 	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greatest empires in the world, as impotent blusterers, unable to face up to the 
condemnation of the United Nations, the United States, and indignant citizens at home.  
Although the British and French would manage to hold on to many of their African and 
Asian colonies for at least a half-dozen years or so, their empires actually died at Suez.  
The Suez crisis also enhanced the reputation of Dag Hammarskjöld, who worked 
incessantly to carve out a peaceful exit for the thrashed colonial powers and to create the 
first UN peacekeeping force.  And the crisis demonstrated that the United Nations, no 
matter how imperfect a body, possessed a moral force of its own, steeled with surprising 
strength.”231 
 
Moreover, many of the newest UN members experienced Western military intervention 
in their own countries, and likely relished the opportunity to establish a precedent for 
upholding their right to non-interference.   
Not only did UNEF help enforce the sovereignty of Egypt, it was also critical in 
the evolution of use of force norms because it helped establish the traditional guidelines 
for peacekeeping operations.  “Traditional peacekeeping” operations adhere to three 
principles established during the intervention in the Suez.  The three principles are: the 
consent of all conflicting parties to the activities of the mission; the impartiality of the 
peacekeepers in their relationship with the conflicting parties; and the minimum use of 
force, only as a last resort and only in self-defense.232  It is important to note, however, 
that “traditional peacekeeping” is an ideal type or template not necessarily an accurate 
description of practice.   
Of these, consent is perhaps the most controversial, because in many cases the 
government being asked to consent to a PKO is the one perpetrating war crimes.  Yet the 
consent requirement established by UNEF reflected the historical context in which it was 
created.  Much of the decolonization movement rested on a normative commitment to 	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self-determination and non-interference, especially from the Western states.  The fact that 
Egypt was invaded by two colonial powers highlighted the concerns of nearly all UN 
members.   SG Dag Hammarskjöld was well aware of the issues a UNPKO into a newly 
independent state raised, and the consent, impartiality, and self-defense, requirements 
were prominently featured as a way to allay concerns.  Yet they became lasting features 
of nearly every UNSC use of force authorization for decades.  Not without controversy, 
however, as we shall see below.  
In sum, although the GA authorized the use of force for UNEF, the mission 
established the “traditional peacekeeping” guidelines that became the baseline for future 
UNSC use of force authorizations.  Put another way, the UNEF use of force mandate 
became the template for virtually all UNSC use of force authorizations, until the 1990’s.  
Thus, consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense were the core norms 
regulating “traditional peacekeeping” throughout the Cold War.   
The Congo: 
The third significant use of force authorization during the Cold War was the 
mission in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-‘64).  ONUC differed from the mission in the Suez 
in that it is generally described as the first and last example of a large-scale “peace-
enforcement” mission authorized during the Cold War. 233  “Peace-enforcement” 
operations, according to Michael Doyle, are “authorized to act with or without the 
consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the 
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Security Council.”234  In this case, the degree of consent, or lack thereof, became a highly 
contentious issue, which had lasting consequences.  Moreover, the political fallout from 
ONUC was tremendous due to the mission becoming captive to US interests and 
effectively yet another proxy war between the US and USSR.235  This led to the end of 
any significant UNPKO for the remainder of the Cold War.  Before discussing the long-
term consequences of ONUC in more detail, however, I will present a short history of the 
Congo conflict. 
In addition to the influence of the Cold War, the history of the Congo crisis once 
again also centers on decolonization.  The Belgians ruled the Congo with a particularly 
brutal hand throughout the 19th and early 20th century, 236 and were one of the last colonial 
powers to cede governmental authority to their African subjects.  In the 1950s, two rival 
movements emerged as major forces to end Belgian rule.  Patrice Lumumba was the 
leader of the more radical Congolese National Movement, and Joseph Kasavubu led the 
rival Alliance des Bakongo.  In January 1960, the Belgian government summoned the 
leaders to Brussels in order to surprisingly inform them that total independence would be 
granted on June 30.  The Belgians chose Kasavubu to become president and Lumumba to 
be prime minister of the new state.  However, both were expected to allow the Belgians 
to retain predominant influence in the government and armed forces and Belgian copper-
mining firms to continue their operations.237   
Yet things did not go according to plan.  Within a few days of independence, 	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Congolese members of the military police mutinied against their Belgian officers, and 
mobs attacked Belgian nationals and seized their property.  Belgium sent troops to defend 
their remaining citizens, and on July 11th following the formal transition of power from 
Belgian to Congolese authorities, Belgians killed over a dozen Congolese.  On the same 
day, the regional leader of Katanga, the southern province where most of the copper-
mining operations were located, declared independence on the advice of the local Belgian 
mining company.238  
The new Congo government, therefore, faced threats of Belgian military 
intervention and secession.  Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu jointly 
appealed to the US, the Soviet Union, and UN for immediate assistance to preserve the 
Congo’s sovereignty.  “Suddenly this resource-rich country in the heart of Africa became 
a tempting target for the intervention of the superpowers, as Washington and Moscow 
watched the deteriorating situation with growing interest,” according to William 
Keylor.239    
In what he called an attempt at “preventive diplomacy,” on July 14, 1960, SG Dag 
Hammarskjöld called a special session of Security Council to request sending a UN 
peacekeeping force into the Congo to replace Belgian troops and restore order.  The vote 
passed, and Security Council resolution 143 called upon the Government of Belgium to 
withdraw its troops, and authorized the SG “to take the necessary steps, in consultation 
with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such 
military assistance as may be necessary until… the national security forces may be able, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Meisler, 2011. 
239 Wiener, 2007; Keylor, 2009, pg. 415; Meisler, 2011. 
   
    
105
in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.”240  Hammarskjöld pledged 
that the UNPKO would include African troops, fire only in self-defense, and keep out of 
the domestic politics of the Congo.  In other words, ONUC was initially to be a 
“traditional peacekeeping” mission based upon consent, impartiality, and the minimum 
use of force only in self-defense.  Yet this mandate would change. 
Although by July 23rd, UN troops had replaced Belgian troops everywhere except 
for two Belgian bases and Katanga, Hammarskjöld refused to order the UNPKO to defeat 
the secessionist movement there.  Lumumba turned to the Soviets for help, therefore, and 
soon Soviet trucks, planes, and personnel poured into the country.  According to William 
Keylor, 
“Lumumba’s appeal for Soviet support sealed his fate in the eyes of the Eisenhower 
administration.  The CIA station chief in the capital city of Leopoldville hastily recruited 
the staunchly anti-Communist commander of the Congolese army, Colonel Joseph-Désiré 
Mobutu, to take action against what Washington increasingly regarded as the pro-
Communist prime minister.  Under intense pressure from Mobutu and his fellow officers, 
President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba on September 5 and was shortly thereafter 
induced to designate Mobutu as his successor.  While attempting to escape Lumumba 
was captured by Mobutu’s soldiers and eventually handed over to the authorities in 
Katanga, where he was murdered (with probable CIA connivance).”241 
 
Thus, the conflict in the Congo was irretrievably caught up in the Cold War, which would 
significantly affect ONUC. 
Following the dismissal of Lumumba, Khrushchev took the UN floor to lambaste 
the US and Hammarskjöld.  The Americans and the SG, according to Khrushchev, “have 
been doing their dirty work in the Congo through the Secretary-General of the United 
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Nations and his staff.”242  Then in January 1961, UN soldiers watched Lumumba being 
transferred by Mobutu’s soldiers to Katanga, where he was beaten and shot to death, but 
did not intervene because of their mandate to stay out of Congolese politics.  The murder 
provoke international outcry, and Khrushchev called Hammarskjöld Lumumba’s “chief 
assassin.”243 
Events in the Congo continued to spiral out of control, with the Soviets backing 
another pro-Lumumba regime in opposition to Mobutu, and six countries withdrawing 
their troops from ONUC in protest against its failure to protect Lumumba.  
Hammarskjöld knowing he still had the support of most new African states and newly 
elected US President Kennedy went to the UNSC to request a broader use of force 
mandate for ONUC.   
Thus, on February 15, 1961, the UNSC passed a resolution authorizing ONUC 
peacekeepers to take “all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in 
the Congo.”244  By authorizing ONUC soldiers to “prevent” civil war, the PKO was 
effectively given a mandate to go on the offensive in an internal conflict – something that 
would not happen again for over three decades.   
Although the vote was nine to zero, France and the Soviet Union abstained.  Both 
were highly critical of the mission, and in protest both withheld their peacekeeping dues.  
This caused an immediate funding crisis for UN operations that has never been fully 
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overcome.245  The French and Soviets also pushed through reforms that had lasting 
effects.  Most significantly, PKOs would only be mandated for six months at time, which 
ensured that the Council would have an opportunity to review operations before 
extending the mission.  This actually gave the Council greater authority over PKOs, and 
is generally regarded as a positive reform.246 
Yet in spite of Soviet and French criticism, ONUC soldiered on, and after helping 
to stabilize most of the rest of the Congo the peacekeepers took on the secessionists in 
Katanga.  The first battle did not go well and ended in a stalemate.  Subsequently, Dag 
Hammarskjöld was killed in a plane crash on his way to try and negotiate a ceasefire.  
The UN community was devastated at the death of their charismatic leader.  The mission 
continued, however, and after many violent twists and turns eventually the peacekeepers 
were able to force the Katanga secessionists to surrender.  Over two and a half years after 
the ONUC began, and many many deaths later, the Katanga secession was over. 
In sum, there were several significant aspects of ONUC.   First, was the death of 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.  The Nobel Prize winner was reviled by the 
Soviets and others, but beloved inside the UN and elsewhere.  It was decades before 
someone of his stature was Secretary General.  Hammarskjöld also principally organized 
ONUC through the “good offices” of the Secretary General.  Although the UNSC 
certainly had a large role in the mission, it was the SG who brought the issue before the 
Council, under the authority of Article 99, and put together the coalition forces.  ONUC 
was the first large-scale “peace enforcement” mission, with almost 20,000 military 	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personnel at its peak.  No other SG would control a mission of this size and scope again.  
ONUC also demonstrated the risks involved in trying to intervene in a domestic conflict: 
250 UN personnel died, including Dag Hammarskjold.   Yet perhaps the most important 
long-term consequence of the Congo mission was the controversy it engendered.  Not 
only were the Soviets and French outraged by the Americans “doing their dirty work” 
through ONUC, as Khrushchev said, but many across the world would not forget the 
ignoble death of Prime Minister Lumumba.  Thus, the right to non-interference became 
even more important, and another UNSC military intervention into a domestic conflict 
would not be authorized until the end of the Cold War.    
In conclusion, the Cold War era was notable in that the UNSC did not authorize 
the use of force very often.  This was principally due to the US and especially the Soviet 
Union using their veto power to turn the Council into another battleground.  Yet in the 
relatively few times the Council, or the GA in the Suez case, authorized the use of force 
they established norms regarding how and why force should be used.  Beyond the Korean 
War, which was a relatively clear case of upholding the Council’s commitment to 
collective security, these norms were relatively circumscribed relative to the following 
era.  Other than acting in collective defense, the baseline for all other future use of force 
authorizations centered on the “traditional peacekeeping” norms: consent, impartiality, 
and the use of force only in self-defense.  Although the UNPKO in the Congo deviated 
from “traditional peacekeeping,” it was the notable exception to the era.  Further, the 
controversial nature of ONUC led to a stricter adherence to “traditional peacekeeping,” 
and a Council unwilling or unable to militarily intervene in domestic conflicts. 
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Moreover, beyond the paralysis of the Council due to the US/Soviet rivalry, the 
era’s decolonization movement led to a strong normative commitment to “non-
interference.”  This also influenced how and why the Council authorized the use of force.  
In the Suez case, it helped justify intervening on behalf of Egypt.  Yet in the case of the 
Congo, the US and UNSC were accused of interfering in Congo’s domestic politics, 
which helped justify a lack of support for future interventions in domestic conflicts.  Put 
simply, without consent most Council members would not authorize the use force. 
Another significant aspect of the Cold War era, was the lack of participation by 
China (PRC).  At first this was due to their lack of a seat on the UNSC, but even after 
they gained a seat in 1971 the Chinese tended not to deeply engage in Council affairs 
unless an issue directly affected their interests.  This would significantly change after the 
Cold War.  In the next chapter, I will pay particular attention to how China’s position 
evolved because following the collapse of the Soviet Union they became the key “swing 
vote” on the Council.  Moreover, as will be shown, China’s voting pattern is the most 
unique of the Council (see Appendix) and their gradual acceptance of R2P perhaps best 
demonstrates the historic nature of this change in the Council’s authority to use force. 
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7. “A New World Order” 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the aftermath of the Cold War, and the advent of a far 
more interventionist Security Council.  The collapse of the Soviet Union ended much of 
the gridlock within the Council, and ushered in an unprecedented era of “humanitarian 
interventions.”  I present several of the most influential and controversial UNSC 
authorized  “humanitarian interventions” (Iraq, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia), as 
well as one the most significant cases of “non-intervention” (Rwanda).  I also detail the 
rise of China within the UNSC.  China becomes increasingly engaged and influential 
throughout the 1990’s, and by the end of the decade almost completely transforms its role 
on the Council.  This chapter also discusses the embryonic emergence of R2P, signified 
by the first clear articulation of it in an influential paper by Francis Deng in 1993.  Deng 
argued that, “where the government is not in control or the controlling authority is unable 
or unwilling to create the conditions necessary to ensure rights, and gross violations of 
the rights of masses of people result, sovereignty in the sense of responsible government 
is forfeited and the international community must provide the needed protection and 
assistance.”247  There would be many twists and turns before this idea would be 
championed by Kofi Annan near the end of the decade, however, and before we get there 
we need to begin with the end of the Cold War. 	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The End of the Cold War: 
Ironically, many of the dominoes that Washington and Moscow worked so hard to 
keep upright fell after the Berlin Wall came down.  Tragically, in many places this 
resulted in violent conflict.   The relatively sudden breakdown of Communist legitimacy 
caught nearly everyone by surprise.  In 1989, the surprising election of anti-Communists 
in Poland and the collapse of the Berlin Wall triggered a domino effect that eventually 
led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  This had consequences well beyond 
Moscow.  World leaders dependent on Moscow’s military and political support were 
suddenly at a loss, and many struggled to maintain control over their respective states.  
Similarly, certain leaders that counted on US aid found the Americans far less supportive 
once the Soviet threat evaporated.  The US helped many states in an effort to prevent 
them from becoming Soviet allies.  With this no longer a concern, many regimes that the 
US provided aid to, in spite of known human rights abuses and poor governance, now 
faced a less forgiving Washington.  Hence, following the end of the Cold War, whether 
backed by the US or Soviets, many governments faced legitimacy crises.  
An unfortunate byproduct of the collapse of the Soviet Union, therefore, was state 
failure and civil war.  Although Germany reunited peacefully, not every state handled the 
end of the Cold War so well.  During the 1990s, the Security Council increasingly 
received reports of gross human rights violations, ethnic cleansing, and mass killings 
from various places.   
As images of violence in Srebrenica, Mogadishu, Rwanda, etc. were broadcast 
around the world, a burgeoning epistemic community began to push the Council to 
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militarily intervene on humanitarian grounds.  In many cases, the most pressure was on 
Washington because of its global military presence, and the lack of Soviet opposition.  
The Soviet collapse had global consequences, however, that were more than the US or 
any state could effectively manage.  Although the US was the “sole-super power,” 
Washington often looked to the UN for help in minimizing the fallout.  Thus, with a 
growing outcry for the US and UNSC to “do something” about the violence, the Council 
entered a new era.  
The UNSC authorized a total of eight new PKOs from January 1989 till January 
1992 alone.  Other than the Iraq mission, arguably all of the missions authorized to use 
force by the Council were sent to end domestic conflict of some sort.248  One of the most 
interesting trends of this era, therefore, is the Council increasingly authorizing military 
interventions in domestic conflicts.   
The US took the lead in most of these missions, and has voted in favor of every 
use of force authorization since 1990.  This is mainly because the US and their NATO 
allies are the principle authors of such resolutions, and because China and Russia 
typically do not initiate such efforts.  Yet, in the early 1990s China and Russia voted in 
favor of every mission not authorized to use force, and to continue all traditional PKO 
established during the Cold War.  Importantly, however, China typically abstained from 
peace enforcement authorizations.   
Chinese leaders were skeptical of authorizing the use of force for at least two 
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reasons.  First, Beijing seemed to fear interventions led by what they called the “Big 
Powers,” or the US and its NATO allies.  This reflected their concern that the US was 
projecting military power into a strategically vital region under the fig leaf of 
humanitarianism.  Second, there was a worry in Beijing that the US and its NATO allies 
were establishing a precedent for future military interventions, perhaps in North Korea, 
Tibet, or Taiwan.249  Similarly, President Putin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO 
expansion, and setting a precedent for intervention in contested areas such as Chechnya 
and Georgia.250  As will be discussed in more detail below, these remain concerns for 
Russian and Chinese leaders.251   
Although Russia’s voting behavior is certainly interesting, the Chinese voting 
“the hard case,” tracing China’s gradual acceptance of R2P perhaps best captures the 
Council’s overall change in use of force norms.  Much of this chapter, therefore, focuses 
on both the evolution of China and the Council’s normative justifications for the use of 
force.  What this approach may lack in breadth will hopefully be made up for in depth. 
Another growing concern for Beijing is international status.  Following Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1978 “open door” policy, a strategy to lessen China’s economic and 
diplomatic isolation, the PRC began participating in more international organizations.  
Gradually they began using these forums to try and counter international criticism 
regarding human rights violations, especially after the violent suppression of peaceful 
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protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989.252  At the start of the 1990s, “Chinese elites were 
simply intent on replacing China’s post-Tiananmen status as a disreputable actor with a 
more neutral, less disruptive image” but according to Allen Carlson, “later in the 1990s 
this concern shifted to securing a reputation as a responsible power.”253  Thus, although 
the two aforementioned concerns regarding the use of force remained, China increasingly 
attempted to balance these issues with an interest in recognition as a “responsible power.”  
The following cases help illustrate this transformation.   
Iraq 1990: 
The Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 shows what might be thought of as the 
traditional UNSC normative positions on the use of force.  This was a relatively clear 
case of aggressive war against a UN member, and the Council was bound by the Charter 
to come to the collective defense of Kuwait.  This type of case is expressly why the 
UNSC has the authority to use force.  Yet, it also shows a clear instance of divergence 
between the NATO allies and China.  Perhaps more importantly, Iraq provided the first 
significant Council debate on war after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Thus began a decade 
of an America unencumbered by the Cold War, and increasingly willing to authorize the 
use of force.  
For better or worse, Iraq is located in one of the most strategic places in the 
Middle East, and not surprisingly therefore, the US had complicated interests there.  
Washington had supported the Hussein government during its war with Iran during the 
1980s, but the US also placed American flags on Kuwaiti tankers, and warships at their 	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side, during the war to protect them from either side.254  Further, throughout the war 
Moscow gradually became more of a benefactor to Saddam Hussein than Washington.  
Yet Hussein still had relatively good relations with the US prior to the invasion of Kuwait.   
Although Saddam Hussein may or may not have misread American signals 
regarding their support for his invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990,255 the US wasted 
little time in building a coalition to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  The Security 
Council was called into emergency session on August 2, and unanimously passed 
Resolution 660, which condemned the aggression and called for an immediate Iraqi 
withdrawal.  The resolution did not authorize the use of force, however, and the 
subsequent twelve UNSC resolutions authorized sanctions rather than military 
intervention. 
During this brief period the US deployed a massive force to defend Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia.  Iraq owed many billions to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and many argued 
Saddam sought to annex Saudi oilfields, just as he had in Kuwait.  Thus, many thought 
Saddam would try to invade Saudi Arabia for many of the same reasons as Kuwait.  On 
August 8, therefore, President Bush announced Operation Desert Shield that would 
defend not only Kuwait but ensure the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the 
entire Gulf Region.256  In very short order, a force of over 200,000 US troops were 
deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.   
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After this rapid military buildup, the US went to the Council to seek a use of force 
authorization.  On November 29, 1990, American Secretary of State James Baker told the 
Council: “With the Cold War behind us… we now have a chance to build the world 
which was envisioned by the founders of the United Nations.  We have the chance to 
make the Security Council and this United Nations true instruments for peace and justice 
across the globe.”257  Following his statement, Resolution 678 passed, which authorized 
“member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait to use all necessary means” 
to expel Iraq from Kuwait.258  It also delegated the command and control of the mission 
to the US, which consisted of twenty-eight states total.  The initial force grew to over 
500,000 American troops, alongside another 200,000 troops from the rest of the coalition.  
The US and the majority of the Council justified this action by condemning Iraq’s 
aggressive war as a “threat to peace and stability,” and by Iraq’s refusal to comply with 
earlier UNSC resolutions.259   
Although China supported Resolution 660 (August 2, 1990), which demanded 
Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, they did not support the use of force in 
order to achieve this goal.  China supported a variety of measures to try and expel Iraq, 
including an embargo, but they did not think US-led military action was appropriate, and 
suggested the US was interested in “hegemony” not humanitarianism (S/PV 2938).260  
Thus, China abstained from voting on Resolution 678.  China supported a variety of 
measures to try and expel Iraq, including an embargo, but it did not think US‐led military 	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action was appropriate.  The Chinese argued, therefore: 
“In the interest of averting escalations of the armed conflict, which will gravely worsen 
the situation, we are in principle against military involvement by Big Powers and are not 
in favor of using force in the name of the United Nations, for this will not help solve the 
crisis but rather will hinder the efforts of the United Nations and other quarters for a 
political solution, leading to further aggravation and complication of the situation.”261 
 
This statement is illustrative for at least three reasons.  First, it reveals China’s 
fear of interventions led by the “Big Powers,” which meant the US and its European 
allies.  This reflected a concern that the US was projecting military power into a 
strategically vital region.  Second, there was also a worry that the US and its allies were 
establishing a precedent for future military interventions, potentially over the Korean 
Peninsula, Tibet, or Taiwan.262   Third, it shows that Chinese leaders either realized they 
must couch their disagreement in normative terms, or truly did believe that military 
action would further aggravate and complicate the situation.  Although we may never 
know their true motivations, what is clear is that Beijing felt the need to offer a normative 
justification for their lack of support for the use of force.  In other words, China sought 
recognition as a responsible state. 
 Despite China’s lack of support, the Iraq/Kuwait mission was successful in 
forcing Saddam’s army to withdraw from Kuwait.  The fact was that China’s opposition 
meant little at that time.  China was still just beginning its rise to power, and they had 
little to no leverage on the Council.   
 Thus, China could not prevent the Council from authorizing the “humanitarian 
intervention” in Northern Iraq on April 5, 1991 (S/Res/688).  When the fighting between 	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coalition and Iraqi forces ended, Saddam Hussein began to violently repress a Kurdish 
independence movement in the north.  French President Mitterrand declared a failure to 
protect the Kurds would severely affect the Council’s “political and moral authority.”263  
The rest of the NATO allies agreed and were able to push through resolution 688 
authorizing the mission based upon the justification that the violence committed against 
the Kurds by their own government threatened “international peace and security.”264   
In light of the precedent this would establish, by authorizing the use of force to 
protect civilians from their own government in the name of “international peace,” the 
resolution passed with just ten affirmative votes.265  China abstained for many of the same 
reasons as the initial Iraq resolution, but did not comment during the meeting.  India did, 
however, and likely spoke for China and others by arguing the mission set a precedent for 
“eroding state sovereignty.”266  Yet US and its allies argued that establishing “safe 
havens” to protect the Kurds took precedence over the Hussein government’s right to 
non-interference.   
In sum, the Iraq missions began a new era for a number of reasons.  For many it 
signified the unrivaled power of the American military.  There were less one hundred US 
deaths in the war, and the vast majority of the American public supported the war.267  
Many spoke of having eliminated “the ghosts of Vietnam,” and a “uni-polar world” in 
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which the US as “sole superpower.”  President Bush even spoke of a “new world 
order.”268  Hence, by “winning” the Persian Gulf War the US and the Council began the 
decade with an unprecedented amount of support for their authority to use force.269   
Further, the mission in Northern Iraq helped establish that the Council could authorize a 
military intervention to try and stop a government from killing its own citizens.  All of 
which gave people confidence that the Council, with American support, could 
“successfully” intervene in other conflicts around the world – whether between or within 
states. 
Somalia: 
 
One of the most significant UNSC use of force authorizations of the 1990s was 
for the mission in Somalia.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and growing 
reports of human rights abuses too large to continually ignore, the US eventually 
withdrew support for the country’s dictator Mohammed Siad Barre.  By this time, 
however, a rebellion had already begun.  In January 1991, the Siad Barre regime 
collapsed, and Somalia descended into violent clan conflict.  The fighting intensified food 
and water scarcity in many parts of the country.  The violence, famine, drought, and 
subsequent disease produced an epic humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by the 
lack of a functioning government.   
In late 1992, after convoys of several NGOs providing humanitarian assistance 
were attacked, the UNSC met and decided to set up the UN Operation in Somalia 
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(UNOSOM I).  The principle mandate was to protect the supply and delivery of 
humanitarian assistance (see S/Res/751, 24 April 1992; and S/Res/775, 28 August 1992).  
UNOSOM I, therefore, is widely regarded as the first specifically humanitarian 
intervention in the history of the UN.   
The mission was also a case of convergence, because the US and China agreed to 
authorize the use of force.  From January 1992 till November 1994 the UNSC passed 17 
resolutions concerning the crisis in Somalia, and only one was not adopted 
unanimously.270  Interestingly, the UNSC also authorized military action without the 
consent of the government of Somalia.271  That China authorized this type of action is 
striking, especially considering it was again a US-led military action.   
A closer look at the normative justification, however, reveals why China might 
have agreed to this action.  Beijing insisted “exceptional measures” were justified due to 
the “long-term chaotic situation resulting from the present lack of a government in 
Somalia” (S/PV 3145).  In other words, there was no functioning sovereign government 
in Somalia so there was no one to give consent.  China expressed a formal reservation, 
however, regarding the role of “certain countries to take military actions, which may 
adversely affect the collective role of the United Nations” (S/PV 3145).  Put another way, 
Beijing was concerned that the if the US led the military force the rest of the UNSC 
would be effectively shut out of deciding how this force was used.  Thus, although 
Beijing agreed with much of the normative rational for authorizing the use of force in 
Somalia, it is also clear that many of their past concerns regarding how that force was 	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used were far from forgotten.   
Although in many respects UNOSOM began as a textbook case of “humanitarian 
intervention,” it quickly ran into problems because of a lack of resources and a limited 
use of force mandate.  The violence in Somalia continued regardless of the presence of 
UNOSOM peacekeepers, and eventually the UNSC then created UNOSOM II.  This 
force was given the authority to effectively go on the offensive in Somalia, and elite 
American Special Forces was deployed to try and take control of Mogadishu.  When 
American Army Rangers in Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and slaughtered by 
hand on live television, however, support for the mission evaporated almost overnight.  
That an “irregular force” could deliver such a blow to the largest and most powerful army 
in the world chastened many.  American hopes for a “new world order” began to fade 
after they effectively lost “the Battle of Mogadishu.”  President Clinton prematurely 
pulled American troops from Somalia completely on March 3, 1994, well before the 
mission’s mandate expired.  The remaining force was ineffective and also finally left in 
defeat on March 28, 1995.   
The fallout touched all involved, but Washington and Beijing seemed to 
especially regret their initial support.272   Chinese leaders apparently concluded that, in 
the future, a deviation from traditional peacekeeping should be avoided.273  This was a 
sentiment shared by many, including in the Whitehouse.  The famous “Black Hawk 
Down” incident was a military and political disaster for the Clinton Administration.  For 
many it was proof that the US and the UNSC should recommit to a policy of “non-	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interference,” which would have serious consequences when the genocide in Rwanda 
unfolded. 
Rwanda: 
Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, in the heart 
of Africa.   Since its independence in 1962, tragically, Rwanda has suffered from 
intermittent conflict that often spills over its borders.  Much of the violence has centered 
on battles between the country’s two largest ethnic groups: the Hutu and the Tutsi.  
Although the groups speak the same language and share many cultural traditions, the 
Belgian colonial government used ethnic identity cards to more rigidly divide the two 
groups.  In a classic example of “divide and rule,” the Belgians allowed the minority 
Tutsis (about 14% of the population) to dominate the government and economy, while 
the Hutus (about 85% of the population) were essentially kept from power.  A Hutu 
rebellion began in 1959 that not only eventually forced the Belgians and Tutsis from 
power, but also kicked off an ongoing cycle of ethnic violence.   
A large number of Tutsi left Rwanda seeking refuge in Uganda.  Many of them 
organized militias there to try and take Rwanda back.  There were at least ten such 
attempts in the ensuing decades, with each one intensifying ethnic violence and 
retaliation.274  On June 22, 1993, in an effort to support a ceasefire the UNSC authorized 
an Observer Mission on the Ugandan side of the border, while a broader peace deal was 
negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania.  The Arusha peace talks concluded on August 4, 1993 
with both sides requesting the UNSC assist in the implementation of the peace agreement.  	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The Council subsequently authorized the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 
with a mandate to contribute to “the establishment and maintenance of a climate 
conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional 
Government.”275 
The ceasefire did not hold, unfortunately, and the violence quickly mushroomed 
out of control.   When the Hutu President of Rwanda was killed in a plane crash on April 
6, 1994, many Hutus used the crash to justify killing Tutsis, and “moderate” Hutus.   The 
speed of the ensuing genocide caught nearly everyone by surprise.  Thousands were 
killed in a matter of days, and between 500,000 and one million people were killed over a 
few months.276  According to Timothy Longman,  
“The war and genocide that shook Rwanda in 1994 represent the most intense violent 
conflict to have swept across an African state in recorded history.  From April to July, 
between 500,000 and 800,000 people, mostly members of the Tutsi minority group, died 
in the genocide, while the civil war between government forces and the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) killed tens of thousands more civilians and drove nearly four 
million of the country’s inhabitants from their homes, including two million who sought 
exile in neighboring countries.  Thousands more civilians died in RPF attacks on refugee 
camps in Zaire in 1996.”277 
 
Many of these people were hacked to death by machete, buried, or burned alive.  The 
Rwandan Prime Minister and ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect her were 
among the victims.  Subsequently, Belgium decided to completely withdraw its troops, 
and UNAMIR was in danger of collapsing completely. 
UNAMIR was already suffering from a delay in deployment and a lack of 
military resources, when the violence exploded.  Further, the conflict in Rwanda 	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intensified while UN peacekeepers were in the process of withdrawing from Somalia in 
defeat.  The US had evacuated its troops from Mogadishu just a few weeks prior, and the 
experience of failure was still fresh.  Perhaps as a result, as the genocide in Rwanda 
began many in UNSC agued that it was not a case of genocide but civil war.278  This 
distinction was crucial because the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide obliges state parties to prevent and punish acts of genocide.279  Yet the 
Council is not obliged to intervene in a civil war, because of the principle of non-
interference.  Unfortunately, arguing about whether a conflict is a civil war or a genocide 
(or ethnic cleansing, mass killing, or something else) seems to be a perpetual feature of 
Council debates on the authority to use force.  As has been well documented elsewhere, 
however, most accept that a genocide did take place in Rwanda.280   
In spite of the escalating violence, however, on April 21, 1994, the Council 
decided to significantly reduce UNAMIR’s troop levels (S/Res/912).   UNAMIR had 
already been severely weakened by Belgium’s withdrawal of its troops, which left only 
1,515 military personnel to try and secure all of Rwanda.   The further reduction in troops 
effectively amounted to a retreat.  Although UNAMIR remained on the ground, Rwanda 
is typically treated as a “landmark case of non-intervention.”281   
UNAMIR did not effectively intervene mainly due to a lack of resources and a 
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limited use of force mandate.  Both circumstances can be partially attributed to the failure 
of UNOSOM II.  Interestingly, Washington and Beijing seemed to learn the same lesson 
from the experience.  The US National Security Advisor at the time said: ‘‘neither we nor 
the international community have either the mandate, nor the resources, nor the 
possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind… the reality is that we cannot solve 
other people’s problems.’’282 Although the US eventually voted for a French-led 
humanitarian mission in June 1994, importantly it did not supply US troops.   
Similarly, China abstained from voting to authorize this French-led mission, and 
provided the following justification for their lack of support: 
“It is clear from the current situation that the action the draft resolution would authorize 
cannot guarantee the cooperation of the parties to the conflict.  We also note that, at its 
recent summit meeting the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formulated the 
following proposals: ‘Any action or effort undertaken by any countries, independently or 
collectively, should be placed within the framework of UNAMIR... Hence, and on the 
basis of the experience and lessons of the United Nations peace-keeping operation in 
Somalia, the Chinese delegation will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution before 
us.”283 
 
So consent was again an issue, but so was “the experience and lessons” of Somalia.284  
Interestingly, although the concern of a US-led military intervention was absent, the 
Chinese still did not authorize the mission, and justified their abstention because of the 
lack of consent.  After the debacle in Somalia, the Chinese argued the use of force would 
not likely be effective.  This is a debatable point, however, what seems clear is that China 
once again showed that consent of “concerned parties” was critical to their authorizing 
the use of force. 	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 Arguably, however, the most significant outcome of the Rwandan case was near 
global outrage that UN peacekeepers watched a genocide unfold before their own eyes 
and were unable or unwilling to stop it.  Moreover, journalists from around the world 
captured the epic failure on film.  There was no hiding the fact that thousands of people 
were murdered with machetes while troops with blue helmets and automatic rifles stood 
down.  Some blamed the US for not supplying troops.  Others blamed the UN Secretariat 
for failing to fully inform the Council of the extent of the violence.  For a variety of 
reasons, most blamed the UNSC as a whole for failing to prevent one of the largest 
genocides in history.  The net result was a Council increasingly divided on how and why 
the use of force should be authorized, and yet still expected to help prevent more mass 
killings and genocide.  
Yugoslavia: 
This tension was on display throughout the violent fragmentation of the former 
Yugoslavia.  Once again the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a legitimacy crises 
beyond Moscow.  Ideological debates over the legitimacy of Communist rule, however, 
soon gave way to religious and ethnic conflict throughout Yugoslavia and the Balkans.  
Violence plagued much of the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, and the UNSC 
authorized a variety of missions authorized to use force throughout the decade. 
The violent breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia centered on 
conflict in two areas.  The first fighting began when the republic of Slovenia seceded 
from Yugoslavia, seized control of its external border posts, and defeated an unprepared 
federal army in just ten days, from June 28 to July 7, 1991.   The second conflict began 
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when Croatian nationalist paramilitary forces tried to remove Croatian Serbs from their 
homes in the border areas between late 1990 and early 1991.  These violent clashes 
within republic of Croatia, and the Croatian parliament’s action to demote legal status of 
all Serbs, led the Serb’s elected leaders to seek territorial autonomy.   The federal 
government of Yugoslavia tried to restore order, but the violence only worsened, 
especially after the Croatian government also declared independence on June 25, and 
then declared war on the federal government on August 22.  The violence in Croatia then 
spread to its neighboring republic: Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Unfortunately, Bosnia 
contained Croats, Serbs, and Muslims (renamed Bosniacs in 1995) that became part of 
the growing ethnic conflict in Croatia.  By September, the Croatian fighters were crossing 
the Bosnian border, which led villages and towns to arm themselves and paramilitaries to 
form along partisan lines.285  In March of 1992, the head of the Bosnian Muslim/Bosniac 
party mobilized forces and demanded the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army.  Bosnian 
Serb leaders quit the government in protest and began to terrorize eastern Bosnia, while 
Croat and Muslim paramilitaries turned on each other in the center and west.   
Hence, the situation was extraordinarily complex, and involved either two, three, 
or more secessions depending on how you counted.  The Council did not even have a 
formal meeting on Yugoslavia until September 25, 1991, during which they committed to 
a principle of non-intervention (S/Res/713).  Yet this position became increasingly 
untenable as the growing claims to sovereignty within Yugoslavia were not being 
resolved through diplomacy, and the violence spiraled out of control.   	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It was often a particular type of violence, commonly called “ethnic cleansing.”  
Similar to the aforementioned cases, various groups tried to systematically remove, or 
cleanse, rival ethnic groups from an area they wanted for themselves.  This often 
involved intense fighting within neighborhoods, with neighbors killing neighbors.  Or 
perhaps more typical, a paramilitary group aligned to one ethnic group would shell the 
village, town, or neighborhood of a rival group.  Irregular forces often formed to take on 
these paramilitary groups, and the net result was a horrific cycle of violence, that showed 
no sign slowing down in 1992. 
The situation was of particular interest to European members of the Council, 
because the violence was close to many of their borders.  Further, following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union many of NATO’s military assets were still in place and in close 
proximity to much of the fighting.  As the violence escalated many called for the NATO 
allies to intervene.  Some suggested this could also be an opportunity to show the 
continuing relevance of NATO, and ensure that new Eastern European states would adopt 
the Western model.286  Gradually the proponents of military intervention in the former 
Yugoslavia won the day. 
A series of UNSC resolutions were issued regarding the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, and on February 21, 1992, the Council established the United Nations 
Protective Force (UNPROFOR) by unanimously passing resolution 743.287  Although the 
mission would have over 13,000 troops, they were not formally authorized to use force.  
According to the resolution, “the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the 	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conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of 
the Yugoslav crisis.”288  Part of the mission was also to establish UN Protected Areas, or 
safe havens where UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers provided safety and 
comfort.  Yet the violence escalated despite the “Protected Areas” and presence of 
UNPROFOR.  The Council, therefore, gradually kept expanding UNPROFOR’s mandate 
to try and stem the bloodshed.  
At first, Beijing was firmly against the use of force, however, when the fighting 
between the ethnic groups in Bosnia intensified in 1993 China conceded (S/Res/836).  
Yet, Beijing only voted in favor of resolutions that limited the use of force to protecting 
peacekeepers and civilians from attacks in “protected areas.” Further, China typically 
voiced formal reservations against the use of force, and stated that its support was only 
due to the consent of the host countries.  As Yugoslavia disintegrated further, however, it 
became increasingly difficult to decide whose consent mattered.289   
Further, following the “Srebrenica massacre,” it became clear that UNPROFOR, 
even with an expanded mandate, was unable to protect civilians in the safe havens.  On 
July 11, 1995, Bosnian Serb forces overran UNPROFOR troops and seized the “protected 
area” in Srebrenica.  The assault was effectively uncontested by UNPROFOR 
peacekeepers on the ground, and by NATO jets in the air.290   The Serbs proceeded to 
slaughter an estimated 7,000 Muslims in about a week, the largest massacre in Europe 
since World War II.  Some again blamed the US for not supplying more troops to the 
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mission.  Others blamed UN officials for not calling in NATO airstrikes, and their overall 
reluctance to use NATO airpower in spite of their authority to do so.   
As in the above cases, blame was thrown in all directions.  Yet, coming just a year 
after Tutsi rebels halted the Rwandan genocide, most of the blame for the massacre again 
focused on the lack of force used.  Particularly in Washington, according to Samantha 
Power, “the massacres strengthened the lobby for intervention and the understanding, 
already ripening within the Clinton administration, that the US policy of 
nonconfrontation had become politically untenable.”291  Following the Srebrenica 
massacre, therefore, NATO jets engaged in a three-week bombing campaign against the 
Bosnian Serbs that forcefully helped end the war.  The subsequent completion of the 
Dayton Accords, in which the US played a critical role as arbiter, further reinvigorated 
the idea that the US and NATO could successfully carry out a “humanitarian 
intervention.”   
Thus, when violence broke out in Kosovo in March of 1998, the US and its 
NATO allies were more willing to use force – with or without UNSC approval.292   
This approach concerned Beijing.  Thus, China failed to support a use of force mandate, 
after voting in favor of every such resolution regarding the Yugoslavian conflicts since 
1995.  Beijing argued that the situation in Kosovo was not a threat to regional and 
international peace and security, and that it was in essence “an internal matter.”293 
Subsequently, on March 24, 1999, NATO began bombing Serbia in an effort to 
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stop the ethnic killings.  This action was controversial from the start, particularly among 
states wary of NATO expansion, especially China and Russia.  The UNSC met two days 
later following a request by Russia.  At the meeting, China supported a draft resolution 
(S/1999/328), which attempted to stop the bombing and condemn the actions of NATO.  
The draft resolution declared that NATO used force “without the authorization of the 
Council.”294  Further, “such unilateral use of force constitutes a flagrant violation of the 
United Nations Charter,” and NATO’s use of force, “constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security.”295 
Regardless of the ambiguity of some of the language found in the Charter and the 
intentions of NATO, it could be argued the action was unilateral in the sense that it was 
not authorized by the UNSC.  Yet according to the official US statement from the 
meeting: “The [UN] Charter did not sanction armed assaults on ethnic groups, or imply 
that the international community should turn a blind eye to a growing humanitarian 
disaster.  NATO's actions were completely justified.  They were necessary to stop the 
violence and to prevent a further deterioration of peace and stability in the region.”296  
Thus, the US and its allies argued that in this case intrastate violence threatened interstate 
peace and stability, and therefore, the use of force was justified.   
China’s UN representative, however, offered a different interpretation that in 
many ways seems to characterize its position during this period.  According to China’s 
official statement, “the continued military strikes... caused severe casualties and damage, 
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and that they “strongly opposed such an act blatantly violating the principles of the 
Charter.”297  Further, they “opposed the use of or threat of use of force in international 
affairs, and interference in the internal affairs of other States under whatever pretext or 
in whatever form.”298  This opposition could be viewed as once again returning to 
China’s baseline position on the use of force.   
However, China’s opposition to the intervention in Kosovo soon became much 
more personal.  On May 7, 1999, NATO bombed China's embassy in Belgrade.   The 
bombing sparked mass protests.  According to the official Chinese government response: 
“US-led NATO has been wantonly bombing Yugoslavia for more than 40 days, killing 
and wounding large numbers of innocent civilians and now it even launched air strikes 
against the Chinese embassy… The Chinese Government and people express their utmost 
indignation and severe condemnation of the barbarian act.’”299  Many saw it as an 
example of “NATO fascism.”300  Peter Gries argues the protests following the bombing 
“promoted a shift in popular Chinese perceptions of American and the world system.”301  
Further, the bombing followed the failure to reach a WTO agreement in April.  These 
events reversed much of the progress in US-Chinese relations.  Many within the Chinese 
elite publicly criticized Premier Zhu Rongji, which was highly unusual, for his outreach 
to the US.302  For many, this event seemed to validate the idea of the “century of 
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humiliation,” and a sense of vulnerability that must be overcome.303  Thus, after the 
bombing there was an increased incentive in Beijing for constraining the power of the US 
and its allies, especially in the form of NATO intervention. 
Subsequently, Beijing sought to constrain NATO action in Kosovo through the 
UNSC.  On June 10, 1999, at a UNSC meeting extending the mandate of NATO 
operations Kosovo, China justified their lone opposition by arguing: 
“More than two months ago, without authorization from the Security Council, the United 
States-led [NATO] blatantly launched military strikes against the sovereign State of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…  Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs are basic principles of the United Nations Charter… In essence, the 
‘human rights over sovereignty’ theory serves to infringe upon the sovereignty of other 
States and to promote hegemonism under the pretext of human rights. This totally runs 
counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.”304  
 
Thus, China once again seemed to return to its baseline normative position on the use of 
force.  Further, as with Iraq in 1990, Beijing voiced concerns that a US-led coalition was 
manipulating the UNSC in order to expand strategically in the name of humanitarianism.   
Also, according to the Chinese, the NATO action diminished the legitimacy of the UNSC 
by using force without Council authorization.  
 Although NATO action in Kosovo was also controversial in the West, in spite of 
the embassy bombing, the majority of policy makers treated the mission there as a 
relative success.  Similar to the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre, NATO jets 
effectively bombed Kosovo until the fighting stopped.  Completion of the Dayton 
Accords, in which the US played a critical role as arbiter, reinvigorated the idea that the 
US could successfully carry out a “humanitarian intervention.”  This bolstered a 	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burgeoning epistemic community dedicated to establishing formal rules for 
“humanitarian intervention,” and reforming international use of force norms generally. 
Francis Deng and the Idea of Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
 As mentioned above, as early as 1993 Francis Deng began to articulate the idea of 
a state and the international community having a responsibility to protect people from 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass killings in general.  Francis Deng is a former 
Sudanese diplomat all too aware of the tragic consequences of domestic conflict.  The 
Sudan has endured two violent civil wars in his lifetime.  Perhaps for this reason, Deng 
became a respected expert on conflict resolution and human rights.   
In 1993, Deng was appointed Special Representative on Internally Displaced 
People (IDPs) by SG Boutros-Gali.  As discussed above, the early 1990s saw a dramatic 
uptick in domestic conflicts across the world.  Hence, the scale of civilians killed and 
displaced in civil wars also increased.  In 1993, there were approximately 25 million 
IDPs globally.305  When IDPs crossed an international border they were entitled to claim 
refugee status, if their host state was a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 
accepting UNHCR aid.306  Yet they were afforded no special international legal 
protection, and remained vulnerable to the actions of their home state.   
Hence, “Deng recognized that this made them particularly vulnerable and noted 
that they suffered significantly higher mortality rates than the general population,” 
according to Bellamy and Williams.307  Consequently, “To argue his way around the use 
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of sovereignty to deny international assistance for IDPs, Deng postulated an alternative, 
post-Westphalian, account.”308  Deng argued that:  
“Sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be held 
accountable.  And they are accountable not only to their national constituencies but 
ultimately to the international community.  In other words, by effectively discharging its 
responsibilities for good governance, as state can legitimately claim protection for its 
national sovereignty.”309 
 
Further, if a state was unable to fulfill its responsibilities, it should invite international 
assistance to “complement national efforts.”310  In 1993, Deng wrote an influential report 
for the Commission on Human Rights, that initially formulated these arguments (which 
were subsequently refined in other texts in the quotes below).311  Roberta Cohen, who 
also began to articulate the idea of sovereignty as responsibility in the early 1990s, then 
joined Deng as co-director of the Project on Internal Displacement.312  They began to 
disseminate numerous reports and papers refining the idea, and gradually the concept 
began to take hold amongst many UN officials, academics, and by some human rights 
advocates.  Eventually, SG Kofi Annan embraced the idea, and used his position as 
Secretary General to present and promote the idea to the world.  The ICISS was created 
by the Canadian government to try and find an international consensus on a formal 
“responsibility to protect” doctrine, and a recognizable R2P epistemic community 
emerged, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Finally, even after the failures in Srebrenica, Somalia, and Rwanda, many still 
believed that it was possible to militarily intervene in a domestic conflict in order to stem 	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a humanitarian crisis.  Support for “humanitarian intervention,” therefore, outlasted the 
turbulent 1990s in spite of the many controversies the concept provoked.  Most of the 
concern focused on the precedent the Council set by authorizing the use of force in 
Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, etc., which provided a template for future military 
interventions in domestic conflicts.  Some worried about potential abuses of such 
authority, especially in Beijing following the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade.  
Many were also skeptical of the Council’s authority to intervene in domestic conflicts 
without consent in the first place.  Yet there was also a growing mass hoping the UNSC, 
NATO, African Union, or any international organization would actually intervene to 
prevent another genocide.  Perhaps most importantly, many asserted that the Council not 
only had the authority to use force, with or without consent, but a responsibility to do so, 
in order to protect people from ethnic cleansing, mass killing, and genocide.  Gradually 
this idea came to be known as “the responsibility to protect,” as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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8. The Rise of China and the Emergence of R2P 
 
“[T]he Commission is in absolutely no doubt that there is no better or more appropriate 
body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for human 
protection purposes.  It is the Security Council which should be making the hard 
decisions in the hard cases about overriding state sovereignty.  And it is the Security 
Council which should be making the often even harder decisions to mobilize effective 
resources, including military resources, to rescue populations at risk when there is no 
serious opposition on sovereignty grounds.  That was the overwhelming consensus we 
found in all our consultations around the world.  If international consensus is ever to be 
reached about when, where, how and by whom military intervention should happen, it is 
very clear that the central role of the Security Council will have to be at the heart of that 
consensus.  The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of 
authority, but to make the Security Council work much better than it has.”313  
 - The Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
 
Following the dramatic increase in UNSC use of force authorizations in the 
1990s, the controversies over Rwanda and Srebrenica, and a growing global media 
covering humanitarian crises, a movement coalesced around reforming international use 
of force norms.  Eventually, a recognizable epistemic community emerged with a fully 
articulated doctrine called the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).  The ICISS submitted 
the doctrine to the UN, and in 2005 it was adopted by the General Assembly.  The UNSC 
formally adopted R2P in 2006, which expanded the Council’s circle of protection and 
significantly altered international use of force norms.  R2P could not have been adopted 
by the UNSC without the acceptance of states that initially opposed the idea, such as 
China.  The story is obviously more complicated than this abridged version, and this 
chapter attempts to flesh out the details of this historic transformation.  In addition to my 
focus on the work of the R2P epistemic community, and the gradual acceptance of China, 	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I also pay particular attention to how UNSC resolutions authorizing the use of force 
changed after 1999.  As mentioned above, the mandate to protect civilians has been 
consistently integrated into every UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force since 
January of 2000 (S/Res/1289, see Appendix).  China voted in favor of every one of these 
resolutions, until the 2011 resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya.   
Thus, 1999 marks a significant tipping point in the evolution of the Council’s 
authority to use force.  For many of the reasons discussed above, the year’s events helped 
catalyze the institutionalization of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.  Although 
there are other important years, 1999 is when human rights advocates, UN bureaucrats, 
Council members, and a discernable epistemic community began to seriously address the 
lessons of the various “humanitarian interventions” of the proceeding decade.  Gradually 
all came to accept that the Council had the authority for such militarily interventions, but 
also that there needed to be rules specifying why this was the case.  This process took 
years, but began with a series of events in 1999.  This chapter will discuss this process, 
with a particular emphasis on the role of the epistemic community in the emergence of 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), and the role of China in its adoption by the UNSC.  I 
begin with two UN reports that made clear UNSC use of force norms needed reform. 
The Srebrenica and Rwanda Reports: 
One of more overlooked yet critical reasons R2P emerged was that Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and other UN officials wanted to learn how and why the UN failed 
in Srebrenica and Rwanda.  Annan called for two reports, which would have a lasting 
impact on the evolution of the Council’s authority to use force.  The Secretary General 
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Report: Srebrenica and the Secretary General Report: Rwanda are crucial to 
understanding the role the epistemic community played in the emergence of R2P.314 
Previously, SG Kofi Annan helped lead the effort to improve UN peacekeeping.  
Being the SG and the former head of the UNPKO office, Annan was intimately involved 
in many of the decisions in Bosnia, Rwanda, and other PKOs.  Perhaps 
uncharacteristically for a person in his position, he supported making public two rather 
damning reports from an independent inquiry regarding the failures in Srebrenica and 
Rwanda.315  The reports, Secretary General Report: Srebrenica and Secretary General 
Report: Rwanda, would have a lasting impact on the evolution of the Council’s authority 
to use force.  The reports provided key first hand accounts of how and why the UN 
missions in both places failed to stop the massacres.  Both also presented two significant 
common conclusions: the missions were under-resourced, and the use of force mandates 
were generally insufficient and/or unclear.  Although the former is clearly important, the 
latter finding is more relevant to this chapter.   
The Report on Rwanda offers a blunt assessment of the “inadequacy of 
UNAMIR’s mandate.”   
“If the mandate which the Security Council gave UNAMIR in its resolution 872 (1993) 
was more limited than the Secretary-General’s proposal to the Council, then it was even 
more distant from the original broad concept agreed on by the parties in the Arusha 
Accords… The limitation of the mandate… was an early and public sign of  the limits to 
the engagements which the Security Council was prepared to assume in Rwanda.”316 
 
The report also said that many within and outside the confines of Council meetings 	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warned members that UNAMIR was not given enough authority to use force.  The 
mission’s mandate was effectively to monitor a peace that demonstrably did not exist.  
The SG and others informed the Council no such peace yet existed, yet the Council 
mandated a more “traditional peacekeeping” mission.   
 This criticism is very similar to the conclusions found in the Srebrenica Report, 
which also faulted the overly defensive mandate of UNPROFOR.317  Although just as in 
the Rwanda report the lack of resources and troops was the most critical failure, the 
inability of troops to effectively defend the “protected areas” (discussed in the previous 
chapter) was also due to an overly limited use of force mandate.  Both reports effectively 
said that “traditional peacekeeping” mandates only allow troops to fire in self-defense, 
and not in the defense of innocent civilians.  In other words, peacekeepers should be 
given a mandate to defend themselves and civilians. 
The Rwanda report also singled out the American role in weakening the use of 
authorization: “The United States presented a number of amendments to the draft 
resolution which weakened the mandate.”318  As discussed in the preceding chapter, the 
Clinton Administration was suffering in the polls following the “Blackhawk Down” 
incident in Somalia, and therefore, reluctant to become involved in another domestic 
conflict.  The US had the most potential military assets to commit to Rwanda, so it is 
perhaps natural to single out their role in limiting UNAMIR’s mandate.  Yet, as discussed 
above, China also was against a broad use of force mandate in Rwanda. 
Throughout the 1990s, China’s position on authorizing the use of force evolved, 	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as shown in the last chapter.  The 1999 reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica were released 
just months after NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo, and China was perhaps 
unusually receptive to criticism of Council use of force authorizations.  Yet much of the 
criticism centered on mandates with too little authority to use force, not too much.  Thus, 
the general aim of the Reports seemed to be to move the Council further from China’s 
typically more traditional position on the use of force.       
Yet, rather than disengaging with the UNSC, Beijing decided to commit to deeper 
engagement.  It increased its financial and troop commitments to UNPKO,319 and became 
a more active participant in the drafting of resolutions, which to an extent parallel its 
engagement with other international organizations, such as the WTO, UNFCCC, etc. 
during the same period.  More relevant, however, Beijing began to articulate more 
nuanced and flexible interpretations of the legitimate use of force.  This perspective 
gradually seemed to become the mainstream position regarding how the UNSC used 
force in the 21st century.   
East Timor: 
The first case for China to articulate and enact its new approach came with East 
Timor, in August 1999.  East Timor was formerly under the control of Portugal, however, 
when they sought to establish a provincial government in 1974 to determine the status of 
East Timor civil war broke out.  The conflict was between those who favored 
independence, and those who wanted to integrate with Indonesia, a close neighbor with 
cultural and ethnic ties.  Unable to stop the violence, Portugal withdrew.  Indonesia 	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militarily intervened in 1976, and after helping end the conflict integrated East Timor into 
Indonesia as its 27th province. The UN never recognized the integration, and both the GA 
and UNSC called on Indonesia to withdraw.  Finally in May 1999, Indonesia agreed to 
elections in East Timor, supervised by the UN, which would decide whether East Timor 
would officially integrate with Indonesia or become fully independent.  On August 30, 
1999 approximately 98% of registered voters took to the polls and voted in favor of 
independence (78.5% to 21.5%).  
The decision led pro-integration militias, often with the support of the Indonesian 
military, to engage in violence, looting, and arson throughout East Timor.  Following the 
escalating violence, a draft resolution was crafted to authorize a UN peace enforcement 
mission.  The Chinese representative insisted on the consent of Indonesia and a clearly 
defined UNSC mandate as preconditions for this mission.  Following the consent of 
Indonesia, the UNSC authorized the UN transitional administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) to fulfill a mandate that would become something of a template for all future 
PKOs (S/Res/1264).   UNSC resolution 1264 authorizes:  
“The establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant 
to the request of the Government of Indonesia… to restore peace and security in East 
Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force 
capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes… the 
multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate.”320 
 
Here we see China’s traditional concern regarding consent being incorporated into the 
resolution, however, also authorizing the UNPKO to “take all necessary measures” to 
restore “peace and security.”  China’s normative position seemed to be that if consent 
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were given, then the scope of the use of force could be broadened beyond “self-defense,” 
but not without limits.    
Subsequently, China voted in favor of every UNSC resolution authorizing the use 
of force for over eleven years (see Figure 1 above).  There were PKOs authorized to use 
force in ten different countries during this time period.  Although China did not support 
every UNSC resolution during this span, it did vote in favor of every one that called for 
military action.  Further, Beijing provided peacekeepers to each of these missions, even if 
the US or its NATO allies led the operations.  A key factor in this support seemed to be 
that China helped define the limits to the use of force in these missions. 
The Epistemic Community in Action:  
A clear articulation of the normative guidelines for the use of force can be found 
in the so-called Brahimi Report.  In 2000, a high-level UN panel, chaired by Lakhdar 
Brahimi, was asked to review all aspects of UNPKO.  The Brahimi Report made four key 
recommendations.  First, peacekeepers should be specifically mandated to use force to 
defend themselves, their freedom of movement, their mission and civilians under 
imminent threat of attack.  Second, the UN should not mandate a mission before it had 
the resources available to fulfill it, which effectively meant that pivotal states could be 
deployed first, to be followed by a UN force.  Third, the report suggested better 
consultation between the UNSC and the troop-contributing countries, which amounts to 
more UNSC oversight.  Fourth, the panel encouraged the UN to pursue a 
multidimensional approach in peace building as an integral part of UNPKO, including the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, training of police 
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forces, supervision of elections, and strengthening of the rule of law and the protection of 
human rights. 
Much of the Brahimi Report reiterated traditional Chinese concerns regarding 
limiting the scope the use of force and providing more UNSC oversight.  In fact, 
according to Stefan Stähle, the emphasis on limiting the authorized level of force was the 
product of a Chinese initiative – and reportedly called the “Chinese model.”321  
Importantly, most of the key prescriptions found in the Brahimi Report began to be 
integrated into UNSC resolutions.   
Clearly, however, the most important aspect of the Brahimi Report was the 
emphasis on protecting civilians.  Although it focuses more on what would come to be 
called “responsibility while protecting,” the report is another step in the emergence of 
R2P.  For example, the report provides the normative justification for using force without 
the consent of the sovereign government: 
“The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in 
self defense should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, 
however, that in the context of modern peace operations dealing with intra-
State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways by the local 
parties. A party may give its consent to United Nations presence merely to gain time to 
retool its fighting forces and withdraw consent when the peacekeeping operation no 
longer serves its interests. A party may seek to limit an operation’s freedom of 
movement, adopt a policy of persistent non-compliance with the provisions of an 
agreement or withdraw its consent altogether. Moreover, regardless of faction leaders’ 
commitment to the peace, fighting forces may simply be under much looser control than 
the conventional armies with which traditional peacekeepers work, and such forces may 
split into factions whose existence and implications were not contemplated in the peace 
agreement under the color of which the United Nations mission operates.”322  
 
This was an attempt to redefine sovereignty.  Similar to the ICISS, the Brahimi Report 
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proposes that consent should not be necessary in order to authorize a military intervention 
in every case.  
 Similarly, the Report also suggests that a commitment to impartiality should not 
entail forgoing a mission’s responsibility to protect civilians.  The Report states that, 
“impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for 
all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties 
consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may 
not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.”323  In 
other words, a responsibility to protect civilians under imminent threat trumps 
impartiality norms. 
 Yet, perhaps the most telling passage in the Brahimi Report ties the lessons 
learned from Rwanda to reforming UNSC use of force norms:   
“Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community 
failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose 
obvious evil. The Security Council has since established, in its resolution 1296 (2000), 
that the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to 
civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international 
peace and security and thus be triggers for Security Council action. If a United Nations 
peace operation is already on the ground, carrying out those actions may become its 
responsibility, and it should be prepared.”324 
 
Hence, we can see the incremental acceptance of the UNSC expanding its circle of 
protection to include human protection, and to do so without consent if necessary.  The 
influence of the Brahimi Report also highlights the significance of the epistemic 
community in this transformation.  The best example of this, however, is the work of the 	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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: 
 As mentioned in the introduction, in 1999 Kofi Anna questioned how the 
international community should react to situations like Rwanda, if humanitarian 
intervention was an unacceptable assault on sovereignty?325  To try and answer this the 
Government of Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced at the 
UN General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of ICISS.  The Commission 
conducted a series of roundtable discussions in Beijing, Cairo, Geneva, London, Maputo, 
New Dehli, New York, Ottawa, Paris, St. Petersburg, Santiago, and Washington DC.   
“The meetings involved representatives from governments and inter-governmental 
organizations, from non-governmental organizations and civil society, and from 
universities, research institutes and think tanks – in all, over 200 people.  These 
roundtable meetings proved to be a wonderfully rich source of information, ideas and 
diverse political perspectives, and an excellent real world environment in which the 
Commission could test its own ideas as they evolved.”326 
 
In many respects, the ICISS was the quintessential manifestation of an epistemic 
community.  ICISS consisted of “professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”327  Further, according to Haas, “Although 
an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and 
backgrounds, they have a shared set of principled beliefs… and a common policy 
enterprise,” which in this case was reforming international use of force norms.328 
 After all the roundtables, meetings with the UN Secretary General, and 	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representatives of each of the P5, the ICISS produced a report, aptly titled “The 
Responsibility to Protect.”  According to the report, 
“Sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally – to respect the sovereignty of other 
states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the 
state.  In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, 
sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility.  Sovereignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship.”329 
 
The report offers two basic principles based on this idea.  First, “State sovereignty 
implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies 
with the state itself.”330  Second, “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a 
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.”331 
At the 2005 World Summit the UN unanimously endorsed R2P.  Referring to the 
Summit document, the R2P doctrine was then unanimously adopted by the UNSC 
(S/Res/1674, 28 April 2006).  There were some revisions from the ICISS report, 
however.  Resolution 1674 states that UN members have a “responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”332  Although these four reasons for enforcement are more limited than those 	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stated in the second principle of the ICISS report, the change is clearly more of a 
refinement of ICISS recommendations rather than a rejection.  That so little was changed 
from the original report shows how important it is for an epistemic community to propose 
a well conceived and realistic policy if it hopes to enact change.  Further, the fact that the 
UN was even considering adopting the ICISS’s recommendations speaks volumes.  That 
the entire UN adopted R2P, including China and other states that initially voiced such 
strong opposition to the idea, is also a significant achievement for the R2P epistemic 
community. 
Although more attention is often given to China’s 2005 and 2006 endorsement of 
R2P, China had already supported the inclusion of the responsibility to protect civilians 
in the Brahimi Report.  Further, as mentioned above, the mandate to protect civilians in 
UNPKO has been consistently integrated into every UNSC resolution authorizing the use 
of force since January of 2000 (S/Res/1289).  China has voted in favor of all of these, 
except the Libyan mission.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration 
of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping 
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out.” 
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Sudan: 
China’s voting behavior, however, also shows that the consent of the target state 
is still critical, and that regardless of their acceptance of R2P, Beijing maintains a more 
rigid conception of sovereignty than the NATO allies.  A good example of this can be 
found in China’s abstention on a 2004 Resolution regarding the violence in Sudan.   
Violent conflict has been an ongoing problem in the Sudan for generations.  
Religion, resources, and geography divide the North and South.  The ongoing conflict is 
too complex to discuss in full detail here, but what is most relevant to this dissertation is 
that the conflict in the Sudan centers on mainly on control over vast oil reserves located 
in South Sudan that historically have been controlled and exported by the North.  The 
government in Khartoum is dominated by Sudanese Muslims that have a history of ruling 
over non-Muslim Sudanese in the South and West.  The much-discussed Darfur region is 
located in the western half of Sudan and has also been ruled from Khartoum.  In the early 
2000s, most of the violence in the Sudan took place between various rebel groups 
attempting to gain either autonomy or independence from Khartoum.  Although most of 
the reports show widespread human rights violations on behalf of the government in 
Khartoum (especially aerial bombing of civilian targets), there is also evidence that 
suggests rebel groups have committed violations as well.333 
The violence in the Sudan escalated in the Darfur region in 2004, and there were 
widespread reports of ethnic cleansing by groups associated with Khartoum.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 See the UNPKO website: “SG Reports on the Situation in Sudan,” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/reports.shtml  
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Council then passed Resolution 1556 regarding the violence in Darfur.334  Importantly, 
the resolution did not seek to establish a PKO authorized to use force.  The resolution, 
however, according to the US: 
“Calls on the Government of Sudan to do all in its power to facilitate humanitarian relief.  
It endorses the deployment of international monitors and a protection force. It imposes an 
arms embargo specifically focused on Darfur and it provides a monthly progress-
monitoring mechanism, with the prospect of sanctions if the Government of Sudan fails 
to fulfill its commitments… The resolution, in stern and unambiguous terms, puts the 
Government of Sudan on notice that it must fulfill the commitments it made on 3 July.  
Sudan must know that serious measures — international sanctions — are looming if the 
Government refuses to do so.”335 
 
China abstained from voting on the resolution so “that political negotiations be expedited 
so as to reach, as soon as possible, a comprehensive agreement based on respect for the 
Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”336  In other words, the UNSC should not act 
without giving the Sudanese government time to solve the crisis on its own. 
Yet, the US and the UK argued that the UNSC should not wait for the consent.  
Further, Washington directly criticized the Chinese position:  
“Some said that the Council should give the Government of Sudan more time before 
adopting this resolution. The United States did not agree…. While precise numbers are 
difficult to ascertain, the latest World Health Organization estimates suggest that between 
240 and 440 people die every day as a result of this conflict. That means that up to 11,000 
people have died since the 3 July communiqué, and more people die every day that the 
Government stonewalls the international community. It is time to start the clock ticking 
on the Government of Sudan.”337   
 
China disagreed, however, and was one of only two UNSC members not to vote in favor 
of the resolution (Pakistan also abstained, interestingly however, Russia voted in favor of 
the Resolution).  China offered the following normative justification for its abstention: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 S/PV.5015, 30 July 2004. 
335 S/PV.5015, 30 July 2004.  
336 S/PV.5015, 30 July 2004.  
337 S/PV.5015, 30 July 2004. 
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“The draft resolution proposed by the United States and other countries, although some 
amendments have been made to it, still includes mandatory measures against the 
Sudanese Government. As all the parties are speeding up diplomatic efforts, such 
measures cannot be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and may even further 
complicate it. China had hoped that the sponsors of the draft resolution would have taken 
seriously into consideration China’s concerns and made the appropriate adjustments so as 
to arrive at a consensus in the Security Council. Regrettably, that proposal was not 
accommodated or responded to. We can therefore only abstain in the voting on this draft 
resolution in the Security Council.”338 
 
Many observers criticized Beijing, and argued that waiting for consent allowed 
the violence in Sudan to continue unnecessarily.  However, what is sometimes 
overlooked is that China was actively pressuring the Khartoum government to negotiate a 
peace agreement.339  This is not to say that China could not have done more to help 
mitigate the violence in the Sudan, but only to say that they were not completely 
unconcerned.   
Although many may question the reasons why Beijing did not support UNSC 
action in 2004, in March of the following year China did vote in favor of Resolution 
1590, which authorized a UNPKO to use force.  Beijing also extended this use of force 
mandate in 2007, with S/Res/1769.  This resolution also offers a relatively clear example 
of the now typical UNSC use of force mandate.  Resolution 1769 authorizes the UNPKO:  
“To take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems 
within its capabilities in order to: protect its personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment… prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect 
civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.”340 
 
China’s involvement in the Sudan is highly controversial, and somewhat opaque, but 
what is relevant to this study is that Beijing supported a mandate to prevent armed attacks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 S/PV.5015, 30 July 2004. 
339 Stähle, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2009. 
340 S/Res/1769, 31 July 2007, (emphasis added). 
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and to protect civilians without prejudice to the domestic government.  This was a 
continuing theme of use of force authorizations from 1999 through 2010, all of which 
China voted in favor of.   
Libya: 
Although China seemed to have come to something of a normative convergence 
with the US regarding why to use force, or who should be protected, there is still a degree 
of divergence on when force should be used.  This normative divergence was illustrated 
on March 17, 2011, when China failed to support the UNSC resolution authorizing the 
use of force in Libya.  The Council adopted resolution 1973, with a vote of 10 to 0, with 
5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia).  This was the first time that China 
had not voted in favor of a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force in over eleven 
years.   
The conflict in Libya was sparked by the revolutions in neighboring Egypt and 
Tunisia late in 2010.  The so-called Arab Spring began in Tunisia, as mass protests began 
after a man lit himself on fire to protest government corruption and oppression.  The 
protests spread across the region, as millions of people demanded more political rights 
and economic opportunities.  Libya, like Egypt and Tunisia, had been ruled by one man 
for generations: Muammar Gaddafi.  Beginning on February 15, 2011 protests against his 
rule broke out in Benghazi, and in an effort to suppress them security forces fired into the 
crowds.  Larger protests quickly spread across Libya, and the government responded with 
more violence.  Eventually the protestors took up arms, and a full-scale rebellion ensued.  
The conflict rapidly escalated, and the world watched images of civilians being bombed 
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by fighter jets on the nightly news.  Cell phone videos captured the violence first-hand 
from rebels, and the UNSC was quickly expected, once again, to do something about the 
violence. 
According to the US, UK, France, and others, the use of force was necessary because 
the international community had a responsibility to protect Libyan civilians.  US 
representative Susan Rice argued: 
“Colonel Qadhafi and those who still stand by him continue to grossly and systematically 
abuse the most fundamental human rights of Libya’s people. On March 12, the League of 
Arab States called on the Security Council to establish a no-fly zone and take other 
measures to protect civilians…  The future of Libya should be decided by the people of 
Libya. The United States stands with the Libyan people in support of their universal 
rights.”341 
 
Thus, the US and the other supporters of the resolution asserted that the Council had a 
responsibility to protect Libyan civilians from the Libyan government.  Interestingly, the 
US had few strategic interests at stake in Libya, and President Obama paid some political 
costs for authorizing the PKO there.342  Further, the US missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were unpopular with most Americans, and there was not an overwhelming domestic 
appetite for another military intervention – humanitarian or otherwise.343  Yet President 
Obama did support authorizing a mission to use force in Libya nonetheless. 
China, Russia, and other Council members, however, did not agree the use of 
force was justified.  Although they condemned the actions of the Libyan military and 
supported robust economic and diplomatic sanctions, according to Chinese representative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 SC/10200, 17 March 2011.  
342 As helpfully pointed out by Thomas Weiss in an interview with the author. 
343 Only 47% of Americans supported the Libya intervention initially, according to Gallup, and it 
actually decreased subsequently: http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/americans-approve-
military-action-against-libya.aspx 
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Li Baodong,  
“[China] asked specific questions that failed to be answered and, therefore, it had serious 
difficulty with the resolution.  It had not blocked the passage of the resolution, however, 
because it attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and the African 
Union.  At the same time, [China] supported the efforts of the Secretary-General’s Envoy 
to resolve the situation by peaceful means.”344 
 
China and especially Russia would go on to more forcefully object to the mission in 
Libya in the days and months following this vote.  Hu Jintao argued that the PKO caused 
civilian casualties, which went against the original intent of the resolution.345  Vladimir 
Putin went further, likening the mission to “a medieval crusade.”346   
The resolution at issue, (S/Res/1973), “[d]etermining that the situation in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security,” provided a mandate “to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack… while excluding a foreign occupation 
force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”347  Li Baodong, China’s official 
representative at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), said of their abstention, 
“the continuing deterioration of the situation in Libya was of great concern to 
China.  However, the United Nations Charter must be respected and the current crisis 
must be ended through peaceful means.  China was always against the use of force when 
those means were not exhausted.”348  The consistency of China’s normative position on 
the use of force may be overstated, however, and in many respects Libya seems to be an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 SC/10200, 17 March 2011. 
345 Hu Jintao, March 30, 2011. 
346 Arutunyan, March 21, 2011. 
347 S/Res/1973, 17 March 2011 
348 SC/10200, 17 March 2011 (emphasis added). Also, importantly, China did not block the 
passage of the resolution, “because it attached great importance to the requests of the Arab 
League and the African Union.”  
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exceptional case.   
As mentioned above, from late 1990 till the 2011 Libya vote, China had voted in 
favor of 30 of 42 (71%) UNSC resolutions authorizing the use of force (see Table 1 in 
Appendix).  Further, although they did not support 12 such resolutions, Beijing never 
vetoed one.  Moreover, beginning with the East Timor vote on September 15, 1999 China 
voted in favor of every UNSC use of force authorization – until the March 17, 2011 
resolution regarding Libya.  Yet, even including the abstention on S/Res/1973, since 
September 1999, China has voted in favor of 20 out of 21 UNSC resolutions authorizing 
the use of force.  Whether Libya is an outlier case or the beginning of a new trend 
remains to be seen, but China did vote in favor of a mission authorized to use force in the 
Ivory Coast just weeks after the Libya vote.  Thus, as the aforementioned statistics 
suggest, China’s perspective on the use of force is much more nuanced than the statement 
above by representative Li Baodong suggests.   
Beyond the rhetoric, however, there are at least a few things that seem important 
to note regarding China’s abstention.  First, it should be noted that China supported 20 of 
21 UNSC use of force authorizations since late 1999, so it seems premature to judge the 
long-term significance of the lack of support regarding Libya.   
Another significant aspect of the Libya vote was the abstention of Germany 
because the NATO allies almost always vote in unison.  This seems to illustrate the 
exceptional status of the Libyan case.   
Third, the “BRIC” countries  (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) all abstained, but 
all voted in favor of S/Res/1970, which placed economic and diplomatic sanctions on 
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Libya.  Whether this is an example of free-riding or genuine concern regarding the use of 
force, or something else, is unclear.  But it seems significant that they voted as a block.   
It also seems important to note that China cited the Arab League and African 
Union’s requests for intervention as justification for not vetoing the resolution.   
This seems to follow Beijing’s pattern of seeking consent for intervention from 
regional parties to the conflict, as seen in multiple cases mentioned above.  The Arab 
League and African Union’s role in especially interesting because both organizations 
explicitly reference R2P as justification for the use of force.  According to Amr Moussa, 
Secretary General of the Arab League, “Our one goal is to protect the civilian population 
in Libya after what has been reported of attacks and casualties in a very bloody 
situation.”349  This is another example of the growing, yet still relatively shallow, 
institutionalization of R2P. 
However, the fact that China did not vote in favor of the no-fly zone directly 
requested by the Libyan rebels, the Arab League, and African Union is interesting; it 
suggests that there were other reasons for their abstention beyond respect for 
sovereignty.350  Yet, it is still too soon to put China’s vote on Libya in much context, and 
there are far too many facts unknown.  Further, just a few weeks after the Libyan vote, 
the unanimously voted to authorize the use of force in the Ivory Coast without the 
consent of the government (S/Res 1975).  Moreover, China has voted in favor of at least 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Bronner and Sanger, March 12, 2011. 
350 China had oil contracts in Libya that were put at risk by the rebellion, however, considering 
the black box that is CCP decision making it seems imprudent assert exactly what their 
motivations were.  Interestingly, there were also about 30,000 Chinese nationals working in Libya 
at the time.  China managed to evacuate these people on the first Chinese naval vessels to ever 
sail into the Mediterranean Sea. 
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nine UNSC resolutions that explicitly reference R2P since the Libyan vote.351   
Further, the UNSC use of force authorizations are typically criticized for taking 
too long, but the Libyan case was often criticized for just the opposite.  This seems to be 
the position China took, arguing that they still had unanswered questions, and that the 
diplomatic and economic sanctions were not given enough time to take effect.   
The relative speed of the vote on the use of force resolution also seems significant 
because it shows how quickly news and empathy travel today.  The argument that “the 
CNN effect,” discussed in detail in Section II, is important in explaining the growth of 
humanitarian interventions may be bolstered by the Libyan case.  It took less than a 
month from the beginning of violence in Libya to the vote on S/Res/1973.  The news of 
the violence in Libya spread far more quickly due to images captured on cell phones 
“going viral” and reaching millions within hours rather than days.  Further, the news 
coverage came not just from CNN and the BBC but also from Al Jazeera, which 
undoubtedly influenced the Arab League’s decision.  Although there were many factors 
influencing the decision to intervene in Libya, the speed of the decision compared to the 
past seems at least partially due to the so-called “CNN effect.”  
  Although the Libyan mission was arguably successful in preventing a massacre in 
Benghazi, and putting the principle of R2P into practice, China, Russia, and others 
argued that the mission exceeded its mandate.  They argued that the NATO used 
excessive force that caused unnecessary collateral damage, and that the mission was more 
about “regime change” than protecting civilians.  These same arguments would be used 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 See UNSC Website, Documents page: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/.  
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to justify blocking efforts in the Council to intervene in Syria. 
Syria and “Non-intervention”: 
Unfortunately, the current violence in Syria often seems like history is repeating 
itself.  In February 1982, Syrian President Hafez Assad ordered an assault on the city of 
Hama.  The Syrian army surrounded Hama, and used tanks and heavy artillery to reduce 
entire neighborhoods to rubble.  Over the course of three weeks, thousands of civilians 
were indiscriminately killed.  Although the exact number of dead is unknown, between 
ten and forty thousand people were killed during the siege, and the majority were 
civilians.352  The army, according to one of the few journalists to witness the assault: 
“crushed the uprising with great savagery.  I stood by the river Orontes as Syrian battle-
tanks shelled the ancient city; I saw the Syrian wounded, covered in blood, lying beside 
their armored vehicles, the starving civilians scavenging for old bread.”353  The city was a 
base for rebels seeking to overthrow the Alawite dominated government, and the 
insurgents were largely drawn from the majority Sunni population.  Hence, many 
considered the assault to be an example of collective punishment.  There were numerous 
reports on “the Hama Massacre,” but the UNSC never addressed the situation.  The 
Council passed 29 resolutions during 1982, but not one related to the assault on Hama.  
Further, I could not find a single Council meeting on the subject.  Interestingly, the 
silence and inaction of the Council seemed to go relatively unnoticed.   
More recently, and tragically, the Syrian army again subjected Hama to 
bombardment.  In August 2011, Hafez Assad’s son President Bashar Assad ordered an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Fisk, 1997. 
353 Fisk, 1997. 
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assault on the city of Hama.  Once again, in an attempt to suppress a rebellion, the Syrian 
government used heavy artillery and tanks to bomb residential sections of Hama.  
Accounts of the assault vary, but the death toll is thought to be in the hundreds, with most 
being civilians.354  Although the UNSC divided on what actions to take, the Council 
united in their condemnation of the mass killing.  The Council explicitly condemned “the 
widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian 
authorities.”355   
Yet the UN Secretary General (SG), the President of the General Assembly (GA) 
and many others criticized the Council for “failing its responsibility” to adequately 
address the ongoing violence in Syria.356  "Syria is self-destructing," stated SG Ban Ki-
moon, "After nearly two years, we no longer count days in hours, but in bodies.  Another 
day, another 100, 200, 300 dead.  Fighting rages.  Sectarian hatred is on the rise.  The 
catalogue of war crimes is mounting…  The Security Council must no longer stand on the 
sidelines, dead-locked, silently witnessing the slaughter."357  Somewhat paradoxically, 
this criticism demonstrates how much the Council has changed over the years.  The 
Council is now expected to address violence within states, not just between states.  
Moreover, in many respects, it is taken for granted that the Council has the authority to 
use force – if necessary - to protect civilians from their own government.  Although when, 
where, and how civilians are to be protected is still hotly debated, there is now little 
question that the Council has the authority to do so – even if it means invalidating a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Bakri, August 4, 2011.  
355 SC/10658, 27 May 2012. 
356 John Ashe, 23 February 2013.  
357 Ban Ki Moon, SG/SM/14808, 12 February 2013. 
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state’s sovereignty.  
The Council’s reaction to the uprising in Syria, beginning at nearly the same time 
as Libya, caused many to not only question the significance of China and Russia’s 
previous support for R2P but the overall ability of the Council to enforce its principles.  
According to the President of the General Assembly: 
“The Universal Declaration defined human rights as the “foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world.  It is in this context that I wish to underline my grave concern at 
the perpetuation of the most horrific humanitarian tragedy of our times the bloodbath of 
Syria…  For close to two years, the international community has failed to put a stop to 
the carnage. Those with the political power to change things must answer to every mother 
and every girl in Syria.  Inaction in the councils of peace looks like indifference in the 
cauldron of war.  The Security Council must no longer stand as a silent witness to the 
slaughter.”358   
 
At the time of this writing, it remains to be seen what the Council will do about Syria.  It 
seems likely, however, that China and especially Russia will block any draft resolution 
calling for a military intervention in Syria that directly or indirectly mandates going to 
war with the Syrian government.   
Concerns over “one-sided” resolutions (see US vetoes regarding Israel/Palestine), 
or those that amount to a policy of “regime change” (as in Libya) are a perpetual feature 
of Council debates.  Although R2P establishes more authority to intervene in a state, that 
authority is not unlimited and is adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.  As the Russian 
position on Syria demonstrates, finding consensus on each and every case is very difficult, 
especially when supporting certain missions would mean acting against a state’s strategic 
interests, or its allies.  In principle, R2P tasks Council members with putting aside such 
interests in order to stop mass murder, however, in practice this is often easier said than 	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done.   
Further, there are many in America and the West who also oppose militarily 
intervening in Syria not because of any allegiance to the Assad government, but due to a 
fear of becoming part of another war like Iraq or Afghanistan.  These wars grew 
increasingly unpopular not just in the US, as mentioned above, but throughout most of 
the world.  Hence, in August of 2013 when President Obama asserted that the Assad 
regime had “crossed a red line,” by using chemical weapons, and that the use of force 
was necessary to protect civilians, he encountered stiff opposition.  Many of the 
American arguments regarding staying out of Syria echo those following the debacle in 
Somalia regarding intervening in Rwanda (see previous chapter).    
The 2013 debate in British Parliament over Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
proposal to back President Obama’s decision to militarily intervene in Syria is especially 
illustrative.  Cameron came out in support of Obama’s plan to militarily intervene in 
Syria without UNSC authorization.  The use of force authorization in question, according 
to Cameron, “is not about taking sides in the Syrian conflict, it is not about invading, it is 
not about regime change, and it is not even about working more closely with the 
opposition… it is about the large-scale use of chemical weapons and our response to a 
war crime — nothing else.”359   During the debate over military intervention, Tony Baldry, 
a Member of Parliament, more explicitly invoked R2P: 
“On the matter of international law, did not the world leaders and the UN sign up 
unanimously in 2005 to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, which means that if 
countries default on their responsibility to defend their own citizens, the international 
community as a whole has a responsibility to do so? Syria has defaulted on its 	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responsibility to protect its own citizens, so surely now the international community and 
ourselves have a responsibility to undertake what we agreed to do as recently as 2005.”360 
 
Interestingly, the Liberal opposition agreed that “the Security Council must live up to its 
responsibilities to protect civilians,” and supported “steps to provide humanitarian 
protection to the people of Syria.”361  Yet they would “only support military action 
involving UK forces if and when the following conditions have been met…”362 Arguing 
those conditions had not been met, the opposition defeated Cameron’s attempt to 
authorize the use of force.  The defeat in British parliament demonstrated the 
complexities involved with enforcing R2P – even amongst those who support its 
principles.   
Beijing and Moscow also cited concerns over authorizing a mission in Syria that 
would likely cause excessive civilian casualties, which they say occurred in Libya.  
Significantly, they argue that in addition to having a responsibility to protect, the Council 
has a “responsibility while protecting” to not cause excessive collateral damage.363   
Brazil also put forth a proposal to adopt specific guidelines for “responsibility while 
protecting,” that have been incorporated into a recent report on implementing R2P by the 
Secretary General.364   
Such suggestions inherently acknowledge the Council’s responsibility to protect 
civilians from mass killings, but focus more on the means of doing so.  In other words, it 
is a debate about the best means to an end, not an argument for abolishing R2P.   Further, 	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calls by the Secretary General, the General Assembly, and members of the epistemic 
community for the UNSC to “do something” about the violence in Syria demonstrates the 
growing expectation for the Council to act on their responsibility to protect.  Put another 
way, although the Libyan case demonstrated the further institutionalization of R2P, the 
lack of action on Syria shows how incomplete and imperfect this process is.365   
Whether Syria is another landmark case of “non-intervention” or not remains to 
be seen, but what is clear is that intervening in a civil war typically means either 
receiving consent or ignoring a lack of host government consent.  For better or worse, 
some Council members are more willing to ignore consent than others.    
Finally, many of the arguments against intervening in Syria demonstrate that 
enforcing R2P can call for a degree of self-sacrifice or altruism that many states are 
unwilling to make.  It should be noted that cases of “non-intervention,” such as Rwanda 
and potentially Syria, show that there are many reasons why the Council does not behave 
as altruistically as their professed principles call for.  Although this highlights the limits 
of empathy and social influence, it also shows the historic significance of the Council 
institutionalizing the responsibility to protect to begin with.   
The Institutionalization of R2P Within the UNSC and at the State-level: 
I conclude this chapter by briefly presenting some of the more recent institutional 
changes at the UN due to the adoption of R2P.  As mentioned above, failures to stop the 
violence in Srebrenica and Rwanda provoked the UN to assess its inadequacies. UN 
internal assessments revealed systemic problems in gathering and disseminating 	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information in both crises.366  For example, although there were UN Peacekeepers on the 
ground in Rwanda, cabled reports from UN officials on the ground describing the 
impending ethnic slaughter were not communicated to the Council.367  In particular, the 
infamous “11 January Cable,” which General Romeo Dallaire sent to the SG requesting 
the authority to use force to stop the ensuing slaughter, never made it to the Council.368  
Although the subsequent UN Report detailing the failures in Rwanda primarily stressed 
the lack of resources and insufficient mandate, another of its findings pointed to failures 
in gathering and disseminating information.  According to Bellamy: “The flow of 
information was sporadic, resulting in critical information being either lost or not getting 
into the hands of appropriate decision-makers.  Several members of the Security Council 
complained that they were not made aware of Dallaire’s now famous cable.”369  One of 
the goals of the adoption of R2P was to institutionalize better knowledge building 
practices, so that a lack of information could never again be used as an excuse for 
inaction.  
Thus in 2001, prodded by the epistemic community, the UNSC requested the SG 
“refer to the Council information and analyses within the United Nations system on cases 
of serious violations of international law,” especially genocide.370  As per this request, in 
2004 the SG created The Office on Genocide Prevention, and appointed a Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.  Significantly, Francis Deng headed this office 	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370 See the Office on Genocide Prevention’s website, 
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from 2007 to 2012.  Once again showing the growing influence of the R2P epistemic 
community.   
The SG bolstered the office by adding a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to 
Protect, at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.371  The two Advisors share an 
overlapping mission, as well as a common office and staff.  The principle mandate of the 
Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect is to discover and 
disseminate information that could help governments and the UN fulfill their 
responsibility to protect.  Thus,  
“The Office creates knowledge and raises awareness of the prevention of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in order to enhance the capacity of 
the United Nations to analyze and manage information relevant to genocide and related 
crimes, and enable States, the United Nations system and civil society to work 
collectively towards preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. The Office assists regional organizations and governments to institute 
prevention mechanisms for genocide and related crimes, and engages governments on the 
nature of genocide and constructive ways of managing diversity as a preventive strategy. 
Finally, the Office conducts training seminars for government officials, civil society and 
UN staff on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”372 
 
The Office collects and maintains working files “on situations of concern, therefore, 
based on the Office’s Analysis Framework, which identifies eight factors which, 
cumulatively, could lead to genocidal violence.”373  Information gathered and 
disseminated by the Office, such as the Analysis Framework, is another product of new 
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knowledge making practices that the adoption of R2P institutionalized.374  
The Office uses such information to provoke governments and relevant UN 
agencies to act.  In February 2011, the Office’s Special Advisers issued a statement 
regarding systematic attacks against the civilian population in Libya by military forces.  
The Advisers invoked R2P, and reminded the Libyan Government of “its pledge to 
protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity, as well as their incitement.”375  The Office has also issued many 
statements regarding the Syrian government’s failure to protect its citizens.376  The fact 
that the UNSC does not always act upon the information provided by the Office, however, 
does not refute my argument that the institutionalization of R2P changed the knowledge 
building practices of the UNSC.  Moreover, these knowledge making procedures 
highlight the new organizational responsibilities of the Council.377  
The Secretary-General has authored several reports regarding the implementation 
of R2P, and many of the practices center on making sure the Security Council and all UN 
member-states, including those who may actually be committing human rights violations, 
understand who is suffering and why.  Moreover, the SG uses his “good offices” to 
publicly advocate on behalf of those seeking UN protection, and to prod the Council to 
act. 
Although at this time there is no formal UNSC policy for taking “the point of 	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view of those seeking or needing support,” there is something of an informal policy that 
other UN agencies, especially UNHCR and Human Rights Council update the SG and 
UNSC on potential violations of R2P.  For example, some of the most thorough reports 
and statements on the violence in Syria have come from the SG, the heads of UNHCR 
and the HRC. As mentioned above, they are also capable of setting up formal 
International Inquiry Commissions, which send out UN observers.  Their findings, 
reports, and statements are typically the foundation for those specifically tasked with the 
“perspective taking” required by R2P, such as Special Advisor Jennifer Welsh at the 
Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.  Further, as evidenced 
above, this office is the institutional embodiment of knowledge building and perspective-
taking.378   
The purpose of the aforementioned work of the epistemic community is to inform 
the UNSC and Council-members, and in some cases pressure them to act.  In a sense, the 
SG and the aforementioned UN offices and agencies are all tasked with being the official 
eyes and ears of the UNSC regarding their responsibility to protect.  They have a duty to 
try and prevent genocide by looking for conditions that may lead to mass killing, and 
informing the UNSC when they have a responsibility to protect.  They also give voice to 
the victims by advocating on their behalf for UN assistance.  The institutionalization of 
R2P enhances these offices' options for prodding the UNSC to intervene in domestic 
conflicts and helps the Council take the perspective of those requiring protection.  In 
effect, R2P empowered these agencies to make the UNSC more empathic. 	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The Office on Genocide Prevention is also an example of the role of the epistemic 
community in the institutionalization of R2P.  The appointment of Jennifer Welsh to 
succeed Edward Luck is especially revealing.  Welsh and Luck are two most cited 
authors on the UNSC and humanitarian intervention (both are cited numerous times 
above).  Both are academics, policy experts, and influential members of the R2P 
epistemic community.  Both of their appointments arguably stem more from their work in 
academia than government.  Interestingly, Welsh is playing dual roles as a professor at 
the University of Oxford, while also heading the UN R2P office.  And Luck is currently 
the dean at the School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego.   
Another of the interesting aspects of the R2P epistemic community is how some 
members move from being an advocate for changing state policies to working in 
government on such policies.  Samantha Power is good example of this.  Her rise from a 
journalist covering the Srebrenica massacre, to founding Director of the Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy at Harvard, to having a seat on the National Security Council, to 
running an office in the State Department, to her current post as UN Ambassador is quite 
illustrative.   
Power began her career disseminating information on the suffering of civilians 
caught in the bloody Yugoslav Wars.  After gaining notoriety for her coverage of the 
conflict, she parlayed this into a prestigious academic position, where she was able 
become a recognized “expert” on genocide.  Her 2002 book “A Problem From Hell,” 
mentioned above, won the Pulitzer Prize strengthening her voice and expanding her 
audience.  The book helped educate people on the history of the international 
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community’s failures to stop genocides, and offered specific and realistic policy 
recommendations.  Power spoke at numerous conferences on the subject of humanitarian 
intervention, and became one of the more prominent members of the R2P epistemic 
community.  In 2004, she was even named one of Time magazine’s “most influential 
people in the world.”379   
Interestingly, the following year Power began advising then Senator Barack 
Obama, with a specific emphasis on educating him about the situation in Darfur.  When 
Obama became President she eventually became an advisor on the National Security 
Council, and many suggest she was critical in convincing Obama to intervene in Libya.380 
As mentioned above, Power eventually went on become the US Ambassador to 
the UN.  On June 5, 2013, when announcing her appointment President Obama said that 
Power was, “One of our foremost thinkers on foreign policy, she showed us that the 
international community has a moral responsibility and a profound interest in resolving 
conflicts and defending human dignity.”381  In her proceeding statement, Power tellingly 
remarked “From the day I met you and you told me that you had spent a chunk of your 
vacation reading a long, dark book on genocide – I knew you were a different kind of 
leader, and I knew I wanted to work for you.”382  She went on to say, “I have seen UN aid 
workers endure shellfire to deliver food to the people of Sudan.  Yet I’ve also seen UN 
peacekeepers fail to protect the people of Bosnia.  As the most powerful and inspiring 
country on this Earth, we have a critical role to play in insisting that the institution meet 	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the necessities of our time.  It can do so only with American leadership.”383  What is so 
striking about this statement is that it is essentially the same argument put forward in “A 
Problem From Hell.”384  This is further evidence the institutionalization of R2P is getting 
deeper, and that an epistemic community can be more influential than many might 
predict.  
Conclusion: 
Finally, it is true that the NATO allies have been willing to authorize the use of 
force more than China and Russia.  This leads to a not unfounded perception that the 
NATO allies support human rights more than China and Russia.  It is important to 
remember, however, that this is a difference of degree not kind.  China and Russia are not 
opposed to the enforcement of R2P, but they are opposed to the US and its allies using 
PKOs to expand their strategic capabilities.  China seems to be concerned with US 
security assets and commitments in their region, and Russia similarly fears NATO 
expansion.  This mutual interest in securing the state from military coercion often leads to 
shared normative positions regarding UNSC resolutions.   
Yet since 1990, there are more cases of China and Russia agreeing to authorize 
the use of force than there are not.  Further, China increasingly sends soldiers to 
participate in such missions.  In other words, it is not accurate to say that China and 
Russia are opposed to humanitarian interventions or R2P.  They may value their own 
strategic interests in certain cases more than the responsibility to protect, but this is also 
true of the NATO allies.   	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Further, China’s identity is in a state of flux, and how Beijing might behave under 
recently elected President Xi Jinping is an open question at the time of this writing.  Also 
what might happen if China faced another large-scale domestic protest movement, similar 
to the one in 1989?  Although it may seem highly unlikely, the Chinese government still 
seems to worry about this possibility (as Beijing’s recent censoring of the internet seems 
to show).  Thus, Beijing may view the protests in the Middle East through the lens of the 
Tiananmen Square crisis and a long history of horrific civil wars.  Beyond its veto power, 
China has the capacity to deter any type of conventional military action.  Regardless, the 
Chinese government seems unlikely to support setting precedent that could overly limit a 
sovereign government’s capacity to use force.  Or they may not.  Perhaps each decision 
and each case is exceptional.   
Likewise it is difficult to assess the all of the motivations behind the US and its 
NATO allies’ normative justifications.  It seems clear that the NATO allies had strategic 
interests at stake in many of the cases, and that the US in particular had increasingly 
come to define its national interests globally.  Although most US leaders shy away from 
embracing the label of “world police,” most seem willing to accept the idea that the US 
acts as the “ultimate guarantor of global security.”  And that the US has “borne this 
burden not because we seek to impose our will,” but according to President Obama, “We 
have done so out of enlightened self-interest.”385  While this claim may not be true, there 
is evidence to suggest that the US has in some cases put values ahead of material 
interests.  In fact, as suggested above, the Libyan case seems illustrative of this because 	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the US had little strategic interest in Libya and President Obama paid some political costs 
for authorizing the use of force there.  However, as the preemptive war launched in Iraq 
without UNSC authorization shows, US behavior is continually evolving and difficult to 
predict. 
Yet it also seems clear that the NATO allies also have an interest in promoting 
and institutionalizing liberal democratic values.  There is an expectation that PKOs will 
not just help maintain order, but also create the conditions where free and fair elections 
can take place.386   Although this may work in their short-term strategic interests, 
fostering liberal democratic values is also a normative prescription that follows from 
previous normative commitments made by the NATO allies.  Unfortunately, this can also 
lead to charges of “neo-colonialism,” which are not always unfounded. 
In sum, although the UNSC is an imperfect moral agent, the institutionalization of 
R2P made it more capable of empathy and altruism.  Further, there is evidence to suggest 
similar changes are also happening at the state-level, which will likely reinforce the 
capacity of the UNSC to enforce R2P.  Moreover, the Council and other UN agencies put 
in place rules, procedures, and allocated resources to help put these principles in practice.  
As these practices become more habitual, or more “taken for granted,” the chances of the 
UNSC ignoring its responsibility to protect will likely lessen.  Now that the circle of 
empathy has expanded, for better or worse, it is more difficult for the Council to 
arbitrarily restrict its circle of protection.   
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Conclusions and Implications: 
 
“No doubt our record has been mixed.  Yet it is a sign of progress that our debates are 
now about how, not whether, to implement the responsibility to protect.  No 
government questions the principle.”387 
- UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
 
In conclusion, a significant change in use of force norms took place within the 
UN Security Council.  The UN Charter explicitly provides the UNSC with a mandate to 
keep peace between states, not within them.  As China’s delegates to the ICISS stated 
above, “Nowhere in the UN Charter can one find a clause that permits using force, except 
for national defense under Article 51 and for restoring international peace, as specified in 
Chapter VII.  Using force for moral or conceptual reasons is questionable and 
dangerous.”388  As discussed above, the Chinese initially opposed adopting R2P doctrine. 
Yet in 2006, China joined the rest of the Security Council to vote unanimously in favor of 
Resolution 1674, which officially adopted the R2P doctrine.  China and the Council’s 
adoption of R2P marked a significant change in international use of force norms.  It 
expanded the UNSC’s security mandate to include “human protection,” defined a state’s 
sovereignty to include a responsibility to protect its citizens, and legitimized military 
intervention in a country if its “national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”389   
Thus, the Council greatly expanded its circle of protection.  This macro-level 	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change was principally due to two factors: an epistemic community pushing the Council 
to become more empathetic and altruistic, and Council members wanting to gain social 
status.  The epistemic community was the external trigger and status seeking was the key 
factor within the Council.  Thus, the R2P doctrine originated outside the UNSC with an 
epistemic community seeking to prevent “another Rwanda,” not from states seeking to 
justify self-interested intervention.  Hence, claims that R2P is “the return of the civilizing 
mission,” or was created as a “Trojan horse” for imperialism misunderstand the history of 
R2P.390  Further, the US invasion of Iraq and the Russian annexation of Crimea show 
Council members’ willingness to authorize the use of force without UNSC approval. 
As shown above, however, the P5 seem to have come to a relative normative 
convergence regarding why to use force.  Yet there is still a degree of divergence over 
how and when it is appropriate to use force.   Essentially, the NATO allies tend to set 
more limits on sovereignty than China and Russia.  Russia and especially China are less 
likely to authorize the use force without the consent of the concerned parties than the 
NATO allies.  We might think of this as a convergence on the principle of protecting 
civilians by force if necessary, but a divergence on the degree of consent necessary for 
such an intervention.  Once China and Russia agree to intervene, however, they also seem 
likely to agree to a broader use of force mandate than the past.  China and Russia 
generally agree to use force not only to protect UN personnel, but also to prevent attacks 
on civilians, without prejudice to the domestic government.   
This degree of normative convergence may enhance the legitimacy of the UNSC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Mazower, 2012, pg. 395. 
   
    
175
by legitimizing its enforcement actions.  Enforcement that is viewed as legitimate by the 
Chinese is critical because of their overall rise in power.  Further, because of its growing 
material capabilities its normative positions increasingly matter.  
The question is: how will China use this growing responsibility?  Evidence 
suggests that China will use their power to shape the international order in their own 
national interest, however, that they will also be shaped by international norms, at least to 
a degree.  China’s increasingly active participation in international organizations adds 
legitimacy to these organizations.  This makes it more difficult, though not impossible, 
for China to simply ignore international norms.  In other words, the more China 
participates in legitimizing international norms the more likely it is to treat them as such.   
Over the years, however, each member of the P5 has actively violated 
international norms that they helped shape.  Yet, we often pay more attention to the 
violations than the compliance.   It also seems clear that all seek recognition as a 
“responsible power.”  This status seeking may not always override material self-interest, 
but it certainly plays a role in shaping international norms that operate in the collective 
interest and help facilitate collective-action. 
China's overall increasing support of UN authorized PKOs seems to have at least 
some of the following motivating factors.  China has strategic interests in constraining 
NATO military expansion, and having more of a say in where PKOs are deployed.  
Further, China wants to be able to do business in a secure or stable environment, and 
mining is difficult in a warzone, for example.  China also has diplomatic interests in 
PKOs.  By increasing their participation, China engages in agenda setting to ensure that 
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their concerns are addressed by the UNSC.   Thus, China helps set international legal 
precedents in its interests.   
As mentioned above, however, social influence best explains China’s acceptance 
of R2P.  Specifically, status seeking appears to be the most important factor.  The 
Chinese government appears to want be recognized as a “responsible power.” Yet all of 
the P5 leaders seem interested in being seen as a consequential actor in international 
politics.  Status seeking is not limited to rising powers such as China.  France and the UK 
may rely more on their “normative power,” as suggested by Hurd and Manners above, 
than the US, and therefore, have an incentive to support human rights causes.  Further, all 
of the P5 have an interest in being perceived as a “responsible stakeholder.” 
Moreover, the important finding is that empathy and social influence are having a 
significant impact on the evolution of use of force norms.  The pace and depth of the 
impact may not be as much as some would hope, but the fact that emotion and 
socialization are having such an effect on international security culture is important.  
Further, the evidence supports the argument that empathy is the necessary catalyst for this 
evolution.  Humanitarian concerns occur in every case, as evidenced by the SG reports 
and UNSC normative justifications, what varies are the strategic interests of the P5.  
Thus, empathy and social influence and are the necessary, but insufficient, variables in 
explaining the evolution of use of force norms.   
Further, the epistemic community that spread the news about the genocide in 
Rwanda, influenced the Brahimi Report, and worked on the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), is part of an ever-expanding global human 
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rights movement.  Although correlation does not necessarily equal causation, the 
expansion of the Council’s circle of protection roughly correlates with the dramatic 
increase in human rights advocates’ ability to promote and provoke empathy due to a 
historic increase in globalization.  As stories of people suffering reaches a wider 
audience, more people seem to join epistemic communities working to alleviate such 
suffering, which leads to more people becoming aware of the plight of others, and so on.   
Thus, increasing interconnectivity leads to an expanding “circle of empathy.”  This 
growing circle also helps to further legitimize and institutionalize human rights norms, 
thereby increasing their social influence.  In other words, empathy and social influence, 
the constants in the evolution in use of force norms function, appear to be growing in 
importance.  The strategic interests of the P5 are critical variables that help explain the 
ups and downs of the evolution, but the overall arc of history, or long-term trend, is better 
explained by the expansion of empathy and human rights norms.  
Moreover, as evidenced above, the growing expectation that the UNSC has a 
“responsibility to protect” people, with or without the consent of the domestic 
government is a historically significant development.  The Council is expected to “do 
something” about domestic conflict, even if it requires violating a state’s sovereignty.  
Further, the intervention in Libya left many questioning: why not in Syria?  The 
expectations for action were based upon empathy for people suffering in Syria and the 
institutionalization of human rights norms posited in international law, not strategic or 
economic self-interest.  The growing call for the Council to authorize the use of force to 
effectively remove a government from power is an important evolution, and is more the 
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result of expanding empathy and social influence than material interest.  Human rights 
norms have a growing influence on international security culture, and thus ordering 
international society.  This supports the argument that emotion and social influence have 
a significant effect on international relations, and specifically in this case on the evolution 
of the Council’s authority to use force.   
My research also leads me to believe that my hypothesis should apply to other 
levels and other issue areas.  As mentioned above, there is evidence of this process at 
work in the abolition of slavery, the regulation of greenhouse gases, and other successful 
social movements.391  The role of the epistemic community is likely key.  Based upon my 
research their influence seems to depend upon two factors: first, having a clear and 
realistic policy change they wish to enact; and second, having a critical mass of public 
support for such change.  The former is easier to define than the latter, because we often 
do not know how much is “critical” until a threshold is passed.  Although I cannot put an 
exact number on the degree of public support necessary, I attempted to show above that 
1999 marks a clear tipping point in the evolution of R2P.  
 The institutionalization of R2P is significant, because by expanding the UNSC’s 
“circle of empathy” to include every person everywhere, and demanding taking risks to 
protect them, the organization’s responsibility to protect is universal – at least in 
principle.  Although the Council will fail in its responsibility to protect, the expectation 
for it to try, even at risk to its own members, is still significant.  As discussed above, 
institutionalizing empathy and altruism have played a critical role in the decline of many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 See: Jackie Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 1998; 
Evangelista, 1999; N. Crawford, 2002; Speth and Haas, 2006. 
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oppressive and violent practices.  Thus, although it may not seem likely at present, the 
adoption of R2P may be a watershed moment in history.   
The broader implications are that external actors pushing international 
organizations to be more empathetic and altruistic can be effective because states are 
concerned with their reputation.  This also implies empathy and social influence matter 
far more to issues of war and peace than many would allow.  The practical implication is 
that epistemic communities pushing international organizations to be more empathetic 
and altruistic can be effective without providing material rewards, because state leaders, 
and people in general, are capable of sympathizing with the suffering of others, and have 
social interests, such as status.  This process is already underway in other international 
organizations, such as the African Union, and at the state level as well.  This is 
principally due to the fact that social influence and emotion affect decision-making at 
every level.  Moreover, the growing interconnectivity of the world will likely make the 
sharing and spreading of emotions and human rights norms easier.  Based upon my 
research, and others discussed above, this may lead to a more peaceful world.  Perhaps 
even one where the Security Council rarely has to debate authorizing the use of force, 
because states uphold their own responsibility to protect.   
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Appendix: 
 
 
Figure 1: China’s Support for the Use of Force (1990-2011) 
 
Y axis = Support Level (0 = No, 1 = Abstain, 2 = Yes, with reservations, 3 = Yes, with no reservations)  
X axis = Votes on Use of Force Resolutions, arranged chronologically  
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Table 1: China's Votes and Normative Positions on Relevant UNSC Use of Force 
Authorizations, 1990-2010 
Date Resolution Location Vote Normative position 
1990/11/29 s/r/678 Iraq Abstain Against the use of force.  
1992/02/28 s/res/745 Cambodia Pro Authorizes use of force only in self-defense of UN 
peacekeepers. 
1992/08/13 s/res/770 Bosnia Abstain Against use of force authorization, but support 
humanitarian aid. 
1992/09/14 s/res/776 Bosnia Abstain Against use of force authorization, but support 
humanitarian aid. 
1992/10/09 s/res/781 Bosnia Abstain Against use of force authorization, but support 
humanitarian aid. 
1992/12/03 s/res/794 Somalia Pro Authorize use of force because of “exceptional 
case.”  Voiced formal concern, however, about role 
of US-led coalition. 
1993/03/26 s/res/814 Somalia Pro See s/res/794 
1993/03/31 s/res/816 Bosnia Abstain Against use of force, but supported humanitarian aid 
1993/06/04 s/res/836 Bosnia Pro Authorizes use of force in self-defense of UN 
peacekeepers and in defense of civilians in “safe 
areas.”  However, voices formal reservations 
regarding consent of parties and use of excessive 
force. 
1993/10/04 s/res/871 Bosnia Pro Authorizes use of force in self-defense of UN 
peacekeepers and in defense of civilians in “safe 
areas.”  However, voices formal reservations 
regarding consent of parties and use of excessive 
force. 
1994/03/31 s/res/908 Bosnia Pro Authorizes use of force in self-defense of UN 
peacekeepers and in defense of civilians in “safe 
areas.”  However, voices formal reservations 
regarding consent of parties and use of excessive 
force. 
1994/06/22 s/res/929 Rwanda Abstain Against the use of force, primarily due to lack of 
“cooperation of the parties to the conflict.”   
1994/07/31 s/res/940 Haiti Abstain Against use of force authorization because action 
“lacks sufficient and convincing grounds.”  Also, 
“The practice of the Council's authorizing certain 
Member States to use force… would obviously 
create a dangerous precedent.”  
1995/03/31 s/res/981 Croatia Pro Authorize the use of force, due to the “consent of the 
parties.”  However, voices formal reservations about 
“taking enforcement action and about the use of 
force in peace-keeping operations under Chapter VII 
of the Charter.” 
1995/06/16 s/res/998 Bosnia Abstain Against use of force authorization, due to a lack of 
consent among involved parties. 
1995/12/15 s/res/1031 Bosnia Pro Authorize the use of force, due to “extraordinary 
circumstances,” but against “the unlimited use of 
force.” 
1996/01/15 s/res/1037 Croatia Pro Authorize the use of force, due to the “consent of the 
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parties.”  However, “peace-keeping operations 
should be limited to self-defense.”  
1996/12/12 s/res/1088 Bosnia Pro Authorizes the use of force.  However, “Continues to 
have reservations… SFOR must maintain strict 
neutrality and fairness and must not misuse force.” 
1997/03/28 s/res/1101 Albania Abstain Against authorizing the use of force, because 
situation “is the internal affair of Albania.” 
1998/03/31 s/res/1160 Kosovo Abstain Against authorizing the use of force, because 
situation was not a threat to “regional and 
international peace and security.” Further, situation 
was “in its essence, an internal matter… It should be 
resolved properly through negotiations between both 
parties concerned on the basis of the principle of 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 
1999/03/26 s/1999/328 Kosovo Pro* Support draft resolution seeking to stop the use of 
force by NATO in Yugoslavia.  This resolution was 
not adopted, primarily due to opposition of NATO 
member-states.   
1999/06/10 s/res/1244 Kosovo Abstain “Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs are basic principles of the 
United Nations Charter… In essence, the "human 
rights over sovereignty" theory serves to infringe 
upon the sovereignty of other States and to promote 
hegemonism under the pretext of human rights.” 
1999/09/15 s/res/1264 East Timor Pro** Support use of force authorization.  “Authorizes the 
establishment of a multinational force under a 
unified command structure, pursuant to the request 
of the Government of Indonesia… to restore peace 
and security in East Timor, to protect and support 
UNAMET in carrying out its tasks… and 
authorizes… the multinational force to take all 
necessary measures to fulfill this mandate.” No 
formal reservations on record. 
1999/10/22 s/res/1270 Sierra 
Leone 
Pro Support use of force authorization, under guidelines 
similar to those stated in s/res/1264.  However, this 
was the first clear articulation of the  mandate “to 
protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.”  
1999/10/25 s/res/1272 East Timor Pro Support use of force authorization, under guidelines 
similar to those stated in s/res/1264.  No formal 
reservations on record. 
2000/01/07 s/res/1289 Sierra 
Leone 
Pro Support use of force authorization, under guidelines 
similar to those stated in s/res/1264, however, clearly 
articulates mandate “to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of violence.”   
2000/02/24 s/res/1291 Congo Pro Support use of force authorization, under guidelines 
similar to those stated in s/res/1264, however, clearly 
articulates mandate “to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of violence.”   
2001/12/20 s/res/1386 Afghanistan Pro Supports the use of force.  Authorizes ISAF “to take 
all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate, which is 
“to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the 
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maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding 
areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as 
the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a 
secure environment.” 
2002/05/27 s/res/1410 East Timor Pro Support use of force authorization, under guidelines 
similar to those stated in s/res/1264.  No formal 
reservations on record. 
2003/02/04 s/res/1464 Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Pro Authorizes the use of force.  In order, to, “take the 
necessary steps to guarantee the security and 
freedom of movement of [UN] personnel and to 
ensure… the protection of civilians immediately 
threatened with physical violence within their zones 
of operation.” 
2003/08/01 s/res/1497 Liberia Pro Authorizes the use of force.  Supports “all necessary 
measures to fulfill its mandate” to protect UN 
personnel and humanitarian workers. 
2003/09/19 s/res/1509 Liberia Pro Authorizes the use of force.  Extends mandate of 
s/res/1497 to protect civilians. 
2004/01/27 s/res/1528 Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Pro Authorizes the use of force.   Mission mandate: to 
protect UN personnel, institutions, and their freedom 
of movement; and to protect civilians, without 
prejudice to the responsibility of domestic 
government. 
2004/02/29 s/res/1529 Haiti Pro Authorizes the use of force.  Mission mandate: to 
protect UN personnel and humanitarian workers. 
2004/04/30 s/res/1542 Haiti Pro Authorizes the use of force.   Extends mandate to 
protect UN personnel, institutions, and their freedom 
of movement; and to protect civilians, without 
prejudice to the responsibility of domestic 
government. 
2004/03/21 s/res/1545 Burundi Pro Authorizes the use of force.   Mission mandate: to 
ensure ceasefire, to protect UN personnel, 
institutions, and their freedom of movement; and to 
protect civilians, without prejudice to the 
responsibility of domestic government. 
2005/03/24 s/res/1590 Sudan Pro Use of force authorized to protect UN personnel, and 
“without prejudice to the responsibility of the 
Government of Sudan, to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence.” 
2006/04/25 s/res/1671 Congo Pro Authorizes the use of force.   Mission mandate: to 
stabilize situation, to protect UN personnel, 
institutions, and their freedom of movement; and to 
protect civilians, without prejudice to the 
responsibility of domestic government. 
2006/08/25 s/res/1704 East Timor Pro Peace Support: Use of force limited to defense of 
UN personnel 
2007/07/31 s/res/1769 Sudan Pro Authorizes the use of force.  Mission mandated “to 
take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment 
of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in 
order to: protect its personnel, facilities, installations 
and equipment… support early and effective 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, 
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prevent the disruption of its implementation and 
armed attacks, and protect civilians, without 
prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of 
Sudan.” 
2007/09/25 s/res/1778 Chad and 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Pro Authorizes the use of force, and “to take necessary 
action, supported by appropriate rules of 
engagement, and be equipped to respond robustly to 
any hostile action and to undertake deterrent and 
protection operations.” 
2010/05/28 s/res/1925 Congo Pro Extends use of force mandate (see s/res/1671), but 
withdraws portion of forces deployed  
2011/03/17 s/res/1973 Libya 
 
 
 
 
Abstain*** Against the use of force.  Argued: “The United 
Nations Charter must be respected and the current 
crisis must be ended through peaceful means.”  
Further, China is “always against the use of force” 
when peaceful means were not yet exhausted.  Also, 
China “had asked specific questions that failed to be 
answered.”  Yet, China did not block the passage of 
the resolution, “because it attached great importance 
to the requests of the Arab League and the African 
Union.” 
* First vote after embassy bombing 
** Beginning of over 11 years of votes in favor of use of force 
*** First time not to vote in favor of use of force since September 1999. 
Sources: http://www.undemocracy.com/; http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/; and Vaughn Lowe, Adam 
Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, Editors (2008), The United Nations Security 
Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford Press; and Stefan 
Stähle, (2008), “China’s Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 
The China Quarterly, pg. 631-655. 
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